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Abstract
This thesis consists of three independent studies in the field of behavioural and
economic science. The aim is to provide a better understanding of individual
decision making using large field datasets and the techniques from econometrics.
Chapter 1 introduces the relevant literature. Chapter 2 investigates deviant
behaviour among police officers. It addresses two questions: What is the effect
of corrupting colleagues on officers’ misconduct? Can misconduct be deterred
by sanctions? By analysing data from 50,000 officers, we show that officers
learn to reduce their own risk of misconduct but that misconduct amongst
their peers increases their own risk of misconduct.
Chapter 3 analyses how mental accounting influences intertemporal choices
in credit card repayment. We test the major prediction of Prelec and Loewen-
stein’s (1998) theory of mental accounting: that consumers will pay off expen-
diture on transient forms of consumption more quickly than expenditure on
durables. Using data from 1.8 million credit card accounts, we provide the first
field evidence in support for this prediction.
Chapter 4 discusses how investors pay selective attention to their portfolios.
We use a rich dataset containing investors’ daily login and trading activity.
First, we study whether investors deliberately reduce their attention to negative
news (demand side for attention). Second, we evaluate how changes in the
opportunity cost of attention affect investors’ login activity (supply side for
attention). We use weather shocks as an exogenous source of changes in the
opportunity cost of attention. Our results show that when investors anticipate
that their portfolio has dropped in value, they regulate the hedonic pain of
negative news by logging in less often. Also, on sunny days, they substitute
viewing their portfolio for other less costly leisure activities.
We conclude with some comments and future directions for the endeavour
of addressing questions in psychological science with big datasets combined
with the techniques from econometrics.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Classical economic theory assumes that economic agents are rational. However,
increasing experimental evidence shows that individuals deviate from the
assumptions of standard economic models (Fehr et al., 2002; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, 1984; Thaler, 1985, 1990, 1999). Much of this evidence comes
from psychologists and experimental economists who have gained expertise in
the development of well-controlled laboratory experiments that were designed to
reveal the fundamental mechanisms underlying human behaviour and cognition,
prompting us to rethink normative economic theory. However, the recent and
growing availability of large sets of behavioural data, such as transaction data,
mobile data, social media data and so on, represents a promising new direction
for the discovery of regular deviations from normative theory.
I believe that this diverse range of data sets provides unprecedented oppor-
tunities to test whether violations of rationality extend to the field. Thus, in
this thesis, I move beyond studying decision making in the lab and attempt
to reveal field evidence of behavioural anomalies. My approach continues
the line of work that uses case studies to uncover principles of judgment and
decision-making. To mention some examples of research in the field, there is
the work of Lacetera et al. (2012), who explore whether the tendency to focus
on the left-most digit of a number (left-digit bias) influences purchase decisions.
After analysing over 22 million used-vehicle transactions, they provide evidence
of discontinuous drops in vehicle sales prices at 10,000-mile and 1,000-mile
thresholds in odometer mileage. Hastings and Shapiro (2013) show, on the other
hand, that households do not treat ‘gas-money’ as fungible. When gasoline
prices rise, many customers substitute higher grade gasoline to lower grade
gasoline to a degree that cannot be explained by income effects. There is also
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the work of Bhargava et al. (2017), who examine the health plan choices of
about 23,000 employees at a U.S. firm and find that the majority of employees
choose dominated plans, a pattern that cannot be accounted by standard risk
preference or any expectations about health risk. Instead, the popularity of
dominated plans is driven by the failure of consumers to accurately evaluate
and compare plans. For an extensive review of cases that document aspects
of behaviour that deviate from the predictions of the standard theory, see
DellaVigna (2009).
In this thesis, I present three independent essays that document (i) evidence
of negative peer effects in police misconduct, (ii) evidence of systematic viola-
tions of fungibility in consumer credit card repayment choices, and (iii) evidence
of active information avoidance among investors. I use large panel data sets and
the appropriate econometric techniques to control for variables that may mask
the underlying relationships of interest. Much of my discussion will focus on
reporting stylized facts in order to make the empirical analysis of our data more
pertinent given that laboratory experiments have already provided insights into
some possible causal relationships.
The rest of this chapter takes the following format. First, I present a
brief overview of the literature pertinent to each essay. This overview aims
to introduce the relevant literature to the chapters that follow and does not
constitute a comprehensive revision of the work in the field. More detailed
literature reviews are, however, given at the start of each chapter. The outline
of the thesis is presented at the end of this chapter.
1.1 Police Ethics and Deviance
Chapter 2 is structured around the following issues: first, how police misconduct
spread? Second, how responsive are police officers to the threat of discipline
for their inappropriate behaviour? And third, what are the challenges and
limitations in studying police misconduct in the field?
There is substantial interest in the study of why people engage in unethical
behaviour. In fact, during the last three decades, a growing body of literature
has started to recognize key individual-level and contextual-level drivers of
unethical decisions, such as the individuals’ cognitive moral development, peers
and leadership influences, codes of conduct, and the ethical climate (for a
review, see Treviño et al., 2014). Among these drivers, and in the study of
1.1 Police Ethics and Deviance 3
misconduct in organizations, we are particularly interested in how misconduct
spreads: Do bad apples spoil the bunch?
Conceptually, people making decisions inside organizations are subject
to authority rules and regulations, social norms, cultural expectations, and
potentially large peer-group pressures. Kohlberg’s research on moral reasoning
(1969) has shown that unlike childhood (when children were more concerned
about the physical consequences of their actions, i.e., punishments and rewards,
and when elements of reciprocity and fairness started to be incorporated
pragmatically), moral reasoning in adolescence and adulthood is typically
determined by beliefs about what others will think is right or wrong. In this
level of moral thinking (termed as ‘conventional’ by the author), the individuals
try to conform to the natural or accepted behaviour.
A great deal of previous research has, in effect, provided compelling evi-
dence for the existence of peer effects under different labels (herd behaviour,
conformity, social interactions, spillover effects, contagion, and so on), and
making use of models that incorporate rational and/or irrational motives, such
as social learning, strategic interactions and behavioural biases. In the financial
literature, for instance, herding behaviour by investors can be thought as an
irrational reaction driven by emotion, greed and fear, that pushes individual
investors to join the crowd of others. Or it can be thought as a rational response
induced by imperfect information, concerns for reputation and compensation
structures (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000).
Although peer influences have been subject to analysis in various domains
via both lab and field studies (Herbst and Mas, 2015, provide a recent meta-
analysis of peer effects in co-worker productivity comparing peer effects from
laboratory experiments and peer effects from naturally occurring environments
and show that laboratory studies generalize in the real world), surprisingly,
much uncertainty still exists on the influence of peers on unethical behaviour
in the field. In particular, much more empirical work is needed for the un-
derstanding of peer effects in police ethics and integrity. Observe that unlike
other organizations, the police are empowered to enforce the law and protect
individual liberties, and so the integrity in policing is essential for establishing
and maintaining legitimacy, as is the integrity of other agents involved in the
criminal justice system (Rosenbaum, 2016).
Because evidence on peer effects in police misconduct remains speculative
and largely restricted to cross-sectional studies, in the first part of this thesis,
we attempt to provide, to our knowledge, the first clear evidence of peer effects.
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Specifically, we are the first to establish causality in peer effects in police
misconduct, rather than mere correlation. We aim to quantify the extent to
which a bad cop would spread misconduct. With this objective in mind, in
Chapter 2 we analyse misconduct records maintained by the UK Metropolitan
Police Service for nearly fifty thousand police offices. The longitudinal data
available to us covers five years of allegations of misconduct, from 2010 to 2015,
and allows us to recognize teams of individuals by linking officers assigned to
the same line manager. Therefore, it provides us with a rare opportunity to
investigate peer effects when officers are assigned to different teams.
What follows is a brief discussion on the organisational processes and struc-
tures that shape the ethical climate in any given police force. A recent review by
Hough et al. (2018) identifies five organizational factors that shape individuals’
ethical decision-making in police organizations: the formal codes of conduct,
the selection and training procedures, the systems for performance management,
the organisation’s values and culture, and the style of leadership. The influence
of these factors is suggested to be mediated by situational variables, such as
the individual differences between decision-makers, the presence or absence of
ethical challenges, and the presence or absence of corrupting colleagues. While
existing research has already provided important insights into the effects of
police departments’ characteristics and some individual demographic charac-
teristics on the likelihood of misconduct events, the problem of corrupting
colleagues has received scant attention in the research literature. It is, therefore,
the first issue we examine in Chapter 2.
We should note, however, that our analysis of peer effects in police ethical
behaviour does not intend to engage in the debate of what specific mechanisms
are driving these effects, nor our data allow us to distinguish, for instance,
between social influences motivated by learning via gathering information about
what behaviour is best to follow given the individuals’ own needs, or motivated
by pure peer pressure and social conformity. In fact, most research in the peer
effects literature have focused on measuring the magnitude of peer effects only
and have focused less upon the mechanisms that may be producing the peer
effects due to the difficulty to discriminate between such mechanisms.
While a discussion of the mechanisms behind police peer effects is beyond
the scope of our research, it is worth commenting on the most recent findings
in the literature provided by Hough et al. (2018). The authors examined cases
of alleged misconduct involving chief police officers in England and Wales over
a six-year period, up to 2013, and interviewed stakeholders, police officers
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and other personnel who had investigated chief officers misconduct. Their
interviews suggest that, throughout their careers, police officers felt under
pressure to not step outside the norm. The ethical climate, promoted by a
typical command-and-control style of management, is alleged to lack ethical
values or, even worse, to sustain the wrong kinds of values. The command-and-
control style of management appears to encourage close mutually supportive
and inward-looking networks that favour homogeneity, preclude difference and
even accept or tolerate bullying behaviour.
As stated, instead of examining the nature of peer effects and exploring
some of the above highlighted mechanisms, the added value of our research
is to properly quantify these effects (if any indeed exist). Establishing causal
peer effects is empirically challenging because peers influence each other si-
multaneously and because there are common unobservable factors that affect
simultaneously the members of the same peer group and, thus, mask real peer
effects Manski (1993). In Chapter 2, by using instrumental variable techniques,
we address these issues and report statistically significant and nontrivial peer
effects. Specifically, we exploit the variation in peer quality that results when
officers change line managers and switch peer groups. Misconduct of the new
peers acquired following the change is instrumented with prior events of mis-
conduct of their new peers’ peers, a strategy that enable us to estimate the
causal effect between peers.
After examining the effect of corrupting colleagues in police misconduct,
the second questions we address in Chapter 2 is whether misconduct can be
deterred by sanctions. Although it is intuitive that punishment influences
ethical behaviour in organizations and in fact existing research on deterrence
recognizes that both the perceived risk of being sanctioned and the sanctions’
severity lowers the recurrence of illegal activity (Nagin, 1998), the evidence
of the deterrent effect of the sanction threats for police misconduct is largely
speculative and sometimes counterintuitive. For instance, Pogarsky and Piquero
(2004) conducted a survey about police misconduct to 210 police officers
from a southwestern United States police department and found that the
perceived sanction severity offered little deterrent threat. Only perceived
sanction certainty and perceived sanction celerity were negatively associated
with police misconduct. Notably, extra-legal or informal sanctions, such as
social disapproval or embarrassment, appeared to be a strong deterrent against
misconduct. More counterintuitively, Harris and Worden (2014) examined
personnel complaints against 1,356 patrol officers from a police department
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in the northeaster United States and identified that officers who received
more severe sanctions were more likely to receive an additional sustained
complaint when compared with no sanctioned officers. The authors provide
three hypotheses to explain such counterintuitive results: punishment could be
an indicator of the most active offenders that are less likely to be deterred; those
punished mistakenly believe that the punishment experience prevents them
from future apprehension on the next offenses (since sanctions are relatively
rare, they reset their sanction certainty, as in the gambler’s fallacy); or those
punished might perceive the sanctions as unfair, which ultimately prompt
them to defy and thus increase offending. Although the authors could not
discriminate among these alternative hypotheses, they argue that the most
plausible explanation is the perceived injustice of the disciplinary system that
may encourage officer deviance.
Since these findings are controversial and since police disciplinary systems
are grounded on the notion of deterrence, in the second part of Chapter 2, we
investigate the effects of the severity of the sanctions received after alleged cases
of misconduct. Unlike previous research that analysed the effect of sanctions on
the likelihood and timing of complaints filed against officers ignoring individual
heterogeneity, we test the deterrent effect of the sanction threats via a dynamic
model that explicitly accounts for individual (time invariant) differences. Note
that a major drawback of the related literature is the failure to account for
individual differences. Yet, it is known that because of some latent and enduring
personal characteristics, individuals’ probabilities to engage in misconduct differ,
which is evident by the fact that a large number of cases of misconduct are
accounted by a small group of officers. The propensity to commit crime is,
for example, related to lack of self-control, risk taking behaviour, impulsivity
and low conscientiousness (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991, 2000). When this
latent characteristics correlate with certain sanction types, estimates of the
sanctions’ deterrent effects are confounded. We show that standard models
that ignore individual heterogeneity are intrinsically flawed. Evidence from our
larger dataset suggests that only severe formal sanctions have some deterrent
effect. Other disciplinary actions, such as management actions, or no actions
at all, do not appear to diminish misconduct events.
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1.2 Mental Accounting Theory
We now move on to discuss how individuals make economic decisions, such
as what to buy, how (and when) to pay for it, or how much to save. In
this section, I address how decisions are made under the mental accounting
theory proposed by Thaler (1985, 1990, 1999) and, fundamentally, how mental
accounting affects intertemporal choices, following the double-entry mental
accounting model proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998).
Research on mental accounting theory (see Thaler, 1999, for a review)
describes the way decision makers organize, evaluate, and keep track of their
expenditure; that is, it describes the cognitive processes used to perform mental
accounting operations in order to keep spending under control. In the decision
theory literature, mental accounting concepts have long been used to explain
human behaviour that often appears irrational (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984;
Shefrin and Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1980).
A key normative principle of rational choice in microeconomic theory is
fungibility. Fungibility implies that money has no labels and so people treat
their resources, wealth and any asset as fungible or interchangeable. Mental
accounting challenges this assumption because money in one mental account is
not a perfect substitute for money in another account. Accounting decisions,
such as which account to assign the transactions to or how frequent to balance
the accounts, are not neutral. They affect the attractiveness of alternative
actions and therefore they affect consumers’ choice.
What follows in the next paragraphs is a discussion on two components
of mental accounting theory: how outcomes from individual transactions are
perceived and evaluated, and how activities are assigned to certain mental
accounts. This discussion is largely based on the review presented by Thaler
(1990), who illustrates how mental accounting rules influence individual choice,
reporting research conducted over two decades on decision making and framing
susceptibility.
1.2.1 How Are the Outcomes of Financial Transactions
Evaluated?
Under classical economic theory, people make financial decisions, such as what
to buy, when to buy, how to pay for it, or how much to save, taking into account
their current wealth, their future earnings, the opportunity costs and, in general,
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all relevant financial information available to them. Kahneman and Tversky
(1984) refer to this wealth-based decision-making analysis as comprehensive.
We should expect that if decision makers follow this comprehensive reasoning,
the context of the choice should be neutral (i.e., framing should not alter
choices). But, empirically, decisions may be heavily context-dependent. In the
real world, because people make decisions piecemeal rather than all at once,
framing does influence peoples’ judgments and choices.
The following example is a typical illustration of the framing effect. As part
of a series of experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) asked participants to
imagine that they had decided to see a play and had already paid $10 for the
ticket. However, the day of the performance when they entered the theatre,
they discovered that they have lost the ticket. Would they be willing to pay
other $10 for another ticket? Most people (54%) refused paying for a new ticket.
Nevertheless, when a slightly different version of the problem was presented,
these results reverted. This time, participants were only told that have decided
to see a play but during the day of the performance, when they entered the
theatre, they realized that they have lost a $10 bill. Would they still be willing
to pay $10 for the play? Now, more than 80% of the participants were willing
to buy a new ticket. The puzzle is why losing the ticket in the first scenario
was coupled to the choice of buying a new ticket whereas losing the $10 bill
in the second scenario was not. The authors explain this puzzle arguing that
mental accounts are topical rather than comprehensive. When the outcomes of
any potential choice are framed in terms of topical accounts, they are evaluated
in relation to a reference level that is determined by the context within which
the decision takes place. In this example, buying a new ticket is a transaction
posted to an account that links the cost of the ticket with the experience of
seeing the play. Buying a second ticket increases the cost attached to this
account. The loss of cash, however, has no influence on the purchase of the
new ticket because it is posted to a different account.
Let us now consider in more detail how people combine multiple outcomes
within a single account. Thaler’s model of mental accounting incorporates the
following elements. Outcomes are perceived and coded in terms of the value
function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. This
value function is described over gains and losses relative to some reference
point. It shows diminishing sensitivity for both gains and losses; and it reflects
loss aversion. Given this value function, outcomes are evaluated according to
certain rules of hedonic framing: segregate gains, integrate losses, integrate
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smaller losses with larger gains, and segregate small gains from larger losses.
Intuitively, these rules are assumed to reflect how decision makers would like
the world to be organized, that is, how outcomes or events should be edited
to make decision makers feel as happy as possible with their decisions. They
would prefer, for instance, many small gains to a single large gain because of the
diminishing sensitivity of the value function. They would prefer to avoid losses
whenever possible but, otherwise, they would combine them, again because of
the diminishing sensitivity in the value function.
Under this framework, how the purchase of a product should be coded to be
hedonically efficient? Because of loss aversion, Thaler (1985, 1999) discards the
possibility that the payment of the product could be framed as a loss. Rather,
he suggests that the purchase of the product produces two kinds of utilities: an
acquisition utility and a transaction utility. The value of the product relative
to its price is reflected by the acquisition utility; whereas, the value of the deal
(i.e., the difference between the price expected by the customer and the actual
price paid) is measured by the transaction utility. To illustrate the effect of
incorporating a transaction utility in the coding of the purchase, consider the
following experiment. Thaler (1985) asked participants (regular beer drinkers)
to imagine that they are lying on the beach and for the last hour they have
been thinking about how much they would enjoy a cold bottle of beer. A friend,
then, offers them to bring back a beer from the closest place (a fancy resort
hotel or, alternatively, a small grocery store) and asks how much they would
be willing to pay for the beer. The friend, however, indicates that if the beer
costs more than the price suggested, he would not buy the beer. What price
would the participants be willing to offer? The median responses when the
closest place to buy the beer was the resort was $2.65; though, when the place
was the small store, it was $1.50. If the consumption experience is the same in
either case (i.e., the beer is the same and the atmosphere is the same), why
would participants be willing to pay more for the beer from the resort? Given
that the acquisition utilities are the same in both scenarios, the discrepancy is
due to the difference in transaction utilities. The resort is expected to evoke a
higher reference price than the small store and therefore its transaction utility,
or the value of its deal, is higher.
Another aspect of mental accounting is related to the decision to close an
account. Decision makers are assumed to be reluctant to close an account in red
and realize the loss (disposition effect). Because closing an account at a loss is
painful, Thaler (1990) predicts that investors will be unwilling to sell securities
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that have decrease in value. Odean (1998), in effect, provides strong empirical
support for this prediction after analysing records for 10,000 accounts at a large
discount brokerage house. He found that investors show strong preference for
realizing their gains than their losses, a behaviour that is suboptimal as it leads
to lower after-tax returns, and that appears to be unjustified by the desire to
avoid the higher trading costs of low prices stocks, or by the wish to rebalance
portfolios.
1.2.2 How Activities Are Assigned to Mental Accounts?
So far, I have described how mental account works in the context of individual
transactions. But, mental accounts can be defined more broadly in terms
of spending categories in which budgets constrain spending. This budgeting
process serves as a spending self-control device and, importantly, simplifies the
representation of the decision-making process whenever there are competing
uses for the available funds.
Thaler (1999) draws attention to the importance of labelling. Consumers
routinely label mental accounts at different levels. Expenditures, such as hous-
ing, education, food, etc., are, for instance, organized into budgets. Different
wealth accounts are also established based on how tempting is for the consumer
to spend the money assigned to the account. For instance, a current income
account would contain the cash on hand (which is spend regularly), a long-term
savings account would contain stocks, mutual funds and other assets. Accounts
are also labelled based on the source of income, such as accounts for regular
income or accounts for windfall income. The fact that accounts under any of
these levels are not perfectly fungible can give rise to wide set of apparent
irrational behaviour.
To mention some examples of mental accounting effects for windfalls, in
a series of experiments conducted by Arkes et al. (1994), participants were
divided in two groups: the first group were told that they would receive $5
to participate in the study, whereas the other group was surprised to receive
$5 when they arrived at the experiment. Later, both groups were sent to a
basketball game. Participants in the unexpected money group spent more
money on the game than the other group’s participants. In a field study,
Milkman and Beshears (2009) show that customers of an online grocery store
who were given a $10-off discount coupon spend more on groceries that they
do not typically buy.
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1.2.3 How Mental Accounting Affects Intertemporal Choices?
Let us now turn to how mental accounting might influence intertemporal
choices. We are particularly interested on how mental accounting rules impact
consumers’ payment decisions. Experimental research has shown that decision
makers display different financing preferences depending on the characteristics
of the good acquired. In a seminal paper, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998)
propose a double-entry mental accounting model that helps to elucidate several,
apparently irrational, consumer choices for the timing of payments. Their
model suggests that there are reciprocal interactions between the pleasure of
consumption and the pain of paying. On each episode of consumption, the
consumer’s mental accounting registers two sets of entries: one set records
the net utility resulting from consumption after subtracting the disutility
derived from the expected payments; the other set registers the net disutility
of payments after subtracting the utility of the expected consumption. It is
the anticipated sequence of these set of entries, the net consumption utility
and the net payment utility, the criteria that guide consumer’s purchase and
payment decisions.
The key element of the model is the assumption of prospective accounting:
consumer’s mental accounting is forward looking. When people decide whether
to purchase a product or not (and, implicitly, how and when to pay for the
product), they only consider the hedonic effects of the current and future
episodes of consumption and the current and future episodes of payments. In
other words, making payments toward future consumption is more pleasant
than paying for goods already consumed; also, consumption that has been paid
beforehand can be enjoyed as if it were free. A straightforward consequence of
this assumption is that the pleasure derived from the consumption of a product
depends on when the product is paid for. Likewise, the pain of paying for the
product depends essentially on when the product is consumed.
Given that episodes of consumption and payment call mental accounts to
mind and induce either pleasure or pain depending on whether the accounts
are in the red or in the black (i.e., with net loss or with net gain) and given the
desire to keep accounts in the black, the model predicts that people would have
a strong preference for accelerating payments of goods whose utility declines
quickly over time (non-durable goods).
In fact, Prelec and Loewenstein’s experimental evidence often reveals that
people expose some form of debt aversion and dislike the possibility of consuming
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an item before paying for it. The following example illustrates this point clearly.
Two scenarios were described to 91 visitors to the Phipps Conservatory in
Pittsburgh. In the first scenario, the visitors were asked to imagine they were
planning a one-week vacation to the Caribbean, six months from now, that will
cost $1,200. They could finance the vacation by either a six-monthly payment
of $200 before the beginning of the vacation or a six-monthly payment of $200
after returning. In the second scenario, the visitors were asked to imagine that
they were planning to purchase a clothes washer and dryer that will cost $1,200
and that they could finance it by either six monthly payments of $200 before
the machine arrives or by six monthly payments beginning after it arrives.
More than 60% of visitors preferred the earlier payments in the first scenario.
However, 84% of them chose to postpone the payments in the second scenario.
A series of similar experiments, both between and within subjects, confirmed
that this reversal of preference between financing options is robust.
Why do people’s payment preferences change? We will return to this
example in more detail in Chapter 3 but for now consider that when the
payment schedule for the vacation is shifted into the future, there is a large
hedonic fall at the very end of the vacation since there are only payments to
look forward to. On the contrary, there is little psychological cost to delaying
the payments for the dryer, as the dryer delivers sufficient residual utility over
its lifetime to offset the remaining payments.
Although we believe Prelec and Loewenstein’s body of evidence is valuable,
no field evidence has yet been reported to test the mental accounting prediction
described above, until now. This is the main motivation of Chapter 3. In
Chapter 3, using transaction data from a sample of 1.8 million credit card
accounts, we provide, to our knowledge, the first field test of this prediction.
Specifically, we test whether consumers will pay off expenditure on transient
forms of consumption more quickly than expenditure on durables
Note that the use of credit card data introduces some challenges. The fact
that credit card payments are often later than purchase events decouples in
some way the purchase from the payment. The longer the temporal distant
between the credit card payment and the purchase episodes, and the larger
the variety of products acquired, the consumer could likely experience more
difficulties to attribute the credit card balance to the different purchases (i.e.,
the assignment of debt to mental accounts becomes less clear to the individual).
Along Chapter 3, we address this problem by using different samples of the
data in which the relationship between spending and repayment vary. Our first
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sample includes only the first month of data for new credit card accounts and
includes only months in which all the spending is in either durable purchases
or non-durable purchases. This sample exhibits no prior history of spending or
repayment behaviour and so consumers are expected to have less difficulties
to recognize the spending type. This is, therefore, the cleanest sample for our
analysis. Our second sample also restricts data to only the first month for new
credit card accounts, but now includes months in which the account incurs in
durable and non-durable spends. In subsequent samples, we include all months,
not just the first month. In a large array of analysis and in all the samples
tested, we found that repayment of debt incurred for non-durable goods is more
likely than repayment of debt incurred for durable goods, in consistency with
Prelec and Loewenstein’s prediction.
To summarize, in Chapter 3 we provide the first field evidence that shows
that debt incurred on consumables is more likely to be paid off rapidly than
debt incurred on durables, evidence that we think underpins the pivotal role of
mental accounting in intertemporal choices.
1.3 Information Avoidance Among Investors
The following section focusses on the economic analysis of information. Par-
ticularly, we want to understand how preference for information are delimited
by hedonic concerns. Under standard economic theory, information is valuable
because it enhances decision making, i.e., because it leads (potentially) to
better decisions. Information is seen as a mean to reach certain end. However,
abundant situations exist in which information that could improve decision
making is avoided. A recent study by Golman et al. (2017) provides in-depth
analysis on the core reasons of why people might avoid information, even when
they are aware that costless information exists or even when it is costly to
avoid obtaining information.
Golman et al. (2017) classify information avoidance in two categories. The
first category highlights events that are driven by strategic considerations (and
so remain consistent with standard economic theory). For instance, consider
the case when a speaker decides not to view a video of himself delivering a
previous talk in order to prevent a loss of confidence in his next talk. The second
category emphasises information avoidance motivated by hedonic considerations,
i.e., when the individual expects that news would induce bad feelings. We
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are interested in hedonically driven information avoidance since it can hardly
be accommodated by the standard economic framework. In this category, a
number of psychological mechanisms could induce information avoidance. To
mention some of these, information could be avoided because of disappointment
aversion, anxiety, regret aversion, optimism maintenance, attention effects, or
dissonance avoidance.
For concreteness, here we examine information avoidance induced by atten-
tion effects, which occur when new information provokes a temporal boost in
the attention devoted to beliefs about some reality and, consequently, amplify
the effects of those beliefs on the individual’s utility. We focus our discussion on
Golman and Loewenstein’s (2015, 2018) theoretical framework of preferences
regarding information. Golman and Loewenstein provide a cohesive theory
that can explain both, the avoidance of potential useful information and the
acquisition of non-instrumental information, contrary to alternative psychologi-
cal mechanisms (as those mentioned above) that can only account for some
particular patterns of behaviour.
The authors document substantial evidence from laboratory and field re-
search that suggests that people derive utility from their beliefs about informa-
tion gaps (i.e., unknowns that they are aware of) and not only from material
payoffs as assumed by the standard economic theory. When a person is aware
of a question and is uncertain about the answer, an information gap opens. The
person forms beliefs or judgements about the answer to the question. These
beliefs attract attention while the person continues to reflect upon the question
and, hence, induce feelings that enter into the person’s utility. To understand
the situations in which people might avoid information, the authors propose a
model of information acquisition and avoidance in which the individuals’ utility
function is defined over beliefs and the attention paid to them, and not only
over objective outcomes.
Briefly, in Golman and Loewenstein (2015) model, a person’s state of
awareness is represented with a set of activated questions. A cognitive state is
defined by the set of probabilities over the possible answers to these questions
(and the prizes that could potentially be received). Attention weights define
how much the person is reflecting about each activated question. Thus, these
attention weights show how much the beliefs about each question impact the
person’s utility. To accommodate the cases in which individuals might seek
answers to questions for their own sake, even when these answers have no
use, the model assume that (holding attention fixed) there is a gain in utility
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from updating beliefs. Note that in their framework the utility function is
defined over cognitive states. So a choice to acquire information is, essentially,
a choice to accept a lottery over cognitive states (since, ex ante, the incoming
information is unknown).
Based on an expected utility representation over cognitive states, the utility
of acquiring information can be thought as the difference between the expected
utility after receiving the information and the utility before receiving it. New
information acquired could have the following consequences: it may change
the value of future actions (and thus, inform future decisions), it may update
the probabilities related to the answers to the activated questions (that is, it
may increase knowledge about the correct answers), and it may change the
attention weights, amplifying the value of the new set of beliefs and, therefore,
intensifying their effect over the individual’s utility.
These consequences shed light on three distinct motives for the demand for
information. First, as in the standard economic framework, new information
allows the individual to make better subsequent decisions, it has an instru-
mental value. Second, individuals are assumed to have a natural disposition
to fill information gaps—i.e., to have innate curiosity. However, their degree
of curiosity fluctuates. It is stronger about questions that are either more
important or more salient. It is also stronger when the incoming information
has the potential to fill multiple information gaps at once. Third, any new
information is surprising and, thus, increases attention weights. The surprise
reflects how much existing beliefs have changed. It is greatest if the individual
has learned the most unexpected answer. With greater attention, there is a
magnifying effect of the new information (new beliefs) on the individual’s utility.
However, the feeling of surprise is only temporal since the individual adapts to
the new state of beliefs. It is because of this potential, although only temporal,
hedonic effect of new information, that the individual might seek answers to
questions he likes thinking about, questions in which answers might likely have
positive valances.
The availability of information induces, therefore, two conflicting reactions.
While innate curiosity can only encourage the acquisition of new information,
the individual might refuse this new information in order to avoid increase his
attention over negative beliefs. Thus, a straightforward prediction of Golman
and Loewenstein (2015) framework is a desire for information regarding neutral
or positive beliefs and a desire against information regarding negative beliefs
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if the bad feelings induced by these beliefs outweigh the pleasing effects of
satiating curiosity.
There have been several investigations showing evidence consistent with
Golman and Loewenstein’s framework. For instance, Falk and Zimmermann
(2016) conducted a laboratory experiment in which a lottery determined whether
participants would receive a series of electric shocks. Participants could choose
how they wanted to receive the information about the lottery outcome, either
sooner or later. Before deciding, participants replied a brief multiple-choice quiz
task. In one condition, after familiarizing with the task and before choosing
how to be informed, participants were told that they would continue responding
the task and that they would even be paid for their performance. In the control
condition, no distracting activity was offered to participants and so they had
to sit in front of the computer displaying the shocking device. Consistent with
Golman and Loewenstein’s model, when the prospect of receiving electric shocks
was salient (because of the absence of a distracting activity), participants were
about 30 percentage points more likely to request the information sooner.
In the financial literature, some prominent examples are the studies con-
ducted by Karlsson et al. (2009). The authors provide evidence for ostrich-like
behaviour in a finance context: an investors’ inclination to avoid exposing
themselves—sticking their heads in the sand—to information that might cause
them psychological discomfort. Specifically, using two two-year period datasets
from the Swedish Premium Pension Authority and the Vanguard Group in the
US, that recorded investors logins to their personal portfolio accounts, they
found that investors account monitoring choices were asymmetric: when the
aggregate stock market was up, investors monitored their portfolio more actively
than when it was down. However, later evidence provided by Gherzi et al.
(2014) that covered the portfolio monitoring activity of a small sample of 617
clients from Barclays Wealth & Investment Management, over a 6-year period,
showed that individual investors act more like hyper-vigilant meerkats than like
head-in-the-sand ostriches. That is, investors increase their attention allocation
not just after positive market returns but also after negative market returns,
a pattern that apparently persist for daily non-trade logins and for weekend
logins (when markets are closed) and that is moderated by the investors’ degree
of neuroticism.
Nevertheless, in a more recent study, Sicherman et al. (2015) investigated
investors’ patterns in aggregate attention and trading using a larger data of
daily investor login activity than that use by Gherzi et al. (2014). Their panel
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data covered 1,168,309 investors with defined-contribution retirement accounts
for the period 2007–2008. They identified ostrich-like login activity operating
at daily, weekly, and monthly return horizons. They also identified that the
ostrich effect is lager for males, wealthier investors, and investors who hold
more equities than bonds. Their results also suggest that ostricity is a stable
personality trait over time.
The above evidence serves as the starting point of the central ideas of
Chapter 4. Although all these research efforts have provided us with valuable
evidence, due to the scarcity of individual portfolio data, all of them were
limited to the analysis of investors’ attention at the aggregate level. As such,
these studies have been mostly confined to explore only correlations between
login activity and some proxies of the investor expectations about their portfolio
returns, such as the VIX index, the Dow index and the FTSE100 index. Yet,
when individual investors hold a few number of stocks only, as non-professional
traders usually do, these indices (which cover typically hundreds of stocks)
might hardly provide accurate information about their anticipated portfolio
return movements. Furthermore, these studies are either short-term studies or
small-sample-size studies, and so they do not capture the full story and cannot
be used to generalize conclusions.
In Chapter 4, we are interested in how investors attribute selective attention
to their portfolios. First, we examine the demand side for attention and explore
whether investors’ beliefs about their future portfolio returns have hedonic
utility consequences. More precisely, we inspect whether investors regulate the
impact of these beliefs on their utility by deliberately reducing their attention
to negative beliefs (i.e., by avoiding bad news), as Golman and Loewenstein
(2015) predict. Second, we examine the supply side for attention and evaluate
how changes in the opportunity cost of attention affect investors’ login activity.
We look at exogenous shocks induced by weather changes that impact on the
opportunity cost of attention.
We assembled and exploited a rich panel dataset containing anonymous
account level records provided by Barclays Stockbroking. The data are sourced
from Barclays’ online execution-only brokerage platform and it covers the login
and trading activity of a total of 155,309 accounts for a four-year period starting
form 2012. The data contains information on investor characteristics, account
logins by day and very detailed records of account activity and positions. All
account activity is recorded in the data, including buy and sell trades, stock-
splits and account management fees and charges. Given the richness of this
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account activity data, we were able to reconstruct individual account portfolios
on any day of the data period, which allowed us to measure, among other
things, how frequently clients log in to the online platform, how is their login
activity around buy days, how their portfolio returns fluctuates in days with
high login activity, and whether they are consistently attentive throughout the
sample period.
Our findings in Chapter 4 are consistent with the notion that investors’
account monitoring decisions have hedonic value. Attention appears to amplify
the hedonic impact of information and, as such, investors make attention
decisions in order to regulate their exposure to positive and negative information.
Our findings also suggest that attention is susceptible to its opportunity cost.
For instance, when the weather is good, and the opportunity cost is high
(because investors could be enjoying the sun instead) investors choose to log in
less often.
1.4 Plan of Thesis
Chapter 2 presents two field studies on police ethics. The first study evaluates
peer effects in police ethical behaviour. It intends to answer the question of
whether bad cops spread misconduct. We examine five years of allegations
of misconduct recorded by the UK Metropolitan Police Service for nearly
fifty thousand police offices. By using instrumental variable techniques and
exploiting the variation in peer quality that results when officers change line
managers and switch peer groups, we offer the first clear evidence of nontrivial
peer effects in this domain. After examining the effect of corrupting colleagues
in police misconduct, the second study investigates how responsive are police
officers to the threat of discipline for their inappropriate behaviour. Our
evidence suggests that only severe formal sanctions have some deterrent effect.
Chapter 3 is devoted to test a major prediction of Prelec and Loewenstein’s
(1998) double-entry mental accounting model. Specifically, we test whether
consumers will pay off expenditure on transient forms of consumption more
quickly than expenditure on durables. Using transaction data from a sample of
1.8 million credit card accounts, we provide the first field test of this prediction.
In Chapter 4, we move to a different domain and analyse how investors
attribute selective attention to their portfolios. Using rich data provided by
Barclays Stockbroking that recorded all account activity, such as buy and sell
1.4 Plan of Thesis 19
trades, stock-splits and account management fees and charges, and that enable
us to reconstruct individual account portfolios, we show that investors account
monitoring decisions have hedonic value and, as such, investors make attention
decisions in order to mitigate (increase) their exposure to negative (positive)
information. Then, Chapter 5 summarizes results from Chapters 2 to 4 and
concludes this thesis.
Chapter 2
Bad Cop, Bad Cops: Learning
and Peer Effects on Police
Misconduct
2.1 Introduction
There is a growing body of literature that recognises the need for understanding
the conditions that lead to police misconduct, since such incidents foster
civilian distrust and hinder police work (Goldsmith, 2005). Research has
revealed, for instance, that crime prevention cannot be pursued in the absence
of public collaboration (policing by consent, Murphy et al., 2008). Moreover,
actions perceived as unfair or arbitrary can affect police legitimacy, increase
public suspicion, and even encourage retaliation (Bayley, 2002; Walker, 2006).
Understanding the antecedents of misconduct will help develop interventions
that reduce misconduct. We exploit a new dataset from London’s Metropolitan
Police Service which positions officers within their social network and follows
them over time. We estimate how officers are affected by their own previous
cases of misconduct and how officers are affected by the misconduct cases of
their peers. Our estimation of these learning and peer effects complements
the existing literature, in which there is much work on the how individual
deviances predict misconduct and how organizational, social, and situational
factors affect misconduct.
The individual deviance approach is appealing because of the long-established
fact that the majority of incidents of corruption, brutality or excessive use of
force are accounted by a handful of officers or “rotten apples”. For example,
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in the US, the Christopher Commission that investigated the Los Angeles
Police Department found that, over the period 1987 to 1991, 5% of the officers
(of nearly 6000) were responsible for 20% of all reports of excessive use of
force (Christopher, 1991). In the UK, in 1997 the then Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police Service Sir Paul Condon famously stated that there were
up to 100-250 seriously corrupt officers in the Service (then, of about 27,000
officers; Gillard and Flynn, 2012; UK Government Select Committee on Home
Affairs, 1997). That a few officers are responsible for much of the misconduct
raises two possibilities: First, identifying and removing, or otherwise preventing,
misconduct from this small number of officers would have a large effect. Second,
and more worryingly, in the presence of strong peer effects, when the bad
apples are not identified and disciplined, corruption can become pervasive and
organized.
Research focused on the individual deviance approach shows that complaint-
prone officers are more likely to be non-white (Harris, 2010; Kane and White,
2009; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 1996), male, less experienced (Brandl et al.,
2001; Harris, 2009; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 1996; McElvain and Kposowa,
2004) and less educated (Kane and White, 2009; Kappeler et al., 1992). Recent
work has also sought to understand the relationship between personality and
misconduct. Donner and Jennings (2014), for instance, have shown that low
self-control is a key predictor of engagement in general misconduct, particularly
related to physical and verbal abuse. In the same vein, Pogarsky and Piquero
(2004) found that impulsivity mediates the influence of legal and extra-legal
sanctions on the decision to commit hypothesized acts of misconduct.
Since most officers will, at some point in time, have an allegation reported,
more recent contributions have been driving the research towards the study
of the likelihood and timing of the onset of misconduct. Harris and Worden
(2014) investigated 938 officers of a police department in the north-eastern USA
from the start of their careers and found that citizen complaints are likely to
onset sooner than internal complaints, black officers had earlier onset, and prior
military service appears to delay the onset. Interestingly, neither education nor
academy performance had an effect on the timing of onset.
In contrast to the individual deviance view, research on organizational
correlates of police misconduct is sparse. Some case studies have documented
evidence of the influence of the police departments’ characteristics, such as
size, bureaucracy and professionalism on the decision to arrest (for a review see
Dunham and Alpert, 2015). More recent evidence has shown that officers who
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perceive fairness in managerial practices are less likely to justify noble-cause
corruption or adhere to the code of silence that protects bad cops (Wolfe and
Piquero, 2011). Some consideration has also been given to situational variables.
For instance, Hassell and Archbold (2010) found that having another officer
on the scene at encounters that resulted in formal complaints does reduce the
likelihood of these complaints being sustained, but has no apparent effect on
the frequency of complaints. Also, the possibility of arrest at police-citizen
encounters escalates with the mere presence of supervisors (Engel, 2000, 2003)
and officers use greater levels of force against suspects encountered in high-crime
and disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Terrill and Reisig, 2003).
The understanding of deviance behaviour should not neglect social aspects.
People making decisions inside organizations are constrained to authority rules
and regulations, but are also constrained to social norms, cultural expectations,
and considerable large peer-group pressures. Kohlberg’s research on moral
reasoning (1969) has shown that, unlike childhood (when children were more
concerned about the physical consequences of their actions, i.e., punishments
and rewards, and when elements of reciprocity and fairness started to be
incorporated pragmatically), moral reasoning in adolescence and adulthood is
typically determined by beliefs about what others will think is right or wrong.
In this level of moral thinking (termed as ‘conventional’ by the author), the
individuals try to conform to the natural or accepted behaviour.
Compelling evidence for the existence of peer effects has already been
documented in other settings. For example, Mas and Moretti (2009) found
that the productivity of cashiers in a supermarket chain increases with the
effort of co-workers who face them, Zimmerman (2003) demonstrated that
first-year college students in the middle of the SAT distribution who share
a room with students in the bottom of the distribution do worse in grades,
and Trogdon et al. (2008) provided evidence that weight gain spreads through
peer networks. The misconduct literature already suggests an association but
the evidence of peer effects on officers’ misconduct falls short of supporting
a causal link. For example, officers assigned to the same workgroup tend to
share occupational attitudes due to their interactions and exposure to similar
environments (Ingram et al., 2013). This shows correlation in attitudes, but
not a causal link. In the Philadelphia Police Department, officers who thought
that their peers considered the use of excessive force as less serious were
more likely to have citizen complaints, as were officers who anticipated more
minor punishment for theft (Chappell and Piquero, 2004). Using the officers’
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judgments of their peers’ attitudes, rather than objective measures of the actual
attitudes of peers, allows only a correlational but not a causal claim. In the
Dallas Police Department, one quarter of the variation in trainees’ subsequent
allegations of misconduct was attributed to field training officers in a multilevel
analysis nesting trainees with their field training officers (Getty et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, this multilevel analysis is likely to be driven by common variance
elements that are typical in nested structures and thus do not reflect causal
relationships.
Because evidence on peer effects in police misconduct remains speculative
and largely restricted to cross-sectional studies, the first issue we address in
this chapter is whether an officer’s risk of misconduct increases when they
are exposed to peer misconduct. That is, we aim to quantify the extent to
which a bad apple would spoil the whole bunch. Estimating social learning is
challenging as individuals from a peer group affect their peer group as much
as the peer group affects them. In addition to this reflection problem, peer
groups are not necessarily randomly sorted, as high-performance workers could
be allocated to a high-performance peer group, and so workers from the same
peer group might likely share common unobserved characteristics. Moreover,
members of a group might show similar misconduct because they are subject
to similar shocks (Manski, 1993). In our econometric approach, we address
these issues using instrumental variable estimation techniques. We exploit
the variation in peer quality that results after workers change line managers
and switch peer groups. Misconduct of the new peers acquired following the
change is instrumented with prior events of misconduct of their new peers’
peers, allowing us to estimate the causal effect between peers. To pre-empt
our results, being assigned to complaint prone peers increases the likelihood of
misconduct events.
We should note that by examining peer effects, we do not intent to engage
in the debate of what specific mechanisms are driving these effects. Nor
do our data allow us to distinguish between the mechanisms by which peer
effects are mediated. For example, we will not discriminate between social
influences motivated by learning about what behaviour is best to follow given the
individuals’ own needs or motivated by pure peer pressure and social conformity.
In fact, due to the difficulty to discriminate between these mechanisms, most
research in the peer effects literature have focused on measuring the magnitude
of peer effects only and have overlooked the mechanisms that may be generating
the peer effects.
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After examining the effect of corrupting colleagues in police, the second issue
we address is whether officers learn from their previous cases of misconduct
and whether sanctions help to dissuade misconduct. Learning from errors
is vital in many psychological domains (like education, Metcalfe, 2017), and
the role of reward and punishment is key (O’doherty et al., 2017). Moreover,
existing research on deterrence recognizes that both the perceived risk of being
sanctioned and the sanctions’ severity lowers the recurrence of illegal activity
(Nagin, 1998). Unfortunately, the literature on police misconduct fails to clarify
whether past exposure to allegations of misconduct or complaints reduces the
probability of future misconduct, and whether past sanctions or punishment
mediate learning.
The evidence of the deterrent effect of the sanction threats for police mis-
conduct is counterintuitive and largely speculative at present. For instance, in
a survey about police misconduct conducted by Pogarsky and Piquero (2004)
of police officers from a southwestern USA police department, it was found
that the perceived sanction severity had little deterrent threat on subsequent
misconduct. Only perceived sanction certainty and perceived sanction celerity
were negatively connected with police misconduct. However, extra-legal sanc-
tions, such as social disapproval, shame or embarrassment, were found to be
a major deterrent against police misconduct. More counterintuitively, Harris
and Worden (2014) examined personnel complaints against 1,356 patrol officers
from a police department in the northeaster USA and identified that officers
who received more severe sanctions were more likely to receive an additional
sustained complaint when compared with no sanctioned officers. The authors
hypothesized three reasons for their results: punishment could be an indicator
of the most active offenders who are less likely to be deterred; those punished
mistakenly believe that the punishment experience prevents them from future
apprehension on the next offenses (since sanctions are relatively rare, they
reset their sanction certainty, as in the gambler’s fallacy); or those punished
might perceive the sanctions as unfair, which ultimately prompts them to defy
and increase offending. Although the authors could not discriminate among
these alternative reasons, they speculate that the most plausible explanation is
the perceived injustice of the disciplinary system that may encourage officer
deviance. They argue that officers, even those largely bonded to the peer group,
tend to be distrustful of their police departments.
Since the above findings are controversial and since police disciplinary
systems are substantiated on the notion of deterrence, in the second part of
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this study we estimate the extent to which receiving allegations of miscon-
duct diminishes the likelihood of subsequent misconduct and, crucially, we
also estimate whether disciplinary actions resulting from earlier misconduct
allegations mediate this effect. To pre-empt our results, repeated exposure to
allegations that led to formal disciplinary actions leads to subsequent declines
in misconduct.
Note that a strength of our panel dataset is that we can identify employees
and their different peers and supervisors over time, enabling us to control
for unobserved individual heterogeneity and limiting the risk that our results
reflect spurious rather than authentic relationships. Therefore, unlike previous
research that analysed the effect of sanctions on the likelihood and timing
of complaints filed against officers ignoring (or incorrectly accounting for)
individual heterogeneity, we test the deterrent effect of the sanction threats
via a dynamic model that takes into account any individual (time invariant)
difference among officers. Our results show that standard models that ignore
individual heterogeneity are largely flawed as they ignore the fact that severe
sanctions could simply correlate with future misconduct episodes for the most
complaint-prone officers.
This chapter unfolds as follows: First, we describe the complaints data.
Then, we present the details of the econometric methodology for the analysis
of peer effects and report our findings on peer effects together with some
falsification tests. Next, we present the details of the econometric methodology
used to estimate learning effects from previous experience of allegations and
report our findings on learning. Finally, we discuss our results and close.
2.2 Data Sources
Our study uses four databases maintained by the Metropolitan Police Service.
The first dataset contains demographic information for 13,558 civilian staff
and 35,845 police officers in active service at the end of the first quarter of
2015. The second dataset includes daily records of allegations of misconduct
filled against civilian staff and police officers from the second quarter of 2010
to the first quarter of 2015. Each record contains fields for the date of the
incident, the nature of the allegations and the complaint’s final disposition (if
any). Allegations include citizen complaints and internal complaints filled by
supervisors or other officers, however the records do not distinguish between
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these two sources. The third dataset comprises the individuals’ performance
scores reported on annual basis in Performance Development Reviews from
2011 to 2014. Scores are given on specific categories: operational effectiveness,
organizational influence, resource management, and final overall rating of
performance. The fourth dataset contains semestral records of employees and
their line managers from 2011 to 2015. The final panel of data, obtained by
merging these data sources, has repeated quarterly observations nested within
each of the individuals. It compromises 47,991 people (28.2% were civil staff;
65.1%, males; and 11.2%, from black and minority ethnic groups) for the period
2011 to 2014. In this final panel of data, we were able to identify the workgroups
for 35,924 individuals by linking officers assigned to the same supervisor in a
given quarter.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Complaints
During the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2015, 19,251 people
had cases of complaints. However, as Figure 2.1 shows, most of them (74.7%)
receive only 2 or fewer complaints in this five-year interval. Note that this
is a very common pattern in police departments (Dunham & Alpert, 2015),
suggesting that misconduct is not systemic and apparently only a minority of
officers (or roles) are complaint-prone.
Allegations of misconduct are classified in six categories: failures in duty,
malpractice, discriminatory behaviour, oppressive behaviour, incivility, traffic,
and other allegations. Their distributions in Table 2.1 reveals that for both
members of police staff and for police officers, the most recurrent allegations con-
sist of cases of failures in duty, which can be, for instance, unjustified use of the
relevant power, unauthorised entry on search, failure to inform detained persons
of their rights and entitlements, failure to maintain proper custody/property
records, interviewing oppressively or in inappropriate circumstances, among
other cases.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics for Complaints 27
BAD COP, BAD COPS 9 
 
complaints in this five-year interval.  Note that this is a very common pattern in police 
departments (Dunham & Alpert, 2015), suggesting that misconduct is not systemic and 
apparently only a minority of officers (or office roles) are complaint-prone. 
 
Figure 1. The distribution of individuals according to the number and type of misconduct 
received over the period 2010Q2-2015Q1. The cohort included 19,251 people. 
 
Allegations of misconduct are classified in six categories: failures in duty, malpractice, 
discriminatory behaviour, oppressive behaviour, incivility, traffic, and other allegations. Their 
distributions in Table 1 reveals that for both members of police staff and for police officers, the 
most recurrent allegations consist of cases of failures in duty, which can be, for instance, 
Fig. 2.1 The distribution of individuals according to the number and type of misconduct
received over the period 2010Q2-2015Q1. Other allegations include traffic allegations. The
cohort included 19,251 people.
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The possible sanctions following misconduct are formal actions, unsatis-
factory performance procedures (UPPs), management actions, retirement or
resignation, though most complaints end in no sanction. Formal actions involve
written warnings, while UPP entails the organizational procedures designed
to deal with unsatisfactory performance and attendance. Management actions
refer to any action that can be locally resolved to handle the allegation of
misconduct. They consist of, for example, the establishment of an improve-
ment plan and the clarification of expectations for future conduct. Observe
in Table 2.1 that very few cases received a formal disciplinary action. Fur-
thermore, over 50% of allegations against members of police staff and about
90% of the allegations against police officers had no subsequent actions taken.
Most of these allegations were instances in which, following investigation and
based upon the available evidence, there was no case to answer concerning
the allegation. It can then be argued that the allegations documented might
over represent real events of misconduct. Nonetheless, research has shown that
allegations are difficult to prove because of the relative lack of physical evidence
and the absence of witnesses and, thus, cases deemed unsubstantiated do not
necessarily imply the absence of police misconduct (Harris and Worden, 2014;
Prenzler and Ransley, 2002). Note that the use of all allegations, irrespectively
of their outcomes, is the usual approach adopted in the literature.
Table 2.2 shows how the types of allegations correlate within individuals.
People with alleged failures in duty seem to also exhibit, to some extent, some
form of incivility and oppressive or discriminatory behaviour.
2.4 Analysis of Peer Effects
2.4.1 Econometric Model
Our first analysis explores whether workers’ peers’ misconduct might affect
the recurrence of workers’ misconduct events. Peer groups were defined by
linking officers and staff assigned to the same line manager. For analysis we
required line manager history (from which we can infer peer groups), at least
one peer, and demographic information. This was true for 35,924 officers and
staff. Our outcome is a binary variable, yit, that equals one if worker i had an
event of misconduct during quarter t. Our independent variable of interest is
the proportion of peers of i in t − 1 receiving reports of misconduct in t − 1.
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Table 2.2 Correlation of Allegations Within Individuals
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0.212 1.000    
[0.198 - 0.225]     
      
Discriminatory 
behaviour 
0.285 0.098 1.000   
[0.272 - 0.297] [0.084 - 0.112]    
      
Oppressive 
behaviour 
0.302 0.147 0.168 1.000  
[0.289 - 0.315] [0.133 - 0.161] [0.154 - 0.182]   
      
Incivility 
0.316 0.066 0.241 0.145 1.000 
[0.303 - 0.329] [0.052 - 0.080] [0.228 - 0.254] [0.131 - 0.158]  
      
Other 
0.080 0.040 0.038 0.041 0.078 
[0.066 - 0.094] [ 0.026 - 0.054] [0.024 - 0.052] [0.027 - 0.055] [0.064 - 0.092] 
 
Note. Pearson correlations of allegation types within individuals with 95% CI in brackets. Other allegations 
include traffic allegations. 
 
 
Analysis of Peer Effects 
Model 
Our first analysis explores whether workers’ peers’ misconduct might affect the 
recurrence of workers’ misconduct events. Our outcome is a binary variable,    , that equals 
one if worker   had an event of misconduct during quarter  . Our independent variable of 
interest is now the proportion of peers of   in   − 1 receiving reports of misconduct in   − 1. 
Since allegations of misconduct raised against a group of officers on the same date are likely 
to be related, we consider as events of peer misconduct only those episodes in which   had no 
same-day concurrent allegations of misconduct.   is a vector of control variables that 
include demographic characteristics, such as gender, length of service, employee’s business 
group, employee type, and employee performance; and additional controls for annual and 
seasonal effects. 
Note. Pearson correlations of allegation types within individuals with 95% confidence intervals
in brackets. Other allegations include traffic allegations.
Since officers who patrol together or are in certain units together have a
higher likelihood of being involved in reports of misconduct that might not
be their fault, to prevent overestimating the effects of peers’ misconduct, we
consider as events of peer misconduct only those episodes in which i had no
same-day concurrent allegations of misconduct. That is, allegations against
peers and allegations against th targ t officer i rrespond to diff rent cases
and were reported on different dates. W is a vector of control variables
that include demographic characteristics, such as gender, length of service,
employee’s business group, employee type, and employee performance; and
additional controls for annual and seasonal effects.
yit = 1[ρPeer yi,t−1 +
∑
f
φfWfit + εit] (2.1)
Empirically there are three challenges for the identification of peer effects
(A grist, 2014; Manski, 1993). First, due to on-random assignment into groups,
individuals with similar characteristics may end up in the same group. Then
what looks like peer effects could actually be due to common characteristics
of the individuals themselves and not due to their peers. Without random
assignment, the influence of individual’s characteristics cannot be identified sep-
arately from the influence of their peer’s characteristics. The second challenge
is that, even when random assignment had been possible, individuals in the
same group share similar environments and, thus, there could be unobservable
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institutional factors affecting the group members’ performance simultaneously.
These two threats are referred to in the literature as correlated effects and do
not correspond to any social phenomenon between peers. Third, we would
expect peer effects to be bi-directional. This means that peer effects are, in part,
a property of the target individual and are not exogenous to the individual.
This reverse causality problem holds even if we had random assignment into
groups.
To address these challenges, we proceed as follows. To absorb the effect of
unobservable institutional factors affecting the likelihood to misbehave either
because some workers are exposed to particular stressful environments or
high crime areas, or because workers sharing some background characteristics
preferred to join specific business groups, our econometric specification includes
dummy variable controls for the business groups the employees belong to.
These business groups include: Territorial Police (divided in Boroughs North,
Boroughs South, Boroughs West, Central, Criminal Justice & Crime, and
Westminster), Specialist Crime and Operations, Specialist Operations, and
Other Business Group (which aggregate the groups Career Transition, Deputy
Commissioners Portfolio, Directorate of Resources, Met HQ, National Functions
and Shared Support Services). Our regressions also include quarter and year
dummies to account for any seasonal fluctuation in crime.
To deal with individual heterogeneity, we also include controls for gender,
years of length of service, employee type and police ranks, and police perfor-
mance. Performance scores are reported on an annual basis in Performance
Development Reviews and evaluate competencies in operational effectiveness,
organizational influence, and resource management. To alleviate the concerns
of simultaneity bias, note that we estimate the effect of lagged peer outcomes
on misconduct. More importantly, to deal with endogenous worker sorting into
peer groups and potential correlated effects unaccounted by our set of controls,
we use instrumental variable techniques and estimate a linear probability model
using two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. Our iden-
tification strategy exploits the variation in peers that is experienced by workers
who switch peer groups.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the procedure followed. The top panel shows the
hypothetical composition of peer groups for three different line managers across
one year, from t − 3 to t. We are interested in modelling the risk of misconduct
of individual i (denoted as ‘T’, for target individual, from now on) at time t.
‘T’ is allocated to a new line manager, Line Manager 2, in quarter t − 1 and
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encounters new peers, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ workers. First, we look at his
new peers and select those that were also recently allocated to Line Manager
2 (i.e., ‘H’). Second, for the identified peer ‘H’, we observe his existing peers
in t − 2 (‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’) and compute the proportion of these existing peers
who had reports of misconduct in t − 2 (P1). Likewise, we also observe his
existing peers in t − 3 (again, ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’) and compute the proportion of
these existing peers who had reports of misconduct in t − 3 (P2). These two
measures are used as instruments of Peer yi,t−1 in Equation 2.1. Note that
the construction of our instruments ignores the behaviour of any worker that
was under the supervision of Line Manager 2 during t − 2 and t − 3, such as
workers ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, and ‘G’, since due to potential non-random sorting these
workers might share some background characteristics with ‘T’.
Valid instruments satisfy two properties. The instrument must be (1)
relevant: the instrument must be correlated strongly with the endogenous
variable Peer yi,t−1. The instrument must satisfy the (2) exclusion restriction:
the instrument must affect the outcome variable, yi,t, only through its effect on
the endogenous variable. That is, the instrument should not affect independently
the outcome variable yi,t. The exclusion restriction implies that misconduct of
the peers of ‘H’ in t − 2 and t − 3 (i.e., misconduct of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’) should
not affect the current behaviour of ‘T’ except through their impact on ‘H’ in
t − 1. If ‘H’ had not been allocated to Line Manager 2, the behaviour of I’, ‘J’,
and ‘K’ should not affect the behaviour of the target officer ‘T’. Accordingly, to
construct our instruments we discard in the first part of our procedure any new
peer of ‘T’ in t − 1 that had at least one peer that worked along ‘T’ during
quarters t − 3 to t. This strategy satisfies the exclusion restriction since only
the peers of peers who had no evidence of direct contact with ‘T’ during the
past year are used in the construction of the instruments. Note that ‘I’, ‘J’ and
‘K’ satisfy this criterion.
In the bottom panel of Figure 2.2, we consider the case in which ‘T’
experiences new peers but does not change line manager. Following the same
procedure, we select ‘H’ and observe the behaviour of his peers in t − 2 and
t − 3 to construct the instruments. In our examples, only ‘H’ was selected in
the first step; however, when more than one peer in t − 1 satisfy the criteria
imposed, we compute for each of these peers the two measures of peers of peers
conduct described (P1 and P2) and average these measures across them. Thus,
we use (P̄1 and P̄2) as instruments of Peer yi,t−1.
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 Line Manager 1  Line Manager 2  Line Manager 3  Instruments 
        
  − 3 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  
P1 = Proportion of H's peers 
with misconduct in   − 3 
         
  − 2 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  
P2 = Proportion of H's peers 
with misconduct in   − 2 
        
  − 1 A, B, C, L  T, D, E, F, G, H  I, J, K, M  
 
 
        
  A, B, C, L  T, D, E, F, G, H  I, J, K, M  
 
 
        
 
 Line Manager 1  Line Manager 2  Line Manager 3  Instruments 
        
  − 3 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  
P1 = Proportion of H's peers 
with misconduct in   − 3 
         
  − 2 T, A, B, C  D, E, F, G  H, I, J, K  
P2 = Proportion of H's peers 
with misconduct in   − 2 
        
  − 1 T, A, B, C, H  D, E, F, G  I, J, K, M  
 
 
        
  T, A, B, C, H  D, E, F, G  I, J, K, M  
 
 
        
Fig. 2.2 The identification strategy for peer effects. Each column represents the peer groups
under the direction of three different line managers over time. ‘T’ is the target individual
under study. The double line frames highlight the groups that ‘T’ belongs to at each time.
In time t − 1, ‘T’ experiences a different peer group, either because he switches line manager
(top panel) or because new workers are assigned to his group (bottom panel). In both cases,
the behaviour of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’, who are the peers of worker ‘H’ in t − 2 and t − 3, are used
as instruments of the peers of ‘T’ in t − 1. Observe that ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ had no direct contact
with ‘T’ during the past year (i.e., t − 3 to t) and so this strategy satisfies the exclusion
restriction required for identification.
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Observations that satisfy our criteria for identification are not prevalent
in the data and, thus, our estimation of peer effects is restricted to a sample
of 80,632 quarter observations (25% of the total quarter observations of the
data) from 30,627 individuals. A summary of the average composition (by
quarter) of the sample used is shown in Table 2.3. The left column displays the
average composition per quarter for the whole sample.The left column displays
the average composition per quarter for the whole sample. The right column
restricts the sample to those observations in which an individual faces a change
of peers. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of the number of peers for each of
these samples. There is not apparent evidence of a disproportionate selection
of particular groups of individuals, which means our estimates of peer effects
should generalise to the wider population of all officers and civilian staff.
2.4.2 Results
We have outlined above how the instrumental variable estimation approach
is critical to addressing the three challenges for identification of the causal
effect of peer misconduct. To have an initial approximation of the direction
and magnitude of peer effects on misconduct, in the Appendix A we present
the estimates from linear probability panel data models—including both fixed
and random effects—that cover all individuals in our data. These panel models
do not correct for endogeneity. While these panel models can be applied to
the whole data set, they do not address the three challenges to estimating the
casual effect. We find that the panel models show significant but small effects
of peer misconduct. But our instrumental variable approach reveals that the
panel models greatly underestimate the causal effect of peer misconduct.
Table 2.4 presents the estimates using our instrumental variable approach.
The first variable, the proportion of peers in t − 1 with misconduct, is instru-
mented using the proportion of peers of ‘H’ with misconduct from Figure 2.2
(i.e., using the proportion of ‘I’, ‘J’, and ‘K’ with misconduct). In Model 1,
we present the estimates from a two-step efficient GMM estimator (results
from the first stage are presented in Table A.2.1 of Appendix). Due to the
instrumenting of our endogenous variable, 75% of the observations are lost;
however, as described earlier in Table 2.3, the remaining sample is structurally
similar to the whole sample. Since in this remaining sample more than half of
the individuals (15,038 out of 30,627) have only 2 or 3 quarter observations,
we are unable to apply panel data estimators. However, the SEs of our GMM
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 Whole sample  
Individuals who 
experience new peers 
Gender    
 Male 0.65  0.68 
    
Employee type    
 Police Constable 0.54  0.61 
 Police Sergeant 0.12  0.13 
 Inspector 0.03  0.03 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent, Chief Superintendent 0.01  0.01 
 Special Constabulary 0.00  0.00 
 Civil Staff 0.30  0.22 
    
Business Group    
 TP - Boroughs North 0.07  0.08 
 TP - Boroughs South 0.10  0.12 
 TP - Boroughs West 0.08  0.10 
 TP - Central 0.00  0.00 
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.12  0.11 
 TP - Westminster 0.03  0.03 
 Specialist Crime and Operations 0.27  0.26 
 Specialist Operations 0.12  0.11 
 Other Business Group 0.10  0.05 
    
Length of service (years) 13.45  1.28 
 Exceptional + Competent (above standard) 0.49  0.49 
 Competent (at required standard) 0.50  0.51 
 Competent (development required) + Not Yet Competent 0.01  0.01 
    
Events of misconduct    
 Incidence of misconduct 0.05  0.06 
 Incidence of failures in duty 0.04  0.04 
 Incidence of malpractice 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of discriminatory behavior 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of oppressive behavior 0.01  0.01 
 Incidence of incivility 0.01  0.01 
 Occurrence of Formal disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.00  0.00 
 Occurrence of Management disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.01  0.01 
 Occurrence of No disciplinary actions following misconduct 0.04  0.04 
    
Total number of quarter observations 331,023  80,632 
  1 Note. The table displays the composition of the whole data (left column) and the data used
to estimate peer effects via instrumental variable regressions (right column).




The density plot scales the height of the bars so that the sum of their areas equals 1. We have replaced that plot 
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Figure 3. Distribution of number of peers by sample. The top panel includes all quarters. The 
bottom panels restrict the data to those quarters that satisfy our criteria for identification. 
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Fig. 2.3 Distri ution of number of peers by sample.
Th op panel includes all qu rters. The bott m panel
restricts the data to those quarters that satisfy our
criteria for identification. Outliers below the
5-percentile and above the 95-percentile of the
distribution are excluded.
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Table 2.4 The Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects
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 Individuals who experience new peers 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES GMM IVPROBIT 
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.768*** 5.426*** 
 (0.157) (0.703) 
Gender (reference: Females)   
 Male 0.017*** 0.140*** 
 (0.002) (0.019) 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)   
 Police Constable 0.017*** 0.210*** 
 (0.004) (0.042) 
 Police Sergeant 0.022*** 0.270*** 
 (0.005) (0.047) 
 Inspector 0.019*** 0.254*** 
 (0.006) (0.056) 
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
0.016* 0.143 
 (0.006) (0.091) 
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
  
 TP - Boroughs North -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.027) 
 TP - Boroughs South 0.007 0.038 
 (0.004) (0.024) 
 TP - Boroughs West 0.002 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.026) 
 TP - Central -0.033**  
 (0.012)  
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.006 0.066* 
 (0.005) (0.028) 
 TP - Westminster 0.006 0.034 
 (0.006) (0.038) 
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.006 -0.053 
 (0.005) (0.038) 
 Specialist Operations -0.013~ -0.163** 
 (0.007) (0.060) 
 Other Business Group -0.001 -0.204** 
 (0.007) (0.076) 
Length of service   
 Length of service (10 years) -0.013* -0.057 
 (0.006) (0.048) 
 Length of service (10 years)2  0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.013) 
   
Employee Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
  
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.038** -0.285*** 
 (0.012) (0.073) 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.035** -0.256*** 
 (0.012) (0.069) 
   
Constant 0.038* -1.606*** 
 (0.018) (0.075) 
   
Observations 80,632 80,612 
Number of individuals 30627 30617 
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  199.3  
P-value of under identification LM statistic p <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 97.75  
Hansen Statistic 0.520  
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1  
P value Hansen Statistic 0.471  
Wald test of endogeneity,   (1)  29.97 
Exogeneity test Wald p-value  p <0.001 
Quarter FEs YES YES 
Year FEs YES YES 
Note. All models estimate the probability of an event of misconduct in quarter t conditional
on a set of covariates. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one when at least one event
of misconduct is reported in quarter t. The independent variable of interest is the proportion
of peers in quarter t−1 with reported cases of misconduct. Our identification strategy exploits
the variation in peer groups experienced by the individuals during the period 2011-2014. We
use instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Column 1 presents
a 2-step GMM linear model and Column 2, an IV probit model. Two instruments are used
for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in
t − 2 and, likewise, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in
t − 3. The models include dummy controls to account for seasonal variation in the report
of misconduct events: Quarter FE and year FE correspond to quarter dummies and year
dummies. Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, p<0.10.
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estimates are robust to arbitrary within-individual correlations. The coefficient
of 0.768 for the instrumented proportion of peers at t−1 with misconduct means
that a 10-percentage point change in the proportion of peers with misconduct
would cause an increase of 7.68 percentage points in the target misconduct.
In Model 1, the estimates for the control variables are in line with the
findings of other studies in the literature: male workers, police officers and less
experienced employees are prone to receive more allegations of misconduct. We
also see expected signs for a positive effect of previous employee performance
reviews.
At the bottom of the Model-1 Column of Table 2.3, we test the validity
of our instruments. To be valid, they should satisfy two requirements: they
must be correlated with the endogenous variable Peer yi,t−1 and orthogonal
to the error process. At the bottom of Table 2.3, we report the first-stage
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for week identification that examines the joint
significance of the both instruments in determining the endogenous variable.
With a value of 97.75, sufficiently larger than 10, the threshold suggested by
Staiger and Stock (1997) to prevent biases by using weak instruments, the
first-stage F-statistic confirms that our instruments are strong. We also report
the Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic for under identification which is robust
in the presence of heteroscedasticity and clustering in errors. Rejection of
the null indicates that our model is identified—that is, that our instruments
are relevant. To evaluate the validity of the instruments, we also report the
J-statistic of Hansen (1982) that tests the null hypothesis of orthogonality of
the instruments and the error process which shows that our instruments are
exogenous.
In Model 2, we use an alternative estimator, an instrumental variable probit
estimator, which also alleviates endogeneity concerns, but it is appropriate
for binary dependent variables and continuous endogenous covariates. The
resulting estimates provide further statistical support for the presence of peer
effects. At the bottom of the column for Model 2, we also report the χ2 statistics
of the Wald test of endogeneity of the instrumented variable, which rejects the
null hypothesis that Peer yi,t−1 is exogenous.
Coefficients from Model 2 do not represent marginal effects as coefficients
from Model 1 do. In order to ease the comparison of both models, Figure 2.4
illustrates the extent of the peer effects from Model 2. Reassuringly, the peer
effects are close in magnitude to those obtained by GMM in Model 1.
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Figure 4. Fitted probability of misconduct at   conditional on the proportion of peers 
exhibiting events of misconduct in   − 1. The shaded area represents 95% confidence 
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Fig. 2.4 Fitted probability of misconduct at t conditional on the proportion of peers
exhibiting events of misconduct in t − 1. The shaded area represents 95% confidence
intervals. Peer effects are based on estimates of Model 2 of Table 2.4.
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2.4.3 Falsification Tests
Under the concern that our estimation of peer effects might still reflect correlated
effects due to unobservable events not accounted by our controls or endogeneity
due to disregarded indirect interactions between individual i and the peers of
peers used in the constructions of our instruments, we perform the following
falsification test. Observe in the top panel of Figure 2.2 that the behaviours of
individuals ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’ are expected to influence the conduct of ‘T’ during
quarter t through a single and unique channel, ‘H’. However, during quarter t
former peers of ‘T’ (i.e., ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’) who remained under the direction
of Line Manager 1 and, consequently, had no direct contact with ‘H’ should
not be affected by any sort of misconduct of ‘I’, ‘J’ or ‘K’ that took place
during quarter t − 2 or t − 3. Thus, our falsification test consists on replacing
the dependent variable yit by the proportion of former peers of i who receive
allegations of misconduct during quarter t. These peers are those who worked
along i during quarter t − 2 (the period immediately preceding the movement
of i into a new peer group). The control variables are analogous to those used
in Table 2.4. They include the proportion of male peers, the proportions of
peers for each rank, business group and performance rating, the average length
of service and the usual year and seasonal controls.
Models 1–3 of Table 2.5 present the results of this falsification test. Models
1–3 are fitting the misconduct of former peers of the target, who should be
unaffected by our instrument. The sample size for our falsification test is smaller
because it is restricted to those quarter observations in which individuals change
line managers (illustrated in the top panel of Figure 2.2). Model 4 of Table 2.5
is fitting misconduct of the target, and here we should replicate our headline
peer effect from Model 5 of Table 2.4, but on the smaller sample size.
The peer effects for Models 1–3 of Table 2.5 are much lower, imprecise, and
not statistically different from zero, as we expected from the falsification test.
Model 4 of Table 2.5 produced estimates very like those found in Table 2.4
Model 5, replicating our headline peer effect within the smaller sample. The
specification tests confirm the validity of the instruments in all models, as
informed by the Hansen J-statistics and F-statistics, except for Model 3. Yet,
any possible endogeneity problem that remains unsolved in Models 1–3 would
induce some upward bias in the estimated peer effects these columns display.
However, these peer effects are of small and non-significant size. Regarding the
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Table 2.5 Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects: Falsification Test
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DV:  Prop. of former peers in   − 2 with cases of 
misconduct in   
  DV: Misconduct in   
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
VARIABLES GMM GMM GMM  VARIABLES GMM 
       
 Prop. of peers in t-1 with misconduct 0.162 0.156 0.132  Prop. of peers in t-1 with misconduct 0.802* 
 (0.136) (0.153) (0.155)   (0.346) 
       
Gender (reference:  Prop. of Females)     Gender (reference: Females) 0.014** 
  Prop. of Males 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***  Male (0.004) 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)    
Employee type (reference:  Prop. of Civil Staff)     Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)  
  Prop. of Police Constable 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030***  Police Constable 0.015~ 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.008) 
  Prop. of Police Sergeant 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.034***  Police Sergeant 0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)   (0.008) 
  Prop. of Inspector 0.015** 0.021** 0.025***  Inspector 0.019* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.009) 
  Prop. of Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
  Chief Superintendent 
0.025** 0.022* 0.026*  Chief Inspector, Superintendent, 
Chief Superintendent 
0.017~ 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)   (0.010) 
  Prop. of Special Constabulary -0.049*** -0.068*** -0.067***  Special Constabulary - 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.013)    
Business Group 
(reference:  Prop. in TP - Boroughs East) 
    Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs North -0.004 -0.009* -0.009~  TP - Boroughs North -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.009) 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs South 0.006~ 0.005 0.005  TP - Boroughs South 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.008) 
  Prop. in TP - Boroughs West -0.006 -0.007 -0.007  TP - Boroughs West 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.008) 
  Prop. in TP - Central -0.011 -0.026 -0.022  TP - Central -0.029* 
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)   (0.013) 
  Prop. in TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.006 -0.009~ -0.009~  TP - Criminal Justice & Crime 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.009) 
  Prop. in TP - Westminster 0.007 0.007 0.007  TP - Westminster 0.020 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.013) 
  Prop. in Specialist Crime and Operations -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.029***  Specialist Crime and Operations -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)   (0.010) 
  Prop. in Specialist Operations -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.048***  Specialist Operations -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)   (0.015) 
  Prop. in Other Business Group -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035***  Other Business Group 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.015) 
Length of service     Length of service  
 Average Length of service (10 years) -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.039***  Length of service (10 years) -0.022* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.010) 
 Average Length of service (10 years)^2  0.003~ 0.006** 0.007**  Length of service (10 years)^2 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.003) 
       
Employee Rating in t-4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet 
Competent)  
    Employee Rating in t-4 
(reference: Competent but development 
required + Not Yet Competent) 
 
  Prop. of Exceptional + Competent (above standard)  -0.079*** -0.080***  Exceptional + Competent (above 
standard) 
-0.048* 
  (0.023) (0.023)   (0.021) 
  Prop. of Competent (at required standard)  -0.072** -0.071**  Competent (at required standard) -0.041~ 
  (0.023) (0.023)   (0.021) 
       
       
Constant 0.057*** 0.136*** 0.146***  Constant 0.054 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.025)   (0.033) 
       
Observations 27,040 19,796 19,796  Observations 20,374 
Number of individuals 18,506 14,111 14,111  Number of individuals 14,401 
LM test statistic for underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap) 52.51 40.70 39.53  LM test statistic for under identification 
(Kleibergen-Paap) 
35.16 
P-value of under identification LM statistic p <0.001 p <0.001 p <0.001  P-value of under identification LM 
statistic 
p <0.001 
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 25.39 19.62 19.09  F statistic for weak identification 
(Kleibergen-Paap) 
16.98 
       
Hansen Statistic 3.135 3.486 3.889  Hansen Statistic 0.0304 
Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1 1 1  Degrees freedom of Hansen Statistic 1 
P value Hansen Statistic 0.0766 0.0619 0.0486  P value Hansen Statistic 0.862 
Quarter FEs NO NO YES  Quarter FEs YES 
Year FEs NO NO YES  Year FEs YES 
 5 Note. All models apply instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects. Models 1 to
3 are part of a falsification test that study the behaviour of former peers of an individual i who moves to
a different peer group in t − 1. The outcome constitutes the proportion of these peers who had reports of
misconduct at time t. The independent variable of interest is the proportion of peers of i in t − 1 presenting
incidence of misconduct. This variable is instrumented by two measures of conduct of peers of peers of i.
By construction, these two measures are expected to have no influence on the outcome variable of these
models. Model 4 is presented for comparative purposes and uses the standard outcome variable of the study,
misconduct of i at time t. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001,** p<0.01,
* p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1.
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effect of the control variables, across the different specifications they exhibit
the expected signs and comparable sizes.
2.5 Estimation of Learning Effects
2.5.1 Econometric Model
The entire analysis thus far has concerned only the impact of learning from
peers’ misconduct, we now proceed to study the impact of disciplinary actions
on future misconduct. The risk of events of misconduct for individual i in
quarter t is represented now by a dynamic probit model where yit is a binary
outcome variable that denotes any allegation raised against i during quarter
t. X is a matrix of explanatory variables that includes: sociodemographic
characteristics, such as gender, length of service, employee’s business group,
employee type, and employee performance; line manager characteristics, such
as supervisor performance and events of changes in supervisors; and additional
controls for annual and seasonal effects.
yit = 1[yi,t−1 Sanctionsi,t−1 ρ + Xitβ + αi + uit > 0] (2.2)
The model is dynamic as it allows the propensity of misconduct to be a
function of the interaction between any previous incidence of misconduct, yi,t−1
and the corresponding disciplinary actions that followed it, Sanctionsi,t−1.
Sanctionsi,t−1 contains a set of dummies for the occurrence of ‘no action’,
‘management action’, ‘formal action’ and ‘unknown action’ in t−1. Due to their
low frequency, actions that involve unsatisfactory performance procedures and
the retirement of the workers were excluded from the analysis. In Equation 2.2,
the term αi captures the individual specific unobserved heterogeneity. It
accounts for all time-invariant unobserved characteristics (e.g., individual
differences such as stable personality traits) that might influence the propensity
to misconduct. Observe that a major drawback of the related literature, which
is mostly limited to cross-sectional data, is the failure to account properly for
individual differences. Yet, it is well known that individuals’ past behaviour
is highly correlated with their future behaviour. Recall that in our data, as
it is the case of many police departments’ data, a small group of officers and
civilian staff account for a disproportionate amount of cases of misconduct. It
is then reasonable to assume that misconduct events are not independent.
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This high degree of correlation among observations from the same individual
can be the result of two non-mutually exclusive mechanisms: unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence (Heckman, 1981). According to the first
of these mechanisms, individuals’ probabilities to engage in misconduct might
differ because of some latent and enduring personal characteristics, perhaps
acquired early in life. In the criminology field, for example, the propensity to
commit crime is related to lack of self-control, risk taking behaviour, impulsivity
and low conscientiousness (Nagin and Paternoster, 1991, 2000). The alternative
hypothesis, state dependence, implies that past experiences of misconduct have
a genuine effect on the risk of future misconduct.
Equation 2.2 allows us to distinguish state dependence from unobserved
heterogeneity. Testing the hypothesis of true state dependence is equivalent to
testing whether the vector of coefficients ρ is non-zero. However, two common
econometric difficulties are introduced once we allow the model to discriminate
between these two aspects: how to treat the unobserved heterogeneity αi and
how to treat the initial conditions of the data, y0 and Santions0. Estimating a
standard random effects model assumes zero correlation between the unobserved
effect αi and the set of explanatory variables Xit. Estimating a dynamic model
when the time series is short relative to the cross-section size assumes that
the initial conditions are uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity. The
failure to meet these assumptions could produce biased parameter estimates of
the lagged dependent variable (Arellano, 2003; Nickell, 1981).
As both assumptions are further restrictive and unlikely to be met, we relax
them as follows. The first assumption is relaxed following Mundlak (1978) and
Chamberlain’s (1984) suggestion that the unobserved heterogeneity is linear
in the means of all the time varying covariates, αi = δ0 + X̄iδ + εi, where εi
is independent of Xit. We relax the second assumption using Wooldridge’s
(2005) conditional maximum likelihood estimator that models the distribution
of the unobserved effect εi conditional on the initial value of the dependent
variable and any exogenous explanatory variables. Thus, we define εi =
ε0 + yi,0 Sanctionsi,0 ω + ϵi. Substituting into Equation 2.2 gives the final
econometric specification used in our analysis:
yit = 1[yi,t−1 Sanctionsi,t−1 ρ+Xitβ+δ0+X̄iδ+yi,0 Sanctionsi,0 ω+ϵi+uit > 0]
(2.3)
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2.5.2 Results
Our main results are displayed in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. In Table 2.6, we begin
by estimating Equation 2.2 using a probit model (Model 1) that uses as a
dependent variable a binary indicator of misconduct in a given quarter and,
as independent variables, the lagged records of misconduct and disciplinary
actions received. Models 2 to 6 are dynamic correlated random effects models
(CRE) that follow Equation 2.3 and so these models include a full set of controls
for the means of all the time varying covariates and dummies for the initial
conditions of the data. From Model 3, we add different control variables to test
the stability of our results. However, as some of these controls variables could
be simultaneously determined (e.g., employee performance being simultaneously
determined with the line manager performance), we test their effects in separate
models.
Model 3 includes controls for gender, length of service, employee’s business
group, and employee type. Model 4 replicates Model 3 but adds controls for
supervisor performance. Model 5 replicates Model 3 but adds controls for
employee performance. Model 6 replicates Model 3 but incorporates controls
for any change in supervision during the preceding year. Arguably, changes in
line manager might have co-occurred with changes in peers. We capture these
confounds with a vector of dummies that reflect the percentage of current peers
that remain working with individual i during the preceding year. These dummies
are part of the control variables used in Model 6. All models incorporate controls
for annual and seasonal effects.
As the standard probit model (Model 1) and the CRE models (Models 2–6)
involve different normalizations, to compare the estimates we need to multiply
the CRE coefficients by
√
1 − ICC, where ICC is the intraclass correlation
coefficient (Arulampalam, 1999). For instance, the scaled coefficient of Model
2, for formal actions, management actions and no actions, are -0.173, 0.116 and
0.095, respectively. The scaled coefficients for the remaining Models 3–6 are
similar in magnitude. Therefore, assuming that the individual heterogeneity is
orthogonal to the explanatory variables and that the initial conditions of the
data are exogenous—the assumptions implicit by Model 1—inflates substantially
the effect of state dependence. Observe that the scaled CRE coefficients from
Models 2–6 are less than one fourth of the Model 1 probit estimates and even
reverse sign (such as in the case of the coefficients for formal actions). Because
the assumptions for Model 1 are violated, the estimates from Models 2–6 should
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be used. Note that the estimates of the ICC from Model 3 and onwards imply
that approximately 12% of the total error variance is attributable to individual
unobserved heterogeneity.
Overall, the estimates from Models 2-6 in Table 2.6 suggest that the expo-
sure to complaints that were followed by formal actions appear to discourage
misconduct events, while the opposite occurs with any other disciplinary action.
Before we consider the size of this learning effect, we introduce a second analysis
including only individuals with a previous history of misconduct—a group of
individuals who are expected to be less heterogeneous. Table 2.7 replicates
Table 2.6 for this group. The effect of disciplinary actions is stronger in this
group and, as before, remains robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic and
contextual controls.
For the models in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, the effect of covariates are in line with
the findings of other studies in the literature: male workers, police officers and
less experienced employees are prone to receive more allegations of misconduct.
We also see expected signs, though non-significant, for a positive effect of previ-
ous performance reviews, positive effects for exposure to competent supervisors,
and negative effects for changing supervisors. It is not surprising, however,
that the supervisors’ behaviour could influences his subordinates’ willingness to
engage in misconduct, since evidence suggest that leaders play a crucial role in
disseminating organizational misconduct, as they could authorize misconduct
explicitly or implicitly, by allowing or rewarding it (Greve et al., 2010).
The probabilities of misconduct at time t conditional on the status at t − 1
for the whole sample and for the sample of individuals with antecedents of
misconduct are presented in Figure 2.5. The black circles show the conditional
probabilities of misconduct at t fitted from Model 3 (Tables 2.6 and 2.7) and
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The red dotted lines provide the baseline
for comparisons, that is the probability of current misconduct in absence of
learning effects (i.e., when misconduct in t − 1=0). The predictions from the
Individuals-with-History-of-Misconduct-Graph shows that the probability of
misconduct at t is much higher for those receiving management actions than no
actions at t − 1: Someone exposed to a management action at t − 1 increased
his or her likelihood of misconduct from 11.3% to 13.0% (i.e., 1.15 times more
likely). Crucially, someone exposed to a formal action in t − 1 decreased his or
her likelihood of misconduct from 11.3% to 7.3% (i.e. 1.55 times less likely). To
compare estimates with raw data in Figure 2.5, diamonds display the conditional
raw proportions. It is reassuring to note that, for the Individuals-with-History-
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Table 3. Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Past Misconduct Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PROBIT CRE CRE CRE CRE CRE 
Sanctions       
   Formal Action in   − 1 0.150** -0.196*** -0.062 -0.138~ -0.190** -0.101 
 (0.053) (0.058) (0.057) (0.076) (0.074) (0.088) 
   Management Action in   − 1 0.456*** 0.131*** 0.174*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 0.196*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041) 
   No Action in   − 1 0.546*** 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
   Unknown Action in   − 1 0.444*** 0.028 0.031 0.078 0.014 0.073 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) 
Gender  
(reference: Female) 
      
   Male   0.178*** 0.165*** 0.178*** 0.171*** 
   (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Length of service       
   Length of service (years)   -0.321*** 0.139* 0.137 0.180 
   (0.031) (0.060) (0.657) (0.806) 
   Length of service (years)2    0.000* 0.001~ 0.001*** 0.001* 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
      
   TP - Boroughs North   -0.019 -0.011 0.002 -0.010 
   (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
   TP - Boroughs South   0.023 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.050** 
   (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
   TP - Boroughs West   -0.012 -0.004 0.007 0.000 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) 
   TP - Central   -0.085 -0.172 -0.882* -0.107 
   (0.128) (0.263) (0.347) (0.216) 
   TP - Criminal Justice & Crime   -0.070*** -0.045* -0.035* -0.018 
   (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) 
   TP - Westminster   -0.017 0.021 -0.000 -0.007 
   (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) 
   Specialist Crime and Operations   -0.274*** -0.250*** -0.276*** -0.271*** 
   (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
   Specialist Operations   -0.547*** -0.550*** -0.545*** -0.526*** 
   (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.025) 
   Other Business Group   -0.666*** -0.673*** -0.669*** -0.651*** 
   (0.023) (0.031) (0.028) (0.035) 
Employee type  
(reference: Civil Staff) 
      
   Police   0.475*** 0.421*** 0.460*** 0.369*** 
   (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
   Special Constabulary   -0.495*** -0.561***  -0.642*** 
   (0.032) (0.042)  (0.043) 
Employee Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
      
   Exceptional + Competent (above standard)     -0.081  
     (0.055)  
   Competent (at required standard)     -0.075  
     (0.053)  
Line Manager Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
      
   Exceptional + Competent (above standard)    -0.166   
    (0.117)   
   Competent (at required standard)    -0.165   
    (0.117)   
Change Line Manager during   − 4 to   − 7      0.013 
      (0.014) 
Constant -1.802*** -2.043*** -2.768*** -1.371*** -1.140 -1.873* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.074) (0.237) (1.071) (0.807) 
ln   
   -1.274*** -1.880*** -1.972*** -1.944*** -1.998*** 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.047) (0.041) (0.057) 
       
Observations 608,220 608,220 608,220 339,943 385,838 263,600 
Log likelihood -107061 -103638 -98993 -62126 -67907 -48788 
Number of individuals  40,548 40,548 42,061 36,992 38,277 
ICC  0.219 0.132 0.122 0.125 0.119 
    0.529 0.391 0.373 0.378 0.368 
Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Annual FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
% Change in peers that coincided with the change in Line Manager FEs      YES 
       
 Note. Sample include individuals with records from 2011q2 to 2014q4. All the models
are dynamic models in which the outcome takes the value of one when at least one
event of misconduct occurred in quarter t. Model 1 is a pooled probit model, Models
2 to 6 are CRE models that account for individual heterogeneity. Model 6 evaluates
the effect of a change in line manager in the preceding year and includes dummy
controls for every decile of peers that remained working with the employee at the
end of the preceding year (i.e, at t − 4). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.001,** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1.
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Table 2.7 Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Past Misconduct
Effects, Individuals with at Least One Complaint
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Table 4. Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Past Misconduct Effects, Individuals with at Least One Complaint 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES PROBIT CRE CRE CRE CRE CRE 
Sanctions       
   Formal Action in   − 1 -0.304*** -0.299*** -0.241*** -0.338*** -0.371*** -0.346*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.072) (0.067) (0.082) 
   Management Action in   − 1 0.076** 0.083** 0.087*** 0.084* 0.085** 0.108** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.032) (0.039) 
   No Action in   − 1 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.018 0.004 0.009 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) 
   Unknown Action in   − 1 -0.016 -0.017 -0.032 0.001 -0.041 0.002 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.048) (0.045) (0.048) 
Gender (reference: Females)       
   Male   0.078*** 0.068*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 
   (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
Length of service       
   Length of service (years)   -0.775*** -1.748*** -1.863* -16.652* 
   (0.054) (0.192) (0.898) (7.335) 
   Length of service (years)2    0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001~ 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
      
   TP - Boroughs North   -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010 
   (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) 
   TP - Boroughs South   0.019 0.039* 0.034* 0.030~ 
   (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
   TP - Boroughs West   -0.004 0.015 0.004 0.013 
   (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
   TP - Central   0.118 0.025 -0.462~ 0.062 
   (0.139) (0.263) (0.263) (0.179) 
   TP - Criminal Justice & Crime   -0.046*** -0.027 -0.034* -0.021 
   (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) 
   TP - Westminster   -0.021 0.004 -0.022 -0.001 
   (0.019) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027) 
   Specialist Crime and Operations   -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.105*** -0.124*** 
   (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) 
   Specialist Operations   -0.172*** -0.215*** -0.196*** -0.225*** 
   (0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) 
   Other Business Group   -0.173*** -0.173*** -0.196*** -0.207*** 
   (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.035) 
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)       
   Police   0.111*** 0.060*** 0.073*** 0.002 
   (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) 
   Special Constabulary   -0.171*** -0.239***  -0.326*** 
   (0.036) (0.048)  (0.046) 
Employee Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
      
   Exceptional + Competent (above standard)     -0.085  
     (0.058)  
   Competent (at required standard)     -0.077  
     (0.057)  
Line Manager Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
      
   Exceptional + Competent (above standard)    -0.208   
    (0.149)   
   Competent (at required standard)    -0.205   
    (0.149)   
Change Line Manager during   − 4 to   − 7      0.027~ 
      (0.016) 
Constant -1.285*** -1.278*** -3.064*** -3.958*** -4.028** -17.816* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.124) (0.356) (1.460) (7.336) 
ln   
   -15.940** -14.846*** -13.220 -15.679 -12.632 
  (6.014) (3.275) (2,872.481) (29,759.415) (1,925.019) 
       
Observations 233,250 233,250 233,250 133,620 156,740 105,794 
Log likelihood -82088 -82070 -81604 -47749 -56015 -38195 
Number of individuals  15,550 15,550 15,213 14,869 14,401 
ICC  1.19 × 10   3.57× 10   1.81× 10   1.55× 10   3.27× 10   
    0.000346 0.000597 0.00135 0.000394 0.00181 
Quarter FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Annual FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES 
% Change in peers that coincided with the change in Line Manager FEs      YES 
       
Note. Sample include individuals with records from 2011q2 to 2014q4 and is restricted to those individuals with antecedents of misconduct. All the models are dynamic models in which the 
outcome takes the value of one when at least one event of misconduct occurred in quarter t. Model 1 is a pooled probit model, Models 2 to 6 are CRE models that account for individual 
Note. Sample include individuals with records from 2011q2 to 2014q4 and is restricted
to those individuals with antecedents of misconduct. All the models are dynamic
models in which the outcome takes the value of one when at least one event of
misconduct occurred in quarter t. Model 1 is a pooled probit model, Models 2 to
6 are CRE models that account for individual heterogeneity. Model 6 evaluates the
effect of a change in line manager in the preceding year and includes dummy controls
for every decile of peers that remained working with the employee at the end of the
preceding year (i.e, at t − 4). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p<0.001,** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ∼ p<0.1.
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of-Misconduct-Graph—where the heterogeneity is low—the simple conditional
proportions tightly coincide with the model predictions. These findings provide
support to the hypothesis that reinforcement facilitates learning and agree with
the commonly accepted ideas that punished behaviour tends to be discontinued
while rewarded behaviour is strengthened (Thorndike, 1898, 1927).
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Figure 2. The effects of recent incidence of misconduct on current misconduct. The panels 
display fitted conditional probabilities of misconduct at   given misconduct at   − 1. The top 
panel includes all individuals (estimates come from Model 3 of Table 3). The bottom panel 
includes individuals with records of misconduct in the period 2011q2 to 2014q4 (estimates 
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Fig. .5 Th effects of rece t incid nce of misconduct on current misconduct. The panels
display fitted conditional probabilities of misconduct at t given misconduct at t − 1. The top
panel includes all i dividu ls (estimate come from Model 3 of Table 2.6). The bottom panel
includes those individuals with records of misconduct (estimates come from Model 3 of
Table 2.7). Circles disp ay the conditional probabilities given a specific sanction in t − 1 (i.e.,
no other type of sanction took place in t − 1). The red dotted lines show the baseline for
comparisons, that is the probability of current miscon uct in absence of learning effects (i.e.,
no misconduct occurred in t − 1). Lines span 95% confidence intervals. To compare
estimates with raw data, diamonds display the conditional raw proportions.
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2.6 Summary and Caveats
To summarize our results, there are two key insights from our study. First,
peer effects are nontrivial. An individual who has a 10% increase in the
fraction of peers with misconduct (e.g., when a complaint prone person is
transferred to their existing group of 10) has his risk of misconduct raised
by an absolute 8 percentage points. Second, misconduct events are mediated
by the experience of recent disciplinary actions. In particular, only formal
disciplinary actions appear to discourage future misbehaviour. For officers with
a history of complaints, formal disciplinary actions in the previous quarter
reduces the chances of misconduct in the current quarter from 11.3% to 7.3%.
In addition, we also replicate the individual differences that are associated
with misconduct. In consistency with earlier research, we found that certain
demographic characteristics are consistently present in individuals with higher
risk of misconduct, such as few years of experience, poor ratings of past
performance, poor line manager performance, male gender, or certain employee
types (like police sergeant and constable).
Before turning to the main conclusions of the study, we must highlight a few
caveats. First, we have taken complaints filed against officers as an accurate
approximation of misconduct events. Yet, these complaints could either over or
under represent real misconduct cases. For example, fellow officers, as opposed
to citizens, fail to report misconduct due to their cultural rules of integrity.
Informally, the “Code” discourages them from reporting misconduct of their
peers (Klockars et al., 1997; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011). On the other hand,
citizen allegations of misconduct may be discouraged when there is fear of
retaliation or a low confidence in the complaint process (Lersch, 2002). Our
data, however, does not allow us to distinguish the source of the complaints.
There is also concern about whether the frequency of complaints mirrors officers’
productivity. There is evidence suggesting that more proactive officers, officers
placed in areas with high crime rates, and officers that due to their patrol
assignment are more likely to be in contact with citizens, are prone to receive
citizen’s allegations of misconduct (Harris, 2009; Lersch, 2002). Unfortunately,
we were not able to control for the officers’ arrest activity. However, to the
extent that some degree of arrest activity might be associated to time-invariant
individual characteristics, or characteristics that might have remained relatively
stable over the four-year interval of available data, such as rank hierarchy or
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the assignment to different police units, we do capture the effects of individual
productivity.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper/chapter adds to a growing list of studies on police misconduct.
Unlike many earlier studies, we used a rich dataset that allowed us to identify
officers, their peers and their immediate supervisors for a four-year interval. Our
findings demonstrate that deviant behaviour can be learnt through socialization
and can be reduced through disciplinary action: The exposure to complaint
prone peers increases the risk of future misconduct; however, formal sanctions
after an event of misconduct reduce such risk.
It appears that officers are inclined to engage in behaviour that they have
recently witnessed their immediate peers doing. Perhaps their beliefs about
what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour became more permissive when
they become part of closely connected groups. Following, Ashforth and Anand
(2003), because life is lived in concrete settings, localized social cultures tend to
be highly salient, and the individual’s commitment to ethics may relax under
the press of local circumstances. Moreover, local groups often provide accounts
to rationalize or neutralize the guilt that individuals engaging in misconduct
might otherwise feel, such as denial of the victim, denial of injury, denial of
responsibility, and refocusing attention, among other accounts.
While a discussion of the mechanisms behind police peer effects is beyond
the scope of our research, it is worth commenting on the most recent findings
in the literature provided by Hough et al. (2018). The authors examined cases
of alleged misconduct involving chief police officers in England and Wales over
a six-year period, up to 2013, and interviewed stakeholders, police officers
and other personnel who had investigated chief officer misconduct. Their
interviews suggest that, throughout their careers, police officers felt under
pressure to not step outside the norm. The ethical climate, promoted by a
typical command-and-control style of management, is alleged to lack ethical
values or, even worse, to sustain the wrong kinds of values. The command-and-
control style of management appears to encourage close mutually supportive
and inward-looking networks that favour homogeneity, preclude difference and
even accept or tolerate bullying behaviour. The attitudes and values shaped
under this climate might explain why only severe sanctions have been found
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to have some deterrent effect. Hough et al’s findings suggest that there is
little to no stigma associated with misconduct in the police culture. Therefore,
management actions or any other less severe disciplinary action might likely
have very little deterrent effect on bad cops.
Our peer effect results are to some extent consistent with the work of
Chappell and Piquero (2004), Getty et al. (2014), and Ingram et al. (2013),
who suggested that peer effects are important determinants of misconduct based
on correlational studies, and lend also support to differential association theory,
according to which criminal behaviour can be learnt through long, frequent and
intense interactions with individuals holding attitudes that encourage criminal
activity (Akers, 2013).
Our confidence in our results is justified by the fact that they are robust to
the inclusion of several contextual control variables and different specifications.
Although it seems intuitive that individuals’ experience and the social context in
which they operate can influence their behaviour, to the best of our knowledge
this is a finding that has not previously been demonstrated convincingly in
police misconduct research, due to the lack of longitudinal data or the omission
of individual heterogeneity.
Chapter 3
The Red, the Black, and the
Plastic: Paying Down Credit
Card Debt for Hotels Not Sofas
3.1 Introduction
The assumption of fungibility is an essential feature of standard consumer
theory. Consumers are assumed to purchase what they value most, and to pay
for their purchases using the least costly options for payment. What a person
pays for should not affect how they pay for it (e.g., via cash or credit), and how
money is obtained should not affect the way it is spent. Research on mental
accounting (Thaler, 1999) challenges these assumptions. There is by now a
large body of empirical research documenting violations of fungibility, showing
that people like to pay for different types of purchases in different ways, and
that people like to spend money arising from different sources, or stored in
different ways, differently (for a discussion of the assumption of fungibility in
standard economics see Thaler, 1985).
Most of the early research on mental accounting involved surveys and hypo-
thetical choice studies. O’curry and Strahilevitz (2001) found that, compared
to ordinary income, windfall gains, including winnings from longshot lotteries,
are more likely to be spend on hedonic, as opposed to utilitarian, goods. Thaler
and Johnson (1990) report the phenomenon, since well documented (Ackert
et al., 2006; Keasey and Moon, 1996; Weber and Zuchel, 2005), that gamblers
are more willing to take risks after a recent gain since they feel they are playing
with house money. Heath and Soll (1996) find that when consumers purchase
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an item that is prototypical of an expense category, they are subsequently
less likely to purchase other items in that category, which they attribute to
non-fungibility between mental accounts.
A number of field studies have subsequently documented diverse violations
of fungibility (for a recent review see Zhang and Sussman, 2018). Virtually all
of these focus on the question of whether money that is framed as coming from,
or designated as being earmarked for, a specific category of consumption is, in
fact, spent on that category (as discussed by Thaler, 1985). Kooreman (2000),
in an early field study, found that the marginal propensity to consume child
clothing out of child benefits is higher than out of other income. Beatty et al.
(2014), using a regression discontinuity analysis, find that the UK Winter Fuel
Payment, a cash grant, is disproportionately spent on heating. Hastings and
Shapiro (2017), using a data set of grocery transactions that include information
about payment medium, find that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) payments are disproportionately spent on food, relative to cash income.
Milkman and Beshears (2009) find that a grocery coupon provided by an online
retailer leads to a much greater increase in spending on food than that which
is predicted by standard economic theory. Finally, whereas all the studies
just reviewed relied on observational field data, Abeler and Marklein (2017)
conducted a field experiment in which patrons of a wine restaurant were given
a coupon good for either any usage or for wine. Customers given the wine
coupon spent more on wine than those given the coupon earmarked for any
usage and both groups spent more on their overall meal. Both results violate
fungibility (given that virtually all patrons of the wine restaurant would have
spent at least the value of the coupon on wine).
We used data from a large data set on credit card spending to test a major
prediction of a theory of mental accounting proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein
(1998): that consumers will be more motivated to pay off expenditure on more
transient forms of consumption more quickly than expenditures on durables.
We provide the first field test of this theoretical prediction using transaction
and repayment data from a sample of 1.8 million credit card accounts. In line
with the predictions of Prelec and Loewenstein, we find that people are an
absolute 10% less likely to pay off, and hence more likely to pay interest on,
durable items like vehicles, clothes and education, compared to non-durable
items like grocery products, gas, hotel accommodation, and restaurants. This
result holds in analyses comparing repayments across individuals and also
analyses comparing changes in repayments within individuals over time (with
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individual fixed effects). As a complement to the judgments of hypothetical
scenarios presented in Prelec and Loewenstein, our field data are the first
evidence that debt aversion varies as a function of the nature of the associated
consumption, and the first evidence regarding preferences for the relative timing
of consumption and payment.
Prior research has examined patterns of behaviour involving credit cards
using diverse research methods and data sources. For example, in incentivized
laboratory experiments, Amar et al. (2011) found that consumers were more
likely to spend on credit cards with the lowest balance rather than, as cost-
minimization would suggest, the lowest rate of interest. Stewart (2009) (see
also Keys and Wang, 2016; Navarro-Martinez et al., 2011) examined, using
both credit card repayment data and an experiment, whether consumers anchor
repayments on minimum payment amounts that are currently included on all
credit card statements. Gathergood et al. (2017) (see also Ponce et al., 2017;
Stango and Zinman, 2009) examined how consumers split repayments across
debts held over multiple cards. All three contributions show that consumers
tend not to minimize interest costs when allocating repayments across cards
and Gathergood et al. (2017) show that this arises because consumers tend
to split the ratio of repayments across their cards in approximate proportion
to the ratio of revolving balances, instead of paying down the highest interest
rate debt first, as economic logic would predict. Using detailed transactions
data from a relatively affluent and financially sophisticated online panel of 917
households, Stango and Zinman (2009) found that the median household pays
$500 per year in credit card costs and could avoid more than half these costs
with minor changes in behaviour. In contrast to these prior contributions, the
current paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to use credit card data
to test for a violation of fungibility, as well as the first to test a key prediction
of the Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) model using field data. Rather than
examining the impact of credit balances and APRs on card repayment, here we
examine the impact of the specific type of consumption financed with a credit
card on the likelihood of fully paying off the credit balance on the card.
Beyond providing support for a key prediction of Prelec and Loewenstein, our
results have implications for the designers of financial products. In particular,
if customers have a preference for paying down certain types of consumption
ahead of others, customers may value payment options which allow them to
prioritize payments against certain spending types. Credit card issuers currently
report customer card balances, with manual and automated payment options
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at various level of payment (including minimum payment or full payment), but
customers might also benefit from options which allow them to identify the
balance due by the spending it represented, and then pay for specific items. The
research reported here suggests that, given such an option, consumers would be
prone to pay off debt incurred for non-durable than for durable consumption,
and that doing so might well decrease the pain they experience from paying
off their credit card. More generally, managers should look for ways to reduce
customers’ and workers’ pain of paying to enhance the value of incentives that
they provide. For example, if customers find it painful to pay for shipping
on purchases, a promotional offer could be framed as paying for, or providing
free, shipping as opposed to a discount from the price of the product itself.
Or, if gas prices are high and consumers find it painful to pay for their daily
commute, a wellness program that provided incentives in the form of gas cards
might be more effective than one that paid the same amount in cash, despite
the compelling economic logic favoring cash that can be spent in a maximally
flexible fashion.
3.2 Background
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) propose a double mental accounting model in
which people establish mental accounts to link the pleasure of the consumption
of an item with the pain of payment for it. In their model, every act of
consumption evokes painful consideration of its cost, and every act of payment
is buffered by (typically) pleasurable thoughts about the consumption that the
payment is financing. The key assumption of the model, dubbed prospective
accounting, is that people only care about future costs and benefits: For each
transaction, people offset the pain of repayments against future consumption,
and offset the pleasure of consumption against the pain of future repayments.
Prospective accounting predicts, for example, that a vacation paid for ahead
of time will be more enjoyable because, since there are no payments in the
future, it feels as if it is free. Likewise, it predicts that paying for the vacation
after one returns will be especially painful because, given that the vacation has
already happened in the past, it feels as if one is paying for nothing. Purchase
and repayment decisions are, therefore, contingent on the expected sequence of
consumption and payment utilities. When a good is not fully paid off, or when
a transaction is made in multiple payments, the pleasure of its consumption
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is undermined by painful thoughts regarding the remaining payments. Hence,
consumers would be inclined to prepay for a product rather than accumulate
the debt.
However, the attractiveness of prepayments is not the same for all types of
consumption in the double mental accounting model. People are happier to pay
interest on durable goods because the pain of paying interest is offset by their
anticipated future consumption from the durable good. But for non-durable
goods that are consumed immediately, as in the vacation example above, there
is no future consumption to offset the pain of paying interest. Hence people
have a stronger preference for prepaying debt associated with non-durable
goods compared with durable goods.
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Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between the magnitude of hedonic benefits of prepayment 
and the durations of the utility flow. The top panels represent the utility flow obtained when prepaying 
(left) and post-paying or leasing (right) a non-durable item with high utility, such as the vacation. The 
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Fig. 3.1 Impact of pre ayment (left) or post-payment (right) on the hed i of consumptio
and payment for a non-durable good (top) and a durable good (bottom). The shaded area is
experienced utility of consumption and the bars are the experienced disutility of the
payments as predicted by the Mental Accounting Model (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
Redrawn from Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) Figure 4.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the interaction between the magnitude of hedonic
benefits of prepayment and the durations of the utility flow. The top panels
represent the utility flow obtained when prepaying (left) and post-paying or
leasing (right) a non-durable item wi h high utility, such as the vacation.
The bottom panel illustrates the equivalent utility flow for a durable item,
such as a clothes dryer. The shaded area indicates the net utility derived from
consumption after subtracting the disutility associated with the future payments.
The vertical bars record the net disutility of payments after subtracting the
utility related to future consumption.
When the payment schedule for the vacation is shifted into the future, there
is a large hedonic fall at the very end of the vacation since there are only
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payments to look forward to. In contrast, there is little psychological cost to
delaying the payments for the clothes dryer, as the dryer delivers sufficient
residual utility over its lifetime. So, the mental account approach predicts a
strong tendency to accelerate payment for items whose utility declines over
time. Note that consumers may also prefer not to pay in advance for durable
goods, so that they can maintain the ability to withhold payments for durable
goods that later break down (Patrick and Park, 2006).
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) show, for instance, that although prepayment
would greatly enhance the quality of a vacation experience, it would have a
small or negligible influence on the hedonics obtained from the use of a clothes
dryer. In one of their studies, they described two scenarios to 91 visitors to
the Phipps Conservatory in Pittsburgh. In the first scenario, the visitors were
asked to imagine they were planning a one-week vacation to the Caribbean, six
months from now, that will cost $1,200. They could finance the vacation by
either a six-monthly payment of $200 before the beginning of the vacation or a
six-monthly payment of $200 after returning. About 60% of respondents chose
the earlier payments. However, in the second scenario, when they were asked
to imagine that they were planning to purchase a clothes washer and dryer that
will cost $1,200 and that they could finance it by either six monthly payments
of $200 before the machine arrives or by six monthly payments beginning after
it arrives, 84% of visitors opted to postpone the payments.
In summary, to keep mental accounts in the black, people are prone to
accelerate payments for items whose utility declines overt time (non-durables),
but will be less motivated to do so with items whose utility persists over time
(durables). Mental accounting may act at the time of repayment, encouraging
people to repay debt on non-durable items when they receive their bill, or it
may at the time of purchase, so that people avoid spending on non-durable
items they cannot immediately afford because they anticipate the greater pain
of repaying. Either way, the prediction is the same. People should be more
likely to repay debt incurred on non-durable items. To test this prediction, we
consider different spending and repayment patterns in which individuals might
link their propensity to repay their credit card bill to the type of consumption
that created the bill.
We begin by analysing repayment patterns in new credit card accounts
that begin with no debt and incur spending of a single purchase type only
—durable or non-durable— during the month. Using a classification proposed by
Kuchler (2013), we categorize spending into durable and non-durable purchases
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from 25 underlying merchant categories of expenditure. Kuchler lists short-run
consumables and other non-durable spending categories (see Kuchler, 2013, p.
46). We used this list to assign our merchant category codes to durable and
non-durable categories. For example, ‘airlines’ are classified as non-durable and
‘electric appliance stores’ are classified as durable. We test the sensitivity of
our results to re-classification of categories which might arguably contain both
durable and non-durable items. In response to a reviewer’s comments we also
ran a consumer survey of 501 UK residents, measuring the durability of 152
goods and services from the 25 merchant categories. These ratings lead to a
durable/non-durable classification that is very similar to Kuchler’s.
We evaluate how the nature of the spending increases or decreases the likeli-
hood of full repayment of the debt. Regression analysis shows that individuals
who spend on non-durable goods are almost 9 percentage points more likely to
pay the bill in full at the end of the month. Durable goods are often big ticket
items, so we control for the size of the credit card balance using a fifth-order
polynomial and also conduct separate regressions across samples by quartile
of the balance amount. This result also holds when additional controls are
added to the regression specification, including characteristics of the credit card
account (including the Annualised Percentage Rate (APR) and credit limit) and
controls for matched socio-economic characteristics of the postcode of the card
holder obtained from census data. The postcode level control variables allow us
to control, albeit imperfectly, for differences in socio-economic characteristics
(e.g. incomes) which might determine credit card repayment behaviour.
We then expanded our analysis to evaluate repayment behaviour of accounts
which show spending on both durables and non-durables within the month.
Specifically, we quantify how the probability of full repayment is related to the
proportion of total spending of each type within the month. Results show the
same effect as in the single purchase type analysis, the coefficient estimates
implying that a switch from the percentage of purchases in the non-durable
category from 0% to 100% increases the likelihood of full repayment of the credit
card bill by 15 percentage points. This result is again robust to the inclusion
of controls for account balance amount, credit card account characteristics and
socio-economic characteristics.
In subsequent analyses, we expand the data sample to include older credit
card accounts and again conduct analysis of months of data in which accounts
incur spending of a single purchase type and multiple purchase types. These
samples provide multiple observations of spending and repayment undertaken
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by the same individual over time. With these data we are able to estimate
models which include random and fixed effects. The inclusion of individual fixed
effects allows us to control for individual-specific time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity, which might drive differences in repayment behaviours across
individuals, such as differences in permanent incomes or Intelligence Quotient
(IQ). These models allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals, such as an underlying propensity to repay an account in full (which
might correlate with the type of spending). We find that our central result is
robust to the inclusion of either random effects or individual fixed effects.
Unfortunately, conducting a field experiment on the question this paper
addresses would be difficult if not impossible because we cannot experimentally
assign debts accruing from spending on durable or non-durable goods to a sample
of credit card holders in real world data. While Prelec and Loewenstein (1998)
examined closely related questions by presenting experimental subjects with
hypothetical scenarios, in real world data we are limited to observing natural
occurring variation in spending over time, which has inevitable limitations.
Specifically, it is difficult to definitely rule out potential confounds, such as
individual differences which might lead to differences in repayment behaviour.
Our data do allow us to control for a rich set of time-varying credit card account
characteristics, socio-economic characteristics and individual fixed effects. The
inclusion of individual fixed effects allows us to allay a concern with models
exploiting variation across individuals that some individuals might be inherently
more likely to repay than others due to differences in time preferences and this
might also explain their tendency to purchase durables instead of non-durables.
Nevertheless, our data do not allow us to account for selection into credit card
spending for durable and non-durable goods. For example, individuals may
be more likely to put spending on non-durable goods they intend to repay
straightaway onto their credit card than they are to put spending on durable
goods they intend to repay straightaway.
3.3 Data and Estimation Strategy
3.3.1 Credit Card Data
Our data source is the Argus Information and Advisory Services’ “Credit Card
Payments Study” (CCPS). The Argus data contains detailed records of credit
card transactions (including spending and repayments), contract terms (e.g.
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APR and credit limits) and billing records (including minimum payments due
and billing dates). We have a subset of data from five large UK credit card
issuers. Together these issuers have a market share of over 40%. We use a
10% representative sample of all individuals in the CCPS who held a credit
card between January 2013 and December 2014 with at least one of the five
issuers. This data sample provides approximately 1.8 million cards. The UK
credit card market is similar to the US in many respects. Visa and Mastercard
are the most dominant card networks. The most widely issued credit cards
are the general purpose credit cards, which offer comparable features and fee
structures and often include rewards programs, teaser rate deals and balance
transfer facilities. Moreover, some UK card issuers are subsidiaries of US firms
(e.g., Barclaycard, Capital One, etc).
3.3.2 Purchases of Durable and Non-Durables
The data include detailed records of card spending incurred each month in
25 merchant coded categories, such as ‘restaurant / bars’, ‘food stores’ and
‘vehicles’. We classify each category as ‘durable’ or ‘non-durable’, closely
following the classification used in Kuchler (2013). For example, ‘airlines’
and ‘hotels services’ are classified as non-durable; while purchases made in
‘clothing stores’ and ‘electric appliance stores’ are classified as durable. Table 3.1
provides a breakdown of the classification of the categories into the two spending
types. Some spending categories might contain purchases of both durables and
non-durables, such as the ‘other retail’ and ‘discount stores’ categories. In a
subsequent analysis, we test the sensitivity of our results to re-classification of
categories which might contain both durable and non-durable items and to a
re-classification based upon consumer’s judgments of durability.
3.3.3 Sample Selection
Our interest in this paper is in the relationship between types of credit card
spending and subsequent repayment behaviour. The unit of analysis is a month
of data in which we observe the spending and repayment on an account. We
therefore first restrict the sample to months in which (a) spending is incurred
on the account in either the durable or non-durable types (or both), (b) the
account has a balance due which is above the obligatory minimum repayment,
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(c) the account does not show a balance transfer to another credit card account1.
After applying these sample restrictions, we focus our analysis on samples of
the data in which the relationship between spending and repayment can be
most cleanly analyzed. We used two main samples.
The first sample includes only the first month of data for new credit card
accounts, in which all the spending is in either durable purchases or non-durable
purchases. This is the cleanest sample for our analysis as the sample exhibits no
prior history of spending or repayment behaviour and accounts can be cleanly
separated by spending type. We use a dummy variable to label observations as
either durable-spend or non-durable-spend months. We call this sample the
Single-Purchase-Type Sample, which provides 21,671 month observations.
The second sample also restricts data to only the first month for new credit
card accounts, but includes months in which the account incurs durable and
non-durable spends in addition to the single purchase type months (hence, this
sample includes the first sample above). For this sample we calculate the share
of spending on durable purchases and the share of spending on non-durable
purchases (which together sum to 1). We term this the Multiple-Purchase-Type
Sample, which includes 58,404 month observations. Summary data for spending
incurred in the first and second samples are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
In additional analysis, we extend the sample to include all months, not
just the first month. Hence, we construct Single-Purchase-Type and Multiple-
Purchase-Type samples which include repeated observations from the same
account. Theses samples include accounts for which we have records of between
a single month to many years. This substantially increases the sample size, with
154,000 observations of single purchase type months and 130,000 observations
of multiple purchase type months. However, this represents a less clean sample
for analysis as these accounts have histories of spending and repayment that
may decouple mental accounts on the part of the cardholder (i.e., people may
1Specifically, under restriction (a) we remove month observations in which the account
holder makes no transactions, withdraws cash using his/her card, pays utility bills or
undertakes a classification unclassified in the merchant code data. These transactions fall
outside of the mental accounting framework we consider here. Under restriction (b) we also
excluded all months with total purchase amount lower than £5 during the preceding month,
as balances equal to or less than this quantity need to be repaid in full, due to the required
minimum policy. Ignoring such transactions is not problematic if small, routine expenses,
such as coffee or lunch, are habitually not booked, emulating the organizational practice
of allocating small expenditures to a petty cash fund that is not under scrutiny (Thaler,
1999). Under restriction (c) we also excluded months in which a balance transfer occurred
on the account, as balance transfers reflect substitution of debts to other credit cards. We
also excluded months in which repayments were made automatically by direct debit.
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no longer be able to remember what they spent the money on when they are
repaying their bill). Summary data for spending incurred in these samples are
shown in Tables B.1.1 and B.1.2 of Appendix B.
Apart from differing in the number of observations, the four samples we draw
show some differences in the level and composition of spends. The monthly
spend on the new accounts single purchase type sample is lower compared to the
new accounts multiple purchase type sample (£660 vs £745), a difference also
see in the sample of all accounts in Tables B.1.1 and B.1.2 (£320 vs £420). The
non-durable spending category with the highest mean spend, travel agencies, is
the same across single and multiple samples (for new and all accounts), while in
the multiple purchase type sample mean spending on airlines is notably higher.2
In each sample, spending on durables is broadly spread across categories. As
we show in Table 3.3, the socio-economic characteristics of card holders who
contribute observations to each sample are very similar across samples.
3.3.4 Census Data Socio-Economic Controls
The data include geocodes, allowing us to match in socio-economic controls
from the UK National Census Records. The data is geocoded at the 4-digit
UK postcode level.3 We match the following variables: (a) the median house
price within the locality based on self-reported evaluations of selling prices,
(b) self-reported median net weekly income, (c) the proportion of households
within the locality with children enrolled in education who receive free school
meal vouchers. The final measure is commonly used in the UK as an indication
of social insurance dependency. Due to some missing postcodes within the
credit card dataset, in the Single-Purchase-Type Sample we can match 70%
of months to census records (107,384 of 154,924 months); and in the Multiple-
Purchase-Type Sample, 69% (194,214 of 282,997 months). The addition of
these variables to the dataset allows us to partially control for differences in
credit card repayment arising from differences in socio-economic characteristics.
2This might be as expected if holiday purchases made via travel agents commonly occur
in the same cycle as purchases of airline tickets to holiday destinations.
3There are approximately 3,000 UK 4-digit postcodes, which each contain on average
9,000 individual addresses, or 0.03% of all UK addresses.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for purchase amounts for the first purchase for new accounts – Single-Purchase-Type Sample  
Merchant Category Frequency Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
       
   Non-durables       
   Airlines 601 £931.12  £1,119.47 £208.75 £547.06 £1,194.87 
   Auto Rental 258 £263.60 £411.43 £73.29 £140.69 £286.90 
   Hotel/Motel 754 £526.41 £895.42 £90.00 £220.14 £500.00 
   Restaurants/Bars 632 £233.44 £821.13 £24.65 £49.65 £95.40 
   Travel Agencies 1885 £1,450.72 £1,224.57 £511.91 £1,140.87 £2,040.00 
   Other Transportation 561 £485.63 £1,059.86 £40.90 £100.00 £322.77 
   Drug Stores 125 £63.73 £173.20 £15.75 £25.00 £51.57 
   Gas Stations 1331 £90.35 £245.46 £34.46 £51.00 £80.08 
   Mail Orders 465 £230.69 £419.24 £29.50 £71.80 £235.31 
   Food Stores 2450 £113.14 £295.09 £23.59 £54.32 £112.56 
   Other Retail 1897 £457.90 £1,052.26 £29.99 £79.99 £363.00 
   Recreation 771 £422.19 £771.18 £65.00 £150.00 £405.60 
   Subtotal 11730 £501.78 £957.17 £40.05 £102.27 £466.00 
       
   Durables       
   Department Stores 485 £458.81 £921.34 £55.79 £142.82 £458.32 
   Discount Stores 294 £191.40 £243.60 £44.99 £119.98 £263.93 
   Clothing Stores 1433 £170.40 £317.94 £37.00 £71.98 £150.00 
   Hardware Stores 687 £1,017.68 £1,594.09 £72.06 £331.56 £1,230.90 
   Vehicles 1200 £2,080.72 £2,282.94 £299.98 £1,100.00 £3,184.50 
   Interior Furnishing Stores 783 £1,113.82 £1,528.05 £234.00 £575.00 £1,248.45 
   Electric Appliance Stores 1028 £660.03 £811.64 £196.49 £419.99 £855.75 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores 510 £471.72 £784.74 £56.00 £155.34 £499.46 
   Health Care 414 £1,237.53 £1,573.06 £150.00 £414.50 £2,000.00 
   Education 191 £1,283.57 £1,640.86 £168.00 £775.00 £1,700.00 
   Professional Services 1257 £672.93 £852.91 £179.04 £410.00 £825.30 
   Repair Shops 16 £1,019.63 £1,273.31 £97.05 £491.39 £1,388.14 
   Other Services 1643 £831.82 £1,485.23 £60.50 £222.50 £947.12 
   Subtotal 9941 £854.70 £1,435.33 £81.41 £290.64 £931.25 
       
   Single purchase total 21671 £663.67 £1,213.18 £50.99 £167.95 £687.76 
       
Note. Single purchase total shows the monthly spending for the Single-Purchase-Type Sample of monthly observations belonging to new credit card accounts. SD=standard deviation. p25=25th percentile, p50=median, and p75=75th percentile. 
  
Note. Singl ase total shows the monthly spending for the Single-Purchase-Type Sample
of monthly observations belonging to new credit card accounts. SD=standard deviation.
p25=25th percentile, p50=median, and p75=75th percentile.
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Purchase Amounts for the First Purchase for New
Accounts – Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for purchase amounts for the first purchase for new accounts – Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample 
 Frequency Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
       
   Non-durables       
  Airlines 2559 £1,176.40 £1,106.75 £412.81 £850.90 £1,571.49 
  Auto Rental 1138 £917.37 £1,082.72 £215.78 £540.18 £1,183.42 
   Hotel/Motel 5282 £959.71 £992.49 £311.00 £652.96 £1,257.84 
   Restaurants/Bars 12572 £796.63 £890.66 £237.12 £525.02 £1,025.39 
   Travel Agencies 4982 £1,445.37 £1,193.59 £563.55 £1,127.27 £1,973.36 
   Other Transportation 5888 £835.91 £960.92 £219.61 £523.17 £1,092.10 
   Drug Stores 4954 £834.38 £861.93 £275.70 £583.23 £1,084.79 
   Gas Stations 14894 £735.42 £853.47 £201.51 £470.37 £941.65 
   Mail Orders 3812 £807.45 £889.52 £218.38 £544.95 £1,066.45 
   Food Stores 23087 £668.35 £821.68 £166.94 £408.22 £849.35 
   Other Retail 16867 £806.69 £950.35 £216.22 £513.00 £1,030.25 
   Recreation 6394 £866.70 £910.35 £272.23 £591.46 £1,133.69 
   Subtotal 45304 £689.94 £930.20 £129.02 £365.98 £867.72 
       
   Durables       
   Department Stores 6084 £919.96 £974.92 £295.14 £624.05 £1,170.77 
   Discount Stores 4052 £821.51 £841.83 £286.94 £581.33 £1,052.89 
   Clothing Stores 14563 £742.01 £822.92 £206.72 £485.90 £964.81 
   Hardware Stores 7124 £1,109.67 £1,197.62 £341.06 £743.07 £1,408.39 
   Vehicles 4700 £1,481.26 £1,642.09 £412.14 £887.19 £1,959.05 
   Interior Furnishing Stores 5656 £1,228.85 £1,275.01 £413.24 £825.02 £1,557.05 
   Electric Appliance Stores 5887 £1,031.85 £1,059.91 £354.99 £700.93 £1,344.82 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores 5611 £864.47 £881.34 £275.52 £594.87 £1,129.82 
   Health Care 2332 £1,101.77 £1,190.37 £325.59 £679.67 £1,425.71 
   Education 866 £1,102.37 £1,181.63 £344.00 £793.01 £1,404.02 
   Professional Services 5617 £1,049.22 £1,091.03 £355.20 £725.98 £1,352.74 
   Repair Shops 236 £1,125.72 £1,123.40 £349.27 £844.68 £1,449.76 
   Other Services 11158 £988.92 £1,161.31 £275.02 £633.79 £1,236.14 
   Subtotal 39685 £848.82 £1,117.68 £199.64 £477.17 £1,021.74 
       
   Multiple purchases total 58404 £735.09 £1,058.35 £122.85 £362.22 £893.76 
       
Note. Multiple purchase total shows the monthly spending for the Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample of monthly observations belonging to new credit card accounts. Note that the Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample includes the Single-Purchase-Type 
Sample described in Table 1. As cardholders can consume products in more than one category during the month, frequencies for each category do not add to the month observations displayed in the multiple purchases total. SD=standard 
deviation. p25=25th percentile, p50=median, and p75=75th percentile. 
Note. le purchase total shows the monthly spending for th Multiple-Purchase-Type
Sample of monthly observations belonging to new credit card accounts. Note that the
Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample includes the Single-Purchase-Type Sample described in
Table 3.1. As cardholders can consume products in more than one category during the
month, frequencies for each category do not add to the month observations displayed in the
multiple purchases total. SD=standard deviation. p25=25th percentile, p50=median, and
p75=75th percentile.
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3.3.5 Summary Statistics
Summary data for spending amounts in each of the 25 categories in the first
month Single-Purchase-Type Sample are shown in Table 3.1. The sample
comprises 21,671 observations. For non-durable spending the most common
purchase category is ‘food stores’, for durable spending the most common
purchase category is ‘clothing stores’. Mean spending totals approximately
£664 with median spending of £168. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics
for purchases in the Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample. Summary statistics
for Single-Purchase-Type and Multiple-Purchase-Type samples including all
accounts (not just new accounts) are shown in Tables A-1 and A-2 of Appendix
A. Table 3.3 summarizes the socioeconomic variables for the four samples (New
Accounts Single-Purchase-Type; New Accounts Multiple-Purchase-Type; All
Accounts Single-Purchase-Type; All Accounts Multiple-Purchase-Type). The
summary statistics are very similar across these samples.4
4This suggests that our four samples are very similar in terms of average socioeconomic
cardholder characteristics. However, we are only able to match socioeconomic variables based
on postcode for 68% of the cardholders in the data.
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3.3.6 Econometric Model
Our main interest lies in estimating whether the propensity of credit cardholders
to repay a credit card bill incurred in a given month relates to the type of
purchases made in that month.
We begin by estimating the following baseline model:
P (Repayit = 1) = β0 + β1NonDurableit + β2APRit + β3CreditLimitit




where Repay is a 1/0 dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if at least 90%
of the bill is repaid within the following month (the period in which payment
of the bill becomes due). We used the 90% threshold to take into account the
possibility of people paying the bill by rounding down to the nearest tenth or
hundred and failing to pay the exact amount, though our analysis is robust
to variations in this arbitrary choice. The variable NonDurable describes the
purchases made on the account. In estimates based on the Single-Purchase-Type
Sample, this variable is a 1/0 dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the month
contains non-durable purchases and a value of 0 for durable purchases. In the
Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample, this variable is the proportion of purchases
(as a proportion of the total monthly spend) on non-durables.
The additional variables in the model which act as control variables (all
measured at the month level) are: the annualized percentage rate on card
purchases (APR), the credit limit on the credit card account (CreditLimit), the
age of the account in years (Tenure) and a measure of utilization (Utilization).
Account utilization is measured as the ratio of the account balance (before
repayment is made) over the credit limit. Hence, a utilization value of 0.5
indicates a balance on the account at a value of half the credit limit.
The model also includes additional controls (captured by the vector X in
Equation 3.1): calendar month fixed effects to control for seasonal differences in
patterns of spending and repayment (for example, the months of November and
December are more likely to include purchases of seasonal gifts). The vector
also includes the socio-economic control variables, which are measured at the
geocode level (which contains a cluster of account × months). We also add to
the model controls for the value of the credit card bill. These are important
controls, as due to the lumpiness of durable purchases, accounts with durable
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purchases typically have higher total purchases than those with non-durable
purchases and hence these accounts might naturally have a lower likelihood
of being repaid in full. As a first approach, we control for the total purchase
amount, allowing for a flexible relationship between purchase amount and the
probability of repayment using a fifth-order polynomial. As a second approach,
we split the sample into quartiles of the total amount of durable purchases and
estimate models on each quartile on observations separately, while continuing
to include the fifth order polynomial of the total purchase amount as controls
in the model.5
We estimate our main models as Linear Probability Models (LPMs). We
also present estimates based upon Random Effects (RE) models and Fixed
Effects (FE) models. These account for correlations among repeated measures
of the same credit card account holder within the dataset.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Single Purchase Type Sample
Results from our main model estimates of Equation 3.1 for the Single-Purchase-
Type Sample are shown in Table 3.4. Column 1 shows estimates from a model
which includes only a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether purchases in the
month were non-durable and a constant term. Hence the reference group is
months of account data which contain durable purchases only. The coefficient
on the non-durable purchase dummy is 0.197, 95% CI [0.184, 0.210], and
indicates that people are almost an absolute 20 percentage points more likely
to pay their bill in full when the bill comprises monies spent on non-durable
purchases. Columns 2 and 3 add the controls for the fifth-order polynomial
in purchase amount, calendar month fixed effects and card characteristics. As
expected, with the addition of controls for the purchase amount in Column 2,
the R-squared of the model increases substantially and the coefficient on the
non-durable dummy variable reduces in absolute magnitude. The coefficient
on the non-durable dummy is 0.097, 95% CI [0.084, 0.106], and indicates that
people are almost an absolute 10 percentage points more likely to pay their bill
in full when the bill comprises monies spent on non-durable purchases.
5We split the sample by quartiles of the total value of durable purchases, instead of
splitting the sample by the total value of all purchases, in order to avoid generating quartiles
which contain account x month observations with nearly all observations of durable purchases























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To gauge the quantitative importance of the coefficient estimates, Figure 3.2
plots the predicted probability of repayment from the model estimates in
Table 3.4 (Column 3). The circles indicate the predicted probability and bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals. In the top panel, the whole sample bars
show that non-durable spending type months have a predicted probability
of repayment of approximately 60%, compared with approximately 50% for
accounts in the durable category. This 10-percentage-point difference is large
in economic terms. A natural economic comparison is to the increase in APR
which would generate an equivalent increase in the predicted probability of
bill repayment. We make this comparison based on the estimated coefficient
on the APR variable in the model, which allows us to make a correlational
comparison.6 Using the estimates from Column 3 of Table 3.4, a 15-percentage-
point increase in APR would be needed to deliver the equivalent increase in
likelihood of card repayment.
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To gauge the quantitative importance of the coefficient estimates, Figure 2 plots the 
predicted probability of repayment from the model estimates in Table 4 (Column 3). The circles 
indicate the predicted probability and bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. In the top panel, the 
whole sample bars show that non-durable spending type months have a predicted probability of 
repayment of approximately 60%, compared with approximately 50% for accounts in the durable 
category. This 10-percentage-point difference is large in economic terms. A natural economic 
comparison is to the increase in APR which would generate an equivalent increase in the predicted 
probability of bill repayment. We make this comparison based on the estimated coefficient on the 
APR variable in the model, which allows us to make a correlational comparison.6 Using the 
estimates from Column 3 of Table 4, a 15-percentage-point increase in APR would be needed to 
deliver the equivalent increase in likelihood of card repayment. 
 
Figure 2. Fitted probabilities of full repayment based on linear probability models (see Table 4, 
columns 3 to 7), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.  
 
The lower part of Figure 2 breaks down the predictions by quartiles of purchase value. 
Coefficient estimates are shown in Columns 4–7 of Table 4. Across the quartiles, the predicted 
                                                 
6 One caveat to this exercise is that in our data we do not have random variation in APR. For studies 
exploiting quasi-experimental variation in APR or random variation, see Gross and Souleles 












     
   
     
   
     
   
     
   
 Sample split by purchase amount
  Purchase value: £5.02 - £81.41
   
          
    
   
      
  
    
 
Purchase value: £81.42 - £290.64
Purchase value:  £290.65 - £931.25
Purchase value:  £931.26 - £17000
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Fitted Probability
Fitted Repayment Probability for the First Purchase in a
Single Consumption Category for New Accounts
Fig. 3.2 Probabilities of full repayment – single consumption category. Fitted probabilities of
full repayment based on linear probability models (see Table 3.4, Columns 3 to 7), evaluated
at the mea of the other covariates. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
The lower pa t of Fi re 3.2 breaks down the pred cti ns by quartiles of
purchase value. Coefficient estimates are shown in Columns 4–7 of Table 3.4.
Across the quartiles, the predicted probability of repayment is higher for spends
6One caveat to this exercise is that in our data we do not have random variation in APR.
For studies exploiting quasi-experimental variatio in APR r random v riation, ee Alan
and Loranth (2013); Bertrand et al. (2010); Gross and Souleles (2002).
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on non-durable goods, with the difference in predicted probability ranging from
approximately 0.04 to 0.14.
Table B.2.1 in the Appendix B.2 shows results with the addition of socio-
economic controls. The coefficients on the non-durable dummy variable are
very similar to those in Table 3.4.
3.4.2 Multiple Purchase Type Sample
Table 3.5 shows results from the main model estimates of Equation 3.1 for
the multiple purchase type sample. In these models the non-durable variable
measures the proportion of the spend in the month that are of the non-durable
type. The coefficient for the non-durable variable is 0.239, 95% CI [0.229,
0.249], and implies that as the share of non-durable purchases increases from
zero to 100%, people are almost exactly an absolute 24 percentage points more
likely to pay their bill in full for non-durable purchases. As in the estimates in
Table 3.4, with the inclusion of controls in Columns 2 and 3, the value of this
coefficient falls in magnitude. The coefficient value of 0.149, 95% CI [0.140,
0.158], in Column 3, indicates that a switch in the proportion of the total
monthly spending in the non-durable category from 0% to 100% increases the
likelihood of full repayment by almost exactly 15 percentage points. Again, this
is a large effect in economic terms. Using the coefficient estimates in Column 3,
the effect of switching spending on non-durable purchases from 0% to 100% is
equivalent to a 21-percentage-point increase in the card APR. Figure 3.3 shows
the size of the difference of the predicted probability of repayments of durable
and non-durable purchases.
The pattern of coefficient estimates on the control variables resembles that
in Table 3.4 The likelihood of full repayment of the credit card bill is increasing
with the APR and credit limit, but falling with account utilization. Columns
4 to 7 of Table 3.5 present estimates by quartile sub-samples. As before,
the coefficients on the non-durable variable are positive and precisely defined
in each specification, with the coefficient values implying an increase in the
likelihood of repayment of between 5 and 22 percentage points from a switch in
the proportion of the spend in non-durable purchases from 0 to 1. Table B.2.2
in the Appendix C.2 presents estimates from the same set of models as Table
3.5 with the inclusion of socio-economic control variables. The pattern in the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Fitted probabilities for full repayment based on linear probability models (see Table 5, 
columns 3 to 7), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95% confidence intervals. 
5.3 Alternative Classification of Purchase Categories 
To test whether our results depend on the classification of purchases used, we perform two 
additional robustness tests. First, as discussed above, some purchase categories might contain both 
durable and non-durable items. Therefore, we re-estimate the main results re-classifying these items in 
to the opposite purchase type.  Specifically, we flip the classification of the following categories: from 
non-durable to durable, other retail; and from durable to non-durable, professional services, other 
services, and discount stores. Appendix C replicates the main results (Tables C-3–C-4) for this 
alternative classification. Our findings remain consistent with the main results. 
Second, although our sample does not contain business credit cards, it is possible that some card 
holders use a personal credit card for business expenses. Such expenditure is likely to be non-durable 
spending which are reimbursed by the card holder’s employer and hence are likely to be repaid quickly. 
To control for this, we re-estimated the main models omitting the following categories which are those 
most likely to contain business expense: hotel / motel, travel agencies, airlines, other transportation.  
Fig. 3.3 Probabilities of full repayment – multiple consumption category. Fitted probabilities
for full repayment based on linear probability models (see Table 3.5, Columns 3 to 7),
evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
3.4.3 Alternative Classification of Purchase Categories
To test whether our results depend on e classification of purchas used, we
perform two additional robustness tests. First, as discussed above, some pur-
chase categories might contain both durable and non-durable items. Therefore,
we re-estimate the main results re-classifying these items in to the opposite
purchase type. Specifically, we flip the classification of the following categories:
from no -durable to dura le, other retail; and from durable to non-durable,
professional services, other services, and discount stores. Appendix B.3 repli-
cates the main results (Tables B.3.1 and B.3.4) for this alternative classification.
Our findings remain consistent with the main results.
Second, although our sample does not contain business credit cards, it is
possible that some card holders use a personal credit card for business expenses.
Such expenditure is likely to be non-durable spending which are reimbursed by
the card holder’s employer and hence are likely to be repaid quickly. To control
for this, we re-estimated the main models omitting the following categories
which are those most likely to contain business expense: hotel / motel, travel
agencies, airlines, other transportation. Appendix B.4 replicates the main
results (Tables B.4.1–B.4.6). Our findings remain consistent with the main
results.
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We also estimate models using the underlying merchant codes which are
classified into durable and non-durable expenditure. Appendix B.5 (Tables
B.5.1–B.5.4) shows the estimated marginal effects for each individual merchant
code. The size of these effects can be observed in Figures 3.5 and 3.6. Figure 3.5
displays the probability of full repayment of each non-durable merchant code
and, as a point of comparison at the bottom of the figure, the probability
of full repayment over all durable expenditures. Figure 3.5 shows that every
non-durable expenditure is more likely to be repaid in full than the average over
all durable expenditures. Figure 3.6 displays the probability of full repayment
of each durable merchant code and, as a point of comparison at the bottom of
the figure, the probability of full repayment over all non-durable expenditures.
Figure 3.6 shows that every durable expenditure is less likely to be repaid in
full than the average over all non-durable expenditures. Hence, our main result
that individuals are less likely to pay down durable spending is not driven by
only a few categories.
3.4.4 Using Durability Measures from a Consumer Sur-
vey
As an alternative approach to classifying items as durable and non-durable
we undertook a consumer survey on the platform Prolific Academic in which
501 individuals recruited were asked to rate the durability of items on a 1–7
scale. We obtained from Argus the approximately 500 next-level-down items
that feed into the 25 categories used in the analyses above, and asked survey
respondents to rate the durability of these individual items. Several of the
items received from Argus made reference to company names (for instance,
for the merchant code “airlines” we have American Airlines, British Airways,
Japan Airlines, etc.). There were 126 airlines companies, 80 hotels, and 24 auto
rental companies. After aggregating such items, we ended up with 274 items
to test. However, some of these items were exceptionally rare with purchase
frequencies of less than 1 in 1000 in the National Accounts. After excluding
these rare cases, we retained and tested 152 items. These 152 categories cover
95% of the weights used in the 2014 UK Consumer Price Inflation indices. We
used the following question format:
We gave each of 501 respondents recruited from Prolific Academic (and
restricted to UK nationals living in the UK) a list of these 152 of these 500





Figure 4. Question format used in the consumer survey for the classification of items in durables and 
non-durables.  
 
We gave each of 501 respondents recruited from Prolific Academic (and restricted to UK nationals 
living in the UK) a list of these 152 of these 500 next-level-down spending categories (e.g., “An Airline 
Ticket”) and had them evaluate the degree to which the item was a durable or non-durable. Some few 
people did not provide scores to some items in the survey because they were not required to evaluate 
all items if they did not want to. But 500 people replied at least 95% of the survey items.  
From these responses we calculated weighted average durability scores for the 25 merchant categories, 
applying expenditure weights from the UK National Accounts and reclassified the 25 merchant 
categories as durable or non-durable items. Our survey design and steps in analysis were pre-registered, 
with details of the methods (https://aspredicted.org/f9iu4.pdf) and results shown in Appendix G.  
Fig. 3.4 uestion for at used in the consumer survey for the classification of items in
durables and non-durables.
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evaluate the degree to which the item was a durable or non-durable. Some
few people did not provide scores to some items in the survey because they
were not required to evaluate all items if they did not want to. But 500
people replied at least 95% of the survey items. From these responses we
calculated weighted average durability scores for the 25 merchant categories,
applying expenditure weights from the UK National Accounts and reclassified
the 25 merchant categories as durable or non-durable items. Our survey
design and steps in analysis were pre-registered, with details of the methods
(https://aspredicted.org/f9iu4.pdf) and results shown in Appendix B.7.
The durable/non-durable classification from the consumer survey was very
close to the original classification based on Kuchler (2013), with the exceptions
being ‘health care’, ‘professional services’, ‘other services’, ‘mail orders’ and
‘other retail’. To test the sensitivity of our results, we re-estimated the main
models using durability scores from the survey responses. The regression tables
in Appendix B.7 are in keeping with our earlier analysis for both the single
purchase type and multiple purchase samples.
3.4.5 Controlling for Characteristics of Other Cards
We also test whether our results are robust to controlling for balances due on
other cards held by the individual at the same time. Drawing from the same
universe of data, Gathergood et al. (2017) show that consumers tend adopt
a repayment heuristic when making intra-temporal choices over allocating
payments across cards due within the same month. Instead of paying down the
highest interest rate debt first, as economic logic would predict, consumers tend
to split the ratio of repayments across their cards in approximate proportion
to the ratio of revolving balances, which Gathergood et al. (2017) describe as
the application of a ‘balance-matching heuristic’.
We draw the sub-sample of observations from our main sample in which
individuals hold two or more cards concurrently within the same month with
positive balances due.7 The resulting sample differs from that used in Gather-
good et al. (2017), who design their analysis to focus on partial repayment of
revolving debts, restricting to cases where consumer face interest payments, in
7Our universe of data contains records from five UK credit card issuers. While these
issuers comprise more than 40% of the UK market by number of cards, we cannot see all
cards held by all individuals in our sample. Therefore, we necessarily restrict our sample by
more than if we had data on all cards in the UK.
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contrast to our focus on full repayment.8We first replicate our main models on
this sample (without adding controls for additional cards), for completeness
including socio-economic controls in the regression specification. Appendix B.6
Table B.6.1 shows that the coefficients on the non-durable variables are very
similar to those obtained using the main samples.
In Tables B.6.2 to B.6.5 we then expand the econometric specification by
adding control variables drawing on characteristics of the other cards held. We
first control for the number of cards held. In a series of additional models, we
then control for the balance on other cards, the ratio of the balance of the first
card to the total balance on all cards (to control for ‘balance-matching’ across
cards), and additional specifications including dummy variables for whether the
first card has the highest utilization among all cards, lowest utilization among
all cards, highest balance among all cards and finally the lowest balance among
all cards. We do not include all of these measures in a single specification are
they are highly correlated.9
Results show that the coefficients on the non-durable variables are unchanged
from those in the earlier models. The coefficients on the multiple-card variables
are consistent with consumers being more likely to pay down the card with
the highest balance. The coefficient on the ratio of balance on the first card
to balances on all cards is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
implying a higher balance on the current card increases the likelihood of full
repayment. The coefficients on the other variables show that when the first
card has the highest balance, or utilization (which correlate), the card is more
likely to be repaid in full, and conversely when the first card has the lowest
8Specifically, Gathergood et al. (2017) restrict their sample to observations where individ-
uals, holding fixed total monthly repayments, have scope to reallocate payments across cards
to minimize interest charges. They restrict the sample to months in which the individual i)
carries revolving debt on all cards, ii) faces different interest rates on the cards, iii) pays at
least the minimum balance due on all cards and iv) does not pay all their cards down in
full. These restrictions allow the authors to analyse whether individuals are minimising their
interest charges. In the current analysis, we restrict to observations where the individual
begins the month not revolving any debt (so that we can link spending and repayment).
Hence, the samples used in the current paper and those in Gathergood et al. (2017) are
mutually exclusive.
9Gathergood et al. (2017) design analysis to distinguish which from a set of candidate
repayment heuristics based on these variables best explain consumer repayment behaviour
across multiple cards. They use two approaches, one based upon goodness of fit criterion to
determine which heuristic is closest on average to the observed allocation of payments across
cards and a second based on determining which heuristic best fits on an observation-by-
observation basis. Our econometric implementation of these heuristics as control variables in
Appendix B.6, while delivering results in keeping with those from Gathergood et al. (2017),
does not therefore exactly match the econometric techniques used in that paper.
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balance, or utilization, it is less likely to be repaid in full. From this analysis we
conclude that repayment behaviour appears to be driven by both inter-temporal





Figure 5. Fitted probabilities of full repayment based on linear probability models (see Tables 
E-1 and E-2, column 1), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95% 
confidence intervals.  
Fig. 3.5 Probabilities of full repayment b merchant codes – single consumption c tegory.
Fitted probabilities of full repayment based on linear probability models (see Tables B.5.1
and B.5.2, Column 1), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95%
confidence intervals
3.4.6 Older Accounts Samples
Next, we widened the sample to older accounts, incorporating months of data
which include single and multiple purchase types. In these wider samples, we






Figure 6. Fitted probabilities for full repayment based on linear probability models (see Tables 
E-3 and E-4, column 1), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95% 
confidence intervals. 
Fig. 3.6 Probabiliti s of full repayment by erch nt codes – multip e consumption category.
Fitted probabilities for full repayment based on linear probability models (see Tables B.5.3
and B.5.4, Column 1), evaluated at the mean of the other covariates. Lines span 95%
confidence intervals.
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we are able to estimate models with individual level random effects and fixed
effects.
Table 3.6 shows results from a Single-Purchase-Type Sample of older ac-
counts. We report specifications without controls (Column 1), with the inclusion
of a fifth-order polynomial in purchase amount (Column 2) and with the inclu-
sion of additional controls and month fixed effects (Column 3). Columns 4–6
repeat these three specifications with the addition of socio-economic controls.
The sample size is smaller as these controls are available for only for 69% of
the data. Columns 7–9 again repeat these specifications with the addition of
individual fixed effects. The sample size reduces in these specifications as only
accounts which contribute at least two months are retained in the account fixed
effects models.
Results show that, consistently across all model estimates, the coefficient
on the non-durable purchase type dummy is positive with a tight CI. Based
upon the fullest specifications incorporating controls (Columns 3, 6 and 9),
the coefficient on the non-durable dummy implies switching from durable to
non-durable purchases raises the likelihood of repayment by between 0.7–3.0
percentage points, a smaller range of magnitude to that found in the earlier
analysis of new accounts. The coefficient estimates on the covariates are keeping
with those returned in previous models: the propensity to repay an account in
full increases with APR and reduces with the credit limit and card utilization.
Table 3.7 reports results from the Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample. The
sample is here again much larger due to the higher prevalence of accounts
with purchase of more than one consumption type. Across all model estimates
shown in Table 3.7, the coefficient on the proportion of the total monthly
spending on purchases of the non-durable type is positive and precisely defined.
Depending upon the model specification, the coefficient varies between 1.0–4.0
percentage points. Hence, the propensity to repay accounts in full increases
with non-durable purchases among older accounts even when conditioning for















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Research on mental accounting has extensively probed violations of the com-
monly assumed fungibility of money and has convincingly argued that the
labeling of mental budgets, the allocation of money and the sources of income
can have an important influence on consumers’ choices (Prelec and Loewenstein,
1998; Thaler, 1999). Much of the early evidence, however, came from studies
using judgments of hypothetical spending and repayment scenarios and from
non-representative samples of young adults.
Subsequent empirical investigations of mental accounting have shifted toward
observational field studies (Beatty et al., 2014; Kooreman, 2000; Milkman and
Beshears, 2009), as well as one experimental field study (Abeler and Marklein,
2017). However, most of these studies have focused almost exclusively on
the issue of labeling—that is, of whether earmarking payments for particular
purposes affects the way they are spent, even when individuals would naturally
spend more on the category of consumption than the amount of the earmarked
payments.
In this paper, we use credit card data to test a specific prediction of a theory
of mental accounting proposed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998): whether
debt incurred on consumables is more likely to be paid off more rapidly than
debt incurred on durables. Analyzing data on credit card usage and repayment
behaviour provided by five UK credit card issuers, we provide strong support
for this prediction of the theory. In a series of analyses that based on different
subsets of the data including both new and older credit card accounts, and
that incorporate different configurations of controls including random effects
and individual fixed effects, we find that this effect of purchase type on the
propensity to repay is strong and robust. Repayment of non-durable goods
is an absolute 10% more likely than repayment of durable goods. The size
strength of this relationship is comparable to an increment in 15 percentage
points in the credit cards’ APR—an economically large relationship. We hope
these results will motivate a deeper investigation of the mental accounting
implications on consumer choice.
Although our evidence provides support for the prediction it was intended
to test, inevitably, there limitations to our analysis. One is that there was some
arbitrariness in the division of spending categories used to catalogue the nature
of consumption. We carefully chose our original classification based on the
previous literature, and this was the first and only classification we have tested.
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After the initial analysis we conducted, and report here, we ran tests designed
to assess the robustness of the estimated effects under alternative classification
schemes. Unfortunately, however, we do not have data on the exact product or
service purchased in an individual transaction. Furthermore, we were unable
to filter the impact of other important determinants of repayment behaviour,
such as the sources of income or the locations of funds cardholders use for
repayment, due to data constraints. These may be other dimensions of the
credit card spending and repayment decisions in which mental accounting
might be relevant. Our analysis, however, attempts to reduce these concerns
by controlling for differences in socioeconomic status, using proxies of income
deprivation in the area surrounding the cardholder postcode, and by controlling
for unobserved (time constant) heterogeneity among cardholders.
These results have diverse implications for managerial decision making. First,
focusing specifically on credit cards, they point to potential new innovations that
could give credit cards a strategic advantage. Repayment options currently are
focusing on the amount to be repaid, with typical options being the minimum
amount to avoid a penalty charge, the last statement balance, or the full current
balance. The results just presented suggest, however, that credit card issuers
could potentially attract customers by offering repayment options that permit
repayment of specific purchases as opposed to amounts. This would increase
the tightness of ‘coupling’ of purchases and payments, which, according to
Prelec and Loewenstein’s (1998) model, should increase the pain of paying for
goods and services, but decrease the pain of paying off the credit card. Similar
strategies could be employed for other financial instruments via, for example,
the partitioning of spending and savings accounts (see Loewenstein et al., 2012).
Second, and more generally, the notion of pain of paying, reinforced by these
new findings, could have diverse implications for the delivery of incentives. In
many situations, managers are interested in increasing the impact of incentives,
e.g., for employees or customers, and in these situations the value of incentives
could be enhanced by delivering them in the form of earmarked payments aimed
at expenses that individuals find it painful to pay for. For example, although
from an economic perspective, customers should be indifferent to whether a
discount is applied to an overall purchase, or to some specific component of that
purchase (e.g., the cost of the good itself, taxes, or shipping), customers may
find some of these components more painful to pay for than others; and firms
could benefit from framing a discount as being applied to those components.
Likewise, special bonus rewards provided to employees for engaging in specific
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behaviours, such as engaging with a wellness program or achieving high rates
of customer satisfaction, could again be targeted to paying off expenses that
employees dislike paying for—e.g., dental insurance premiums, parking, or other
commuting costs. As these examples suggest, managers have barely begun to
take advantage of the diverse opportunities available for exploiting variability
in the pain of paying, both across situations and people (see Rick et al., 2008).
In sum, our analysis provides a new theoretically grounded data point in
a growing body of empirical research documenting systematic violations of
the predictions of standard consumer theory in ways predicted by theories of
mental accounting.
Chapter 4




When making financial decisions, individuals face financial choices but also
face the additional choice of how much attention to pay to their financial situa-
tion. Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals allocate resources—
including their attention—rationally, choosing to be optimally attentive in light
of competing needs and limited time resource (Sims, 2003). However, recent
empirical studies show that individuals allocate their attention in non-rational
ways, including not paying attention to sales taxes (Taubinsky and Rees-Jones,
2017) or avoiding paying attention to negative checking account balances (Pagel,
2018). Understanding how individuals allocate attention in practice is impor-
tant for understanding individual financial behaviour and developing realistic
models of financial market interaction.
In this chapter, we study how individual investors allocate attention to their
trading accounts. Existing studies have found that investors allocate much
more attention to their accounts than is explained by the functional need to
make trades. For example, Sicherman et al. (2015) find that investors log in to
view their account position on average 40 times more frequently than making
a trade. Recent studies find that investor attention measured through logins,
differs depending on whether the investor’s portfolio is making gains or losses
(Gherzi et al., 2014; Sicherman et al., 2015). This raises the question of what
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drives investors to devote attention to their investment accounts, if it is not
primarily the need to trade.
We draw upon detailed data from Barclays Stockbroking, one of the UK’s
largest execution-only trading platforms for individual investors. The data
covers a large sample of investors over a multi-year panel, with detailed infor-
mation on investor characteristics and records of daily login behaviour. A key
advantage of our data is that we can observe the exact portfolio holdings of
investor on a daily basis. This allows us to match in data on security prices
and performance.
This rich data allows us to go beyond previous studies, which have explored
the relationship between movements in aggregate index prices and individual
login behaviour. Studies adopt this approach of relating aggregate index
movements to individual attention despite much evidence in the previous
literature that most investors holding only a few stocks (Barberis and Huang,
2001; Barberis, 2018; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Unlike those studies, in
ours we can examine how investors respond to movements in the prices of the
stocks in their own portfolios, and also examine the dynamics of attention
around the time of investors’ trading activity.
Our main contribution is to show that investors allocate attention to their
portfolios in ways consistent with attention being allocated to optimize hedonic
utility (i.e., the satisfaction or pain arising from observing movements in the
value of a portfolio).
We build this contribution upon three findings. First, we find that investors
log in much more frequently than they trade, suggesting that logging in derives a
significant hedonic utility component for the individual investor. In our sample
of individual investors, the ratio of logins to trades is approximately ten-to-one.
Hence, most logins are unconnected to trading activity. This ten-to-one ratio is
not as high as in the sample of 401k accounts used in Sicherman et al. (2015).
However, 401k long-term saving accounts differ in many aspects compared with
the brokerage accounts in our data. Hence, we might expect that 401k accounts
are particularly inactive in trades as individuals set contribution limits via their
employer and are unlikely to trade within the 401k plan. In our sample, both
occasional and regular traders log in much more frequently than they trade.
Second, we find evidence for Ostrich effects in investor attention. Previous
studies have concentrated on the relationship between aggregate market index
movements and investor login behaviour. Instead, we examine the relationship
between price movements of the stocks within the investor’s portfolio and login
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behaviour. Focusing on reactions to price movements after buy-trades, we show
that investors who make price gains on recent buy trades log in more than
investors who make price losses (or who see prices unchanged). These effects
are seen among investors with both thick and thin portfolios, and persist over
multiple weeks following the buy-trade. These patterns are consistent with
models of hedonic utility in which individuals are averse to experiencing losses
on their portfolios.
Third, we show that the allocation of attention to portfolios varies with the
opportunity cost of time. Using shocks of local weather, we show that on sunny
days investors are less likely to view their portfolios. This suggests that the
utility value of good-weather leisure is a substitute for the hedonic utility value
of viewing the portfolio position. We implement this analysis using matched
postcode data on local weather, conditioning on both region and day fixed
effects.
Our findings also relate to the broader study of attention. Gabaix (2017)
distinguishes between optimal inattention under which attention is allocated
to maximize individual utility and behavioural attention, whereby attention
is allocated by behavioural biases. Gabaix (2017) suggests different measures
of attention including inferring inattention from sub-optimal behaviour (i.e.
assumed inattention), survey measures of time spent paying attention and proxy
measures of attention, such as logins. Our use of logins as a proxy measure
of attention is facilitated by the rise of online-only trading platforms and is a
reliable measure by virtue of the automated, machine driven collection of the
login records.
Our results have implications for models of attention. While the canonical
model of optimal inattention of Sims (2003) assumes that individuals allocate
attention rationally, our results show a strong hedonic utility role for the
allocation of attention. Investors appear to be loss averse to experienced losses.
Much evidence exists for loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Loss
aversion has been suggested as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle,
and the under-diversification positions of many investors (Barberis and Huang,
2001; Barberis et al., 2016). However, our results are consistent with a model
of aversion to observed losses, even when those losses are not realized. Hence,
investors may be averse to seeing losses on their accounts, as well as being
averse to realising those losses in their trading activity.
Prior studies have also suggested that individuals allocate attention in
sub-optimal ways. DellaVigna (2009) shows that investors are under-responsive
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to earnings announcements that are released on Friday afternoons, distorting
trading behaviour. Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2017) show that investors are
unresponsive to changes in sales taxes which are not salient in posted prices in
retail stores.
Our study also contributes to the broader literature on the behaviour of
individual investors. The prior literature shows that although the optimal
portfolio diversification strategy is long-established (Markowitz, 1952), most
investors hold only a few stocks in their portfolio (Barber and Odean, 2013;
Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Investors also exhibit biases in their trading
behaviour, such as over-trading and rank effects (Barber and Odean, 2000,
2001; Hartzmark, 2014). Our findings contribute to the study of the role of
psychology in investor behaviour (Barberis, 2018) and more broadly to the
application of psychology to economic decision making (DellaVigna, 2009).
4.2 Data
We use anonymous individual investor account level panel data provided by
Barclays Stockbroking, a large UK based execution-only brokerage platform.
Barclays Stockbroking offers a competitively priced platform, offering the ability
to trade individual stocks, mutual funds and a range of retail focused securities.
Data were provided by Barclays for the purpose of academic research, with no
constraint on the research agenda.1 The data set provided by Barclays contains
a total of 155,309 accounts, including accounts which opened and closed, during
the period April 02, 2012 to March 29, 2016. During this period, there were no
significant changes to the Barclays Stockbroking platform.2
4.2.1 Trading Account Types
The majority of investors hold non-tax favored trading accounts with no limits
on investment sizes or withdrawals. Hence, attention and login activity is
unlikely to be affected by rules regarding withdrawal limits or the allowable
timing of withdrawals. The Barclays Stockbroking platform offered a range of
account types, all of which were execution-only, but differed in taxable status
and liquidity. The majority of accounts are tax liable direct investing accounts,
1Barclays Stockbroking have not reviewed this manuscript.
2Subsequently, Barclays have substantially overhauled their execution-only brokerage
platform which has also been re-branded to Barclays SmartInvestor.
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with no limits on investment amounts or withdrawals. Additionally, 24% of
accounts are Retail Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). ISA investments are
non-tax accruing, with caps on maximum annual investment amounts, which
are likely to limit login activity once the maximum buy amount limit is reached.
A further 3% of accounts were money-purchase Self-Invested Personal Pensions
(SIPP), which are also non-tax accruing and have no option to withdraw funds
until a set retirement age. Fewer than 1% of accounts correspond to other
categories (such as Advisory Dealing Accounts, Corporate ISA, Advisory ISA).
4.2.2 Description of Key Variables
Most accounts in the dataset trade individual stocks listed on the London
Stock Exchange (LSE). Trading of more complex securities is uncommon
among European retail investors. During the data period, trading in diversified
products such as Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) had not
yet reached popularity in the UK, with only 18% of accounts trading Mutual
Funds or ETFs at least once during the period. As we show later, investors
trading these diversified products differ in their login frequency compared to
investors trading individual stocks.
The dataset contains information on investor characteristics, account logins
(by day) and very detailed data on account activity and positions. Investor
characteristics (measured once in the dataset at account opening) include in-
vestor age, gender and account tenure. The dataset contains dated observations
of every login to the account. All account activity is recorded in the data,
including buy and sell trades, stock-splits and account management fees and
charges. The account activity data includes details on individual positions
bought and sold, including stock identifiers. We use these identifiers to match
in data on individual stocks and securities from Datastream.
In addition, the data set contains quarterly records of portfolio balances on
all positions in the portfolio. Combining these quarterly stock position data
with the daily buy and sell flow data, we are able to recreate individual account
portfolios at daily frequency. Also, in cases where investors transfer accounts
into Barclays Stockbroking from another investment platform, we observe the
details of all positions transferred in and hence we can also recreate portfolios
for these account types.
The ability of observing portfolio details at the daily level is particularly
advantageous for studying investor attention. Many studies document that
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individual investors tend to hold only a few stocks (Barber and Odean, 2013;
Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008). Hence, we might expect that investors are
particularly attentive to the price movements of the small number of stocks
they hold, rather than to aggregate indices (e.g., the FTSE100) which will
have little information about price movements for the stocks they actually hold.
Whereas Sicherman et al. (2015) examine the relationship between aggregate
index movements and individual login behaviour, we are able to examine the
relationship between movements in prices of the specific stocks held by investors
and investor login behaviour.
4.2.3 Sample Selection
Our interest lies in investor attention, measured by login activity. We therefore
make the following sample selections to create a baseline sample. We start our
analysis with a representative 10% random sample of accounts, including 15,013
accounts in total. The unit of observation in the data is an account × day. First,
we drop observations for dormant accounts. We drop account × days during
periods of at least one year in which the account made no login or trade, as these
long periods of inactivity suggest that the account is dormant. The remaining
observations allow us to define cycles of account activity. Additionally, we drop
all cycles that have fewer than two logins and two transactions, as in these
cases we cannot observe the period between transactions and, fundamentally,
the period between logins, which is our main measure of attention. Second, we
drop all observations for accounts for which we cannot reconstruct portfolios
due to missing prices data (this arises when accounts have positions in securities
for which no label is provided), and also for accounts for which there is missing
demographic data (the age and gender variables are missing). Finally, we also
drop the top and the bottom 1% of accounts by average portfolio value over
the sample period to avoid results being driven by a very small sample of very
high wealth individual investors, or the other way around. The lower bound
threshold for removing the top 1% of accounts by average value is £2,100,377,
while the bottom 1% is £44.30.
Table 4.1 shows the results of these steps in sample selection. Of the 6,623
accounts dropped due to sample selection, 59.9% are dropped due to account
inactivity. The baseline sample retains 55.9% of accounts. The other steps in
sample selection drop only 23.1% of days with logins and only 27.7% of days
with transaction. The baseline sample is unbalanced, i.e., accounts open and
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Fig. 4.1 Distribution of accounts by number of months in the baseline sample. Histogram of
the number of months accounts are active in the data. Active account defined as as an
account with at least two login-days and at least two transaction-days during a period of
activity. A period of activity compromises any year or consecutive years in which the
account has at least one login-day per year.
close during the sample period. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of accounts
by number of months for which they are present in the baseline sample. The
majority of accounts are in the sample for the entire period, with only a small
minority of accounts present for less than half of the full sample period.
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4.2.4 Baseline Sample Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 provides summary data for the baseline sample. Panel A summarizes
investor demographic characteristics. The majority of account holders are male.
The average age of an account holder is 54 years. Account holders have held
their accounts for, on average, 5 years.
Panel B summarizes account characteristics. The average portfolio value
(calculated by first taking the average portfolio value of an account, and then
averaging across all accounts) is close to £55,000. However, the distribution of
account portfolio values has a long right-tail. The average value is higher than
the 75th percentile, and the median portfolio value is £15,000.3.
In keeping with the evidence of prior studies, our sample of UK investors
hold portfolios that are highly concentrated in only a few stocks. Accounts
have less than 7% of their portfolio invested in mutual funds. The number of
stocks held is on average only 5, and at the median only 3.
The final two rows of Table 4.2 summarize login and transaction activity at
the monthly level. On average, accounts show at least one login in 73.1% of
months in which they are present in the data, at the 75th percentile accounts
show logins in every month in which they are present in the data. Accounts
on average show logins more frequently than they show trades. On average,
accounts show at least one transaction in 27.6% of months in which they are
present in the data.
3Note that these summary data are for the baseline sample having dropped the top 1% of
accounts by portfolio value. The top 1% contains some accounts with portfolio values in the
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4.3 Frequency of Logins vs. Frequency of Trades
We begin our analysis of investor attention to their accounts by comparing
login activity with transaction activity. In keeping with Sicherman et al. (2015),
we find that investors log in much more frequently than they trade. We then
explore the determinants of investor login activity.
For each account, we calculate the frequency of login-days and the frequency
of transaction-days (days on which a buy or sell transaction is made).4 Because
our account data contain account openings and closings, the panel is unbalanced.
We calculate the frequency of logins as the account-level average distance (in
days) between login-days and the frequency of transactions as the account-level
average distance (in days) between transaction-days.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the distributions of login frequency, trading frequency
and the correlation between the two.5
Panel A of Figure 4.2 illustrates the correlation between frequency of logins
(shown on the y-axis on a scale of 0–40 days) and frequency of trades (shown on
the x-axis on a scale of 0–400 days). The plot shows a clear positive relationship
between login frequency and trading frequency, but that logins are much more
frequent than trades across the full distribution of login and trading frequency.
The line of best fit has a slope of approximately 0.1, implying that accounts
log in approximately ten times more frequency than they trade. Notably, a
linear line of best fit fits the data reasonably well, with the data showing a little
concavity in the top-right quadrant. Hence, login frequency is much higher
than trading frequency for accounts that are very active in logging in and
trading (located in the bottom-left quadrant of the plot) and for accounts that
are less active (located in the top-right quadrant of the plot).
Panels B and C illustrate the distributions of login frequency and trading
frequency. These two marginal distributions have similar shapes. Approximately
4.91% of accounts log in every day, with 45.12% of accounts logging in on
average at least once per week. Panel B illustrates the frequency of trades.
Notably, the density of high-frequency trade accounts is far lower than that
4Our definition of transaction-days excludes automatic transactions, such as automatic
dividend reinvestments. Hence we define a transaction-day as a day on which the investor
logged-in to their trading account and made a manual instruction.
5In the plots in Figure 4.2, we restrict the data to the bottom 95% of accounts, excluding
those who log in in intervals greater than 70 days. Table 4.3 reports summary statistics for
these variables from the unrestricted baseline sample.
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Fig. 4.2 Frequency of logins vs. frequency of trades. Panels A and B show histograms of the
account level average distance between days with a login and the account level average
distance between days with a trade. Panel C shows a binned scatter plot of the two
variables (100 bins). In Panels A and B the baseline sample is further restricted to the
bottom 95% of accounts by the x-axis variable.
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Table 4.3 Logins Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max p25 p50 p75
Interval Between Logins (days) 18.80 27.69 1.05 377.67 3.22 8.48 22.85
Interval Between Transactions (days) 114.66 135.86 1.00 1379.00 32.60 70.50 144.29
Ratio of Login Days to Transactions Days 20.43 35.48 1.00 602.50 5.00 9.69 21.10
N 8390
Note. The intervals between login-days and the intervals between transaction-days are ac-
count average measures.
of high frequency login accounts. Only 3.58% of accounts trade on average at
least once per week.
Table 4.3 provides summary data on the frequency of logins and trades.
Accounts see logins on average every 19 days, but see transactions every 115
days. At the median, accounts see logins every 8 days but trades only every 71
days. The bottom row of Table 4.3 shows the ratio of login-days to transactions
days. This is calculated as the total number of login-days for an account during
the period in which the account is present in the baseline sample, divided by
the total number of transaction-days for an account during the period in which
the account is present in the baseline sample. At the median, the ratio takes a
value close to 10, implying that accounts log in 10 times more frequently than
they trade. The mean value is nearly double this, driven by a small number
of accounts that log in very frequently (including the small subset of accounts
that see logins every day of the sample period).
The tendency of investors to log in much more frequently than they trade
suggests that in our data sample, as in Sicherman et al. (2015), login activity
has a strong hedonic component. Most login activity is evidently not for the
purpose of making transactions alone. Hence, investors are clearly logging in
most of the time in order to purely view their accounts. Even if investors log
in once to place a transaction order and then again to check that the order has
been executed (most likely logging in the next day), such behaviour cannot
account for investors logging in ten times more frequently than they trade.
4.3.1 Correlates of Login behaviour
In this section, we explore the correlates of login behaviour. To do so, we
estimate parsimonious Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models. In
our baseline cross-sectional model specification, the dependent variable is the
account-level average interval between logins, measured in days. Hence, each
account contributes one observation to this cross-sectional model.
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Table 4.4 reports results from the cross-sectional OLS regression model.
The specification in Column 1 includes only investor characteristics—age and
gender. The specification in Column 2 adds controls for the portfolio value (the
account-level average value of the portfolio over the sample period) and the
number of transaction days per month. Column 3 adds the number of stocks
held in the portfolio (the account-level average over the sample period) and a
dummy indicating whether the portfolio includes an investment in mutual funds
during the data period. All models include a constant term and geographic
region of residence fixed effects.
Results in Column 1 show that women have a longer average interval between
logins compared to men. The coefficient value of 3.6 on the female dummy in
Column 1 implies that female investors have an average interval between logins
that is 3.6 days longer than the male average. With the addition of controls
in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient falls to 2.0, but remains precisely defined.
The sample average overall is 18.8, and so two additional days are comparable
to 10% of the number of days between logins for the average investor.
Results in Column 2 show that the interval between logins decreases with
the number of trades per month. This relationship is in part mechanical because
investors have to log in to their accounts in order to make a trade. Conditional
on this, results in Columns 2 and 3 show that the interval between logins
decreases with the size of the investor’s portfolio and decreases with the number
of stocks. The relationship between number of stocks and intervals between
logins is non-monotonic, with the coefficient estimates implying the interval
between logins is shorter at the third quartile of the number of stocks compared
with the fourth quartile. These coefficient estimates are consistent with investors
paying on average more attention to their portfolios as the financial stakes
increase (portfolio value) and with the complexity of the portfolio (number of
stocks held).
We further explore the correlates of login behaviour using data on within-
investor changes in login behaviour over time. There may be important stable
individual differences in login behaviour, such as personality, that cannot
be controlled for in a cross-section regression. Therefore, we also present
panel (fixed-effects) estimates. To conduct this analysis, we take within-quarter
averages of time-varying variables (e.g., the time-varying measure of the account
portfolio value is the average portfolio value within the quarter). We then
estimate models with account fixed effects. The advantage of these models is
that they control for account specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 4.4 Interval Between Logins, Pooled OLS Models
(1) (2) (3)
Female=1 3.566*** 2.013*** 1.958***
(0.734) (0.655) (0.652)
Investor Age
(ref: 27 year old or less )
28 - 37 years old 1.628 1.166 1.035
(1.446) (1.287) (1.280)
38 - 47 years old 2.594 3.210** 2.778*
(1.408) (1.264) (1.258)
48 - 57 years old -1.347 1.265 0.910
(1.378) (1.253) (1.247)
58 - 67 years old -2.817 0.966 0.698
(1.453) (1.331) (1.325)
68 or more years old -2.819 1.489 1.219
(1.518) (1.394) (1.391)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -2.327*** -1.126
(0.775) (0.787)
Quartile 3 -4.703*** -2.666***
(0.793) (0.845)









Number of Trade Days per Month’
Quartile 2 -15.198*** -15.104***
(0.760) (0.758)
Quartile 3 -26.094*** -25.767***
(0.766) (0.773)
Quartile 4 -31.574*** -31.423***
(0.781) (0.801)
Investment in Mutual Funds = 1 -5.638***
(0.718)
Constant 16.545*** 38.653*** 40.507***
(4.411) (3.962) (3.955)
Observations 8390 8390 8390
Adjusted R-squared 0.0077 0.2185 0.2274
Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Note. Regressors included in the estimation correspond to average measures
by account. Portfolio value and number of stocks were measured on the first
business day of the month and then averaged across months. Quartiles rep-
resent the following values: for frequency of days with trades in a month,
Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13 to 0.28 days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and Q4:
0.62 to 17.90 days; for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1: 0.04 to 4.50, Q2:
4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21 to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to 2100.38; and for the
number of stocks, Q1: 0.02 to 1.48, Q2: 1.48 to 3.11, Q3: 3.11 to 6.26, and
Q4: 6.26 to 69.04 stocks. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
*** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table 4.5 Interval Between Logins, Individual Fixed Effects
Models
(1) (2)
Log Portfolio Value (£1000) -2.468*** -3.322***
(0.161) (0.179)
Number of Stocks 0.422***
(0.046)
Number of Trade Days per Month -4.567*** -4.620***
(0.134) (0.134)
Investment in Mutual Funds = 1 2.979***
(0.750)
Observations 91402 91402
Number of Accounts 8214 8214
Adjusted R-squared 0.3554 0.3563
Account FE Yes Yes
Note. Regressors included in the panel data estimation are
quarter average measures by account. Investment in mutual
funds is a dummy equal to one when the investor’s portfolio
had any mutual fund during the quarter. A fewer number
of accounts than the baseline total is included in the regres-
sion. This reduction is because the panel regression requires
at least two quarters of activity. So the accounts that have
a short active period of less than two quarters (or less than
three logins-days in two different quarters) are omitted. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,**
p<0.02, * p<0.05.
Results are shown in Table 4.5. Results in Column 1 show that accounts
containing higher valued portfolios log in more frequently, confirming the cross-
sectional relationship. A £1,000 increase in the log portfolio value is associated
with a 2.47 days reduction in distance between login-days. The coefficient on
the number of days with trades per month implies that an account with one
additional trade per month has an interval between login-days which is 4.6
days shorter.
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The model shown in Column 2 include measures of diversification: the
number of stocks held in the portfolio and whether the portfolio includes an
investment in mutual funds during the quarter. The coefficients on both of
these variables are positive, implying that more diversified accounts have a
longer period between logins. This is consistent with more diversified investors
paying less attention to the performance of individual stocks. The coefficient
magnitudes imply that a portfolio with one additional stocks has a 0.4 days
longer interval between logins, and that during the quarters in which the
investor holds a mutual fund the interval between logins is 3.0 days longer.
These coefficients have reversed sign compared to those in Table 4.4. However,
these models include account fixed effects and are therefore identified from
within-person changes in account positions over time, ruling out the confound
that investors who diversify more may be different in their attention behaviour
to those who diversify less.
4.4 Selective Attention I: Stock Prices and Lo-
gin Behaviour
In the final two sections of the chapter, we use two natural experiment to
examine how investor attention varies with the hedonic utility value of attention.
First, in this section we examine patterns in login behaviour in the period
following trades, with a specific interest in differences in login behaviour among
investors making gains (which yield positive hedonic utility) and losses (which
yield negative hedonic utility) from recent trades. Second, in the next section
we examine how login behaviour varies with good weather (which raises the
opportunity cost of paying attention to the account). Both of these natural
experiments generate variation in the hedonic value of paying attention to the
investment account.
Existing studies examine the relationship between investor attention and
movements in stock market prices (Gherzi et al., 2014; Sicherman et al., 2015).
These studies find either the well-known “Ostrich” effect, whereby attention
falls in light of bad news, such as declines in the market index, or the alternative
“Meerkat” effect, whereby investors increase their portfolio monitoring following
both positive and daily negative market returns. One shortcoming of using
the market index is that, as is well documented in the literature on individual
investor behaviour, most investors do not hold index funds but instead pick
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a small number of stocks (Barber and Odean, 2013; Goetzmann and Kumar,
2008). Hence, movements in the value of the index are likely to be relevant
only for a small subset of investors.
With our rich data on the portfolio positions of individual investors, we
can exploit the investor-specific information on portfolio positions and logins
to analyse the relationship between login activity and movements in the prices
of the particular stocks held by an investor. Specifically, we study the login
behaviour of investors on days following a buy-trade. We examine how investor
login behaviour varies by losses and gains on the specific stock purchased via
the buy-trade.
From the baseline sample, we restrict to the sub-sample of accounts that
make at least one buy-trade in the sample period, remain in the data for at
least 5 days after the day of the buy-trade, and have no other trades (buy or
sell) in the 5 days period after the first buy-trades.6 This restriction removes
only a modest proportion of accounts, providing 6,456 accounts for analysis.
We then examine login behaviour over the 5-day period following the day of
the buy-trade.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the main results. Panels A and B illustrate the
probability of a login on the 5 days following a buy-trade (day 0). The sample
is split into three groups by the change in price on the stock purchased via the
buy-trade: price increases (the blue line), decreases (the red line) and prices
unchanged (to the nearest penny, the grey line). In Panel A, the reference price
is the price the day before, in Panel B the reference price is the price on the
day of the buy-trade (day 0).7 By construction, all investors in the sample log
in on the day of the buy-trade, day 0, to place the order. Figure 4.4 illustrates
the distribution of price changes over the 5 day period following the day of the
buy-trade. The distribution of returns is very close to a normal distribution.
The pattern seen in both panels A and B of Figure 4.3 is that, on the
days following the buy-trade, investors are more likely to log in if the stock
has increased in price, or remained unchanged, compared to if the stock had
decreased in price. This is true under both definitions of price change based
on the two reference groups. The effect is also seen on each of the five days
following the day of the buy-trade.
6We make this additional restriction in order to remove any effects of login behaviour
arising due to multiple trades. This restriction drops only a small number of accounts that
make trades in close succession.
7Individual investors may focus on price changes since the day of the buy-trade, as
suggested by evidence for the disposition effect.
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Fig. 4.3 Probability of logging in by price change of most recent purchased stock. The top
panel shows the raw likelihood of logging in during the 5 business days following the
purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays, according to changes in the daily return of
that stock; while the bottom panel, according to changes in the return of that stock since
the purchase day. The probability of logging in is displayed for the cases in which the trader
has a portfolio of stocks and buy a new stock or has one or more stocks in his portfolio and
increase his position in one of these stocks (26,166 weeks from 6,456 accounts). In all weeks,
no other transaction has taken place. Figures C.1.1 and C.1.2 distinguish patterns of logins
for each of these cases. Histograms of returns for the week following the transaction are
shown in Figure 4.4. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
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Fig. 4.4 Distribution of stock returns. Panel A displays the daily return since purchase of
stocks during the following five business days after the purchase, excluding the weeks in the
top/bottom 1% of returns. Panel B displays the daily return (day t vs day t − 1) of stocks
during the following five business days after the purchase, excluding the weeks in the
top/bottom 1% of returns. Weeks included are those in which the trader bought only one
stock and make no other transaction during the week (21,315 weeks from 6,077 accounts).
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In Appendix C, we show that this difference in login behaviour by increase /
decrease in price of the stock purchased holds true across accounts by different
types of portfolio positions on the buy-day, such as accounts with or without
other stocks in the portfolio. Figure C.1.1 shows that the same pattern is seen
in response to daily price changes after buy-days in accounts with single stocks,
in accounts with multiple stocks when buying a new stock, and in accounts with
multiple stocks when topping-up a position in an existing stock. Figure C.1.2
shows that these patterns are the same when using the buy-day as the reference
day. The same pattern is also seen when the time-period after the buy-day
is extended to 20 business days (a month), illustrated here in Figure 4.5 for
all buy-days and in Appendix C, in Figures C.1.3 and C.1.4, for the same
three subsets of buy-days as shown in Figure C.1.1, but extended to the 20-day
period.
We use an econometric model to estimate the strength of the relationship
between movements in prices of the stock purchased on the buy-day and login
behaviour. Table 4.6 shows results from a baseline model specification in which
the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the account
logged in at least once during the day. Logins are studied from the first week
after the buy-day (Column 1) to the fourth week after the buy-day (Column
4). Each week is composed by 5 business days. Observing login behaviour over
the 4-week period allows us to test whether the price effect on login behaviour
is temporary with the purchase of a new stock, or whether the effect persists
over time.
Results in Columns 1–4 show that the change in stock prices of the purchased
stock have a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of
logging in that persist over the 4-week period. The coefficient of the change
in price of the purchased stock is constant across the time periods, implying
that in each week a 1% increase in the price of the purchased stock raises the
probability of logging in by approximately 0.5%.
The econometric model also includes as a control the change in prices of
other stocks in the portfolio. Again, the coefficient is positive and statistically
significant, implying that investors login behaviour is also responsive to changes
in the prices of stocks already held by the investor. These estimates are robust
to the inclusion of investor characteristics, trading frequency, portfolio value
and the number of stocks held in the portfolio.
Table 4.7 presents results from a very similar econometric model to that used
in Table 4.6, the only difference being that the change in price is defined from
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the purchase day, not the previous day. Results are very similar, with positive
coefficients on the change in price of the purchased stock and positive coefficients
on the change in price of remaining stocks. These positive coefficients are seen
in all four weeks after the buy-day.
These results are consistent with investors holding an aversion to observing
losses on their accounts. Whereas the disposition effect arguably arises because
investors are averse to realising losses, the relationship between login behaviour
and losses we see here can be explained by a form of loss aversion in which
investors are also averse to experiencing losses (i.e. seeing losses displayed on
their portfolio screen). Also, our results, which are consistent with investors
not logging in to their accounts when they observe declines in aggregate indices
(as in Sicherman et al., 2015), show that investor attention is responsive to
losses on the specific stocks held in the investor’s portfolio.
In addition, in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 we distinguish the effect of increments
in prices from that of reductions in prices. That is, we allow for the effects of
changes in prices to be monotonically non-linear (e.g., for the possibility of a
kink at zero). The variable ‘% Change Purchased Stock +’ records the changes
in prices from 0 (i.e., negative changes take the value of 0); while the variable
‘% Change Purchased Stock -’ records the changes in prices up to 0 (excluding
0) (i.e., positive changes take the value of 0). In most columns, the size of the
coefficients for the reductions in prices is higher in magnitude to that for the
increments in prices. In Appendix C, in Tables C.1.1 and C.1.2, we observe
that this pattern holds even for the second most recent stock purchased, along
with the rest of the portfolio. Overall, these findings suggest that the perceived
hedonic pain of observing losses is at least twice as great as the impact of
observing gains. The fact that losses appear to be hedonically more impactful
than gains is again consistent with the notion of loss aversion from Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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Fig. 4.5 Probability of logging in by price change of most recent purchased stock - Daily
price changes, one month window. The top panel shows the raw likelihood of logging in
during the 20 business days following the purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays,
according to changes in the daily return of that stock; while the bottom panel, according to
changes in the return of that stock since the purchase day. The probability of logging in is
displayed for the cases in which the trader has a portfolio of stocks and buy a new stock or
has one or more stocks in his portfolio and increase his position in one of these stocks
(14,968 months from 5,737 accounts). In all months, no other transaction has taken place.
Figures C.1.3 and C.1.4 distinguishes patterns of logins for each of these cases. Lines span
95% confidence intervals.
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Table 4.6 Logins and Daily Returns, OLS Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock (Daily) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Remaining Stocks (Daily) 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female=1 -0.006 -0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.040 -0.035 -0.047 -0.046
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
38 - 47 years old -0.016 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
48 - 57 years old -0.009 0.003 0.001 0.014
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
58 - 67 years old 0.011 0.026 0.023 0.033
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
68 or more years old 0.047 0.064* 0.069* 0.078**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.074*** 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.073***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Quartile 3 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.167*** 0.166***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Quartile 4 0.306*** 0.314*** 0.299*** 0.298***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.022 -0.010 -0.001 -0.000
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 -0.001 0.007 0.022 0.020
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 4 0.006 0.021 0.032 0.030
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.016 -0.015 -0.027 -0.017
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 3 0.028 0.036 0.027 0.041*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 4 0.013 0.028 0.015 0.033
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant 0.327*** 0.263*** 0.236*** 0.231***
(0.080) (0.084) (0.069) (0.071)
Observations 58280 58280 58284 58285
Number of Accounts 4669 4669 4670 4670
Adjusted R-squared 0.0607 0.0694 0.0685 0.0727
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Columns 1 to 4 display the probability of logging in during the first to fourth weeks
following the purchase of an stock (excluding non-business days and bank holidays). The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when there is a login during the day. Only months
in which no other transaction occurred after the purchase of the stock are included. The
data is also restricted to months in which the cardholders has a portfolio of at least two
stocks after the purchase. Change in value of the purchased stock and remaining stocks are
computed daily with respect of the value in the previous business day. The other regressors,
monthly frequency of trades, portfolio value and number of stocks, reflect account average
measures. Quartiles represent the following values: for frequency of days with trades in a
month, Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13 to 0.28 days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and Q4: 0.62 to
17.90 days; for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1: 0.04 to 4.50, Q2: 4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21
to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to 2100.38; and for the number of stocks, Q1: 0.02 to 1.48, Q2:
1.48 to 3.11, Q3: 3.11 to 6.26, and Q4: 6.26 to 69.04 stocks. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table 4.7 Logins and Returns Since Purchase, OLS Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock (Since Purchase) 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
% Change, Remaining Stocks (Since Purchase) 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female=1 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.001
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.040 -0.035 -0.048 -0.048
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
38 - 47 years old -0.017 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
48 - 57 years old -0.009 0.003 -0.000 0.011
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
58 - 67 years old 0.011 0.026 0.021 0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
68 or more years old 0.048 0.064* 0.068* 0.076**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.075*** 0.089*** 0.079*** 0.071***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Quartile 3 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.167*** 0.165***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Quartile 4 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.301*** 0.299***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.022 -0.013 -0.004 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 -0.001 0.005 0.019 0.017
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 4 0.005 0.017 0.027 0.024
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.017 -0.016 -0.029 -0.018
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 3 0.028 0.034 0.024 0.039
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 4 0.013 0.025 0.012 0.029
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant 0.328*** 0.272*** 0.247*** 0.246***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.070) (0.071)
Observations 58280 58280 58280 58280
Number of Accounts 4669 4669 4669 4669
Adjusted R-squared 0.0611 0.0708 0.0705 0.0756
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Columns 1 to 4 display the probability of logging in during the first to fourth weeks following
the purchase of an stock (excluding non-business days and bank holidays). The dependent variable is
a dummy equal to 1 when there is a login during the day. Only months in which no other transaction
occurred after the purchase of the stock are included. The data is also restricted to months in which
the cardholders has a portfolio of at least two stocks after the purchase. Change in value of the
purchased stock is computed daily with respect of the value of that stock at the end of the purchase
day. Change in value of the rest of the portfolio are measured with respect of the value during that
day too. The other regressors, monthly frequency of trades, portfolio value and number of stocks,
reflect account average measures. Quartiles represent the following values: for frequency of days
with trades in a month, Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13 to 0.28 days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and Q4:
0.62 to 17.90 days; for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1: 0.04 to 4.50, Q2: 4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21
to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to 2100.38; and for the number of stocks, Q1: 0.02 to 1.48, Q2: 1.48 to
3.11, Q3: 3.11 to 6.26, and Q4: 6.26 to 69.04 stocks. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table 4.8 Logins and Daily Returns, by Gains and Losses, OLS Model
Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock + (Daily) 0.007*** 0.003 0.005** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Purchased Stock - (Daily) 0.003 0.007*** 0.003 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Remaining Stocks + (Daily) 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
% Change, Remaining Stocks - (Daily 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female=1 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.000
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.040 -0.035 -0.046 -0.046
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
38 - 47 years old -0.017 -0.005 -0.006 -0.001
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
48 - 57 years old -0.009 0.003 0.001 0.014
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
58 - 67 years old 0.011 0.027 0.023 0.033
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
68 or more years old 0.047 0.064* 0.069* 0.078**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.080*** 0.074***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Quartile 3 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.167*** 0.167***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Quartile 4 0.306*** 0.315*** 0.299*** 0.299***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.022 -0.011 -0.001 -0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 -0.001 0.006 0.021 0.019
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 4 0.006 0.020 0.031 0.028
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.017 -0.015 -0.028 -0.018
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 3 0.027 0.034 0.025 0.039
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 4 0.011 0.025 0.012 0.029
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant 0.331*** 0.272*** 0.244*** 0.243***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.069) (0.071)
Observations 58280 58280 58284 58285
Number of Accounts 4669 4669 4670 4670
Adjusted R-squared 0.0608 0.0695 0.0686 0.0730
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Columns 1 to 4 display the probability of logging in during the first to fourth weeks
following the purchase of an stock (excluding non-business days and bank holidays). The
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 when there is a login during the day. Only months
in which no other transaction occurred after the purchase of the stock are included. The data
is also restricted to months in which the cardholders has a portfolio of at least two stocks after
the purchase. Change in value of the purchased stock and remaining stocks are computed
daily with respect of the value in the previous business day. Change in value followed by a
positive sign records the changes from 0; while change in value followed by a negative sign,
up to 0 (excluding 0). The other regressors, monthly frequency of trades, portfolio value
and number of stocks, reflect account average measures. Quartiles represent the following
values: for frequency of days with trades in a month, Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13 to 0.28
days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and Q4: 0.62 to 17.90 days; for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1:
0.04 to 4.50, Q2: 4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21 to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to 2100.38; and for the
number of stocks, Q1: 0.02 to 1.48, Q2: 1.48 to 3.11, Q3: 3.11 to 6.26, and Q4: 6.26 to 69.04
stocks. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table 4.9 Logins and Returns Since Purchase, by Gains and Losses, OLS Model
Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock + (Since Purchase) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Purchased Stock - (Since Purchase) 0.004*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Remaining Stocks + (Since Purchase) -0.000 0.004** 0.003 0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Remaining Stocks - (Since Purchase) 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female=1 -0.007 -0.007 0.002 0.000
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.039 -0.035 -0.047 -0.048
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
38 - 47 years old -0.015 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
48 - 57 years old -0.008 0.003 0.000 0.011
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
58 - 67 years old 0.012 0.026 0.022 0.030
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
68 or more years old 0.048 0.064* 0.068* 0.075**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.075*** 0.090*** 0.080*** 0.072***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Quartile 3 0.170*** 0.175*** 0.168*** 0.166***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Quartile 4 0.308*** 0.316*** 0.302*** 0.300***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.023 -0.013 -0.005 -0.004
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 -0.002 0.004 0.018 0.015
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 4 0.003 0.016 0.025 0.022
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.018 -0.017 -0.029 -0.018
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
Quartile 3 0.023 0.032 0.022 0.037
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Quartile 4 0.006 0.023 0.009 0.026
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Constant 0.345*** 0.278*** 0.260*** 0.262***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.070) (0.072)
Observations 58280 58280 58280 58280
Number of Accounts 4669 4669 4669 4669
Adjusted R-squared 0.0618 0.0709 0.0706 0.0759
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. Columns 1 to 4 display the probability of logging in during the first to fourth weeks following
the purchase of an stock (excluding non-business days and bank holidays). The dependent variable is
a dummy equal to 1 when there is a login during the day. Only months in which no other transaction
occurred after the purchase of the stock are included. The data is also restricted to months in which the
cardholders has a portfolio of at least two stocks after the purchase. Change in value of the purchased
stock is computed daily with respect of the value at the end of the purchase day. Change in value of
the rest of the portfolio are measured with respect of the value during that day too. Change in value
followed by a positive sign records the changes from 0; while change in value followed by a negative sign,
up to 0 (excluding 0). The other regressors, monthly frequency of trades, portfolio value and number
of stocks, reflect account average measures. Quartiles represent the following values: for frequency of
days with trades in a month, Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13 to 0.28 days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and
Q4: 0.62 to 17.90 days; for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1: 0.04 to 4.50, Q2: 4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21
to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to 2100.38; and for the number of stocks, Q1: 0.02 to 1.48, Q2: 1.48 to 3.11,
Q3: 3.11 to 6.26, and Q4: 6.26 to 69.04 stocks. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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4.5 Selective Attention II: Evidence from
Weather Shocks
In this section, we exploit a second natural experiment in the data that allows
us to examine the effects of changes in the opportunity cost of paying attention
to the investment account. If paying attention is driven by hedonic utility, then
attention to the investor’s portfolio is a substitute for other forms of utility, such
as leisure. Here, we exploit local level weather shocks as exogenous variation in
the opportunity cost of time spent paying attention to the investor’s portfolio
(i.e., sitting at a computer and logging in to the investment account to read
portfolio screens). A large literature examines the effect of the weather on stock
prices (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Saunders, 1993). Our focus differs from
that of those prior studies.
We construct measures of local level weather shocks using the postcode
identifiers available in the Barclays data. We match investor locations (identified
by postcode) to the nearest UK weather station and match data on daily weather
patterns at each of the weather stations. To identify weather shocks, we exploit
within-regional variation in the weather, i.e. variation within a UK region, as a
source of exogenous change in the weather. The identifying assumption here is
that investors cannot influence very local level weather. Our identification is
based upon within-region variation. For example, weather may be sunny in the
eastern region of the UK, but some areas within the eastern region nevertheless
experience overcast weather.8 To control for the effects of the weather on
stock prices, we condition on day fixed effects. Hence, we exploit within-day
within-region variation in the weather, controlling for regional weather patterns
and daily stock prices. Of course, investors across different regions of the UK
face the same stock market prices on a given day.
The weather data is constructed as follows. The Barclays data contain 2,846
unique postcodes, which represent the locations of investor home addresses.
We match these to the 150 weather stations in the UK by geographic distance
(based on the precise latitude and longitude of weather stations). Figure 4.6
8Although in the long-run investors might choose to move to places or regions with better
weather, very local level weather is exogenous because investors’ actions cannot influence
local weather conditions.
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Postcodes
Weather Stations
Fig. 4.6 Locations of UK weather stations. The figure shows the geographic location of UK
weather stations (shown as dark green squares) and UK postcodes in the Barclays account
data (light green crosses).
shows the geographic locations of weather stations and postcodes used in the
matching exercise.9 The match used 122 of the 150 weather stations.
Daily weather data was obtained for each weather station via the UK Open
Data initiative.10 Weather data is available at the hourly level. A daily measure
of weather was constructed as the mode weather during daytime hours (8am
9This was implemented using the online tool available at https://www.doogal.co.uk/
BatchGeocoding.php. Also, 79 postcodes in the Barclays data were corrupted and could not be
matched.
10Met Office UK Weather open data is provided to https://data.gov.uk and hosted by
Windows Azure Datamarket.
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to 8pm), with weather measured as visibility range.11 Figure 4.7 shows the
within-day distribution of modal weather across localities in the dataset. As
expected, modal weather in the winter months has more moderate, poor and
very poor visibility, compared with summer months that are dominated by
excellent and very good visibility.
We show the unconditional relationship between local weather and the logins
in Figure 4.8. The figure illustrates a clear relationship that the probability of
logging in on days with better visibility is lower, with a monotonic relationship
across the categories of visibility. In Appendix C, in Figures C.2.1 to C.2.5, we
show that this negative relationship between visibility and the probability of
investors logging in holds across a range of variables. Figure C.2.1 shows this
by gender, Figure C.2.2 shows that the relationship holds across different age
groups in the data and Figure C.2.3 shows this by the frequency with which
the investor trades within the month. Figure C.2.4 illustrates the same pattern
by quartiles of portfolio value. Finally, Figure C.2.5 shows that the relationship
between visibility and login behaviour is not driven by one particular season.
The negative relationship is seen in all seasons.
These unconditional relationships suggest that investor attention is affected
by the opportunity cost of logging in, but they do not control for investor
characteristics or market prices. Therefore, in Table 4.10 we report estimates
from regression models that quantify the relations described above controlling
for investor and portfolio characteristics. The unit of analysis is an account ×
day, with the dependent variable being a dummy variable to indicate whether
the investor logged in to his or her trading account on the day. We pool
together all account × days in the baseline sample, providing 9.5 million
observations. The likelihood of logging in on the day is then regressed against
investor and portfolio controls, together with the measure of local weather. In
Column 1, day fixed effects are added to the model. In Column 2, both day and
region fixed effects are added, hence local weather is identified from within-day,
within-region variation in the weather as discussed above.
11The visibility range measures are >= 40000m, Excellent; < 40000m, Very good; <
20000m, Good; < 10000m, Moderate; < 4000m, Poor; and < 1000m, Very poor. We
combined the last two categories in one due to their low frequency.
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Fig. 4.7 Distribution of modal visibility across investor locations by calendar date. The plot
shows the raw probability of the daytime visibility during the year. Data considers records
of visibility during the period April 02,2012, to March 29, 2016.




























Fig. 4.8 Probability of logging in by daytime visibility. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
Results show that investor attention is raised on days of poorer weather.
The estimates in Column 1 imply that poor or very poor visibility increases
the likelihood of logging in by 1 percentage point, an increase of approximately
5% of the baseline likelihood of logging in. With the addition of region fixed
effects in Column 2, this coefficient reduces in magnitude to imply that poor
or very poor visibility increases the likelihood of logging in by 0.8 percentage
points. Other patterns in the coefficients resemble those from earlier estimates,
with the probability of logging in lower among female investors and increasing
with portfolio value and the number of trades undertaken each month.
These results are consistent with attention to the investor’s portfolio being a
substitute for other forms of utility, such as leisure. When the opportunity cost
of taking the time to log in is high, i.e., on good weather days, the likelihood of
investors taking the time to log in is lower. This naturally raises the question
of whether the effects we see are driven by a particular type of investor. In
particular, investors who log in very frequently might be more likely to defer
their next login (temporarily) on sunny days.
Therefore, in additional analysis we replicate the main regression results
across accounts by frequency of login. To do so, we partition the sample by
quartile of the account level average distance between logins. We then conduct
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separate regressions on each subsample, controlling for investor and account
characteristics as before. Coefficient estimates for the visibility variables are
shown in Table 4.11. Results show that the relationship between weather and
the probability of logging in exists only among the top quartile of accounts
by login frequency, i.e., the quartile of accounts that log in most frequently.
Coefficient estimates for this quartile are shown in Panel A, with statistically
significant coefficients on each measure of visibility in both econometric model
specifications. Results in Panels B–D show much smaller, or no, effects of
visibility on the probability of logging in.
These estimates confirm that the effect of weather on investor attention
behaviour arises from investors who logging in very frequently. This result fits
with a hedonic utility based model of investor attention, in which investors
who value the hedonic utility of seeing portfolio prices (those who logging
in at highest frequency) are also those who are more likely to defer paying
attention to their accounts when the opportunity cost of other forms of leisure
is higher, such as on sunny days. Overall, these results are consistent with
investor attention being driven by hedonic concerns.
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Table 4.10 Logins and Daytime Visibility, Pooled OLS Models
(1) (2)
Day FE Day & Region FE
Visibility Daytime
(ref: 1: Excellent )











28 - 37 years old -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001)
38 - 47 years old -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
48 - 57 years old 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.001)
58 - 67 years old 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.001) (0.001)
68 or more years old 0.071*** 0.070***
(0.001) (0.001)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.000) (0.000)
Quartile 3 0.036*** 0.037***
(0.000) (0.000)
Quartile 4 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.000) (0.000)
Quartile 3 0.111*** 0.111***
(0.000) (0.000)
Quartile 4 0.250*** 0.249***
(0.000) (0.000)
Investment in Mutual Funds = 1 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of Stocks 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 9521825 9521825
Number of Accounts 8386 8386
Adjusted R-squared 0.1410 0.1417
Region FE No Yes
Day FE Yes Yes
Note. Visibility categories are defined based on the mode
of the visibility during the time interval 8am to 8pm: excel-
lent (visibility over 40,000 meters), very good (visibility less
than 40,000 meters), good (visibility less than 20,000 meters),
moderate (visibility less than 10,000 meters), and poor (visi-
bility less than 4,000 metres). Portfolio value and number of
stocks were measured at the first business day of the month.
Quartiles represent the following values: for frequency of
days with trades in a month, Q1: 0.04 to 0.13 days, Q2: 0.13
to 0.28 days, Q3: 0.28 to 0.62 days, and Q4: 0.62 to 17.90
days; and for the portfolio value (£1,000), Q1: 0.04 to 4.50,
Q2: 4.51 to 15.21, Q3: 15.21 to 44.28, and 4 Q4: 44.28 to
2100.38. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels:
*** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table 4.11 Logins by Login Frequency, Pooled
OLS Models
Panel A Quartile 1
(1) (2)
Day FE Day & Region FE






Poor & Very poor 0.012*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2541142 2541142
Number of Accounts 2098 2098
Adjusted R-squared 0.2262 0.2270
Panel B Quartile 2
(1) (2)
Day FE Day & Region FE






Poor & Very poor 0.004* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2418852 2418852
Number of Accounts 2096 2096
Adjusted R-squared 0.0594 0.0596
Panel C Quartile 3
(1) (2)
Day FE Day & Region FE






Poor & Very poor 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2332152 2332152
Number of Accounts 2097 2097
Adjusted R-squared 0.0240 0.0240
Panel D Quartile 4
(1) (2)
Day FE Day & Region FE






Poor & Very poor 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2229679 2229679
Number of Accounts 2095 2095
Adjusted R-squared 0.0133 0.0133
Note. Quartiles defined based on the account
average distance between login days. Standard
errors in parentheses. Significance levels: ***
p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study the allocation of attention to trading accounts
by individual investors. Rich data from an online execution-only brokerage
platform allows us to measure attention using logins to the platform. Consistent
with previous studies, we find that investors log in to their accounts far more
frequently than they trade, on average making a trade only once every nine
logins. This suggests that investor attention to trading accounts is primarily
driven by hedonic utility concerns, not by immediate trading needs.
We exploit two natural experiments which arise in the data to further explore
whether attention is allocated in ways consistent with hedonic utility. First,
we use short-term price movements in traded stocks to analyse the response
of investor attention to losses and gains on recent purchases. Consistent with
models of experienced loss aversion, we find that investors who experience
losses on recent purchases are less likely to log in to their accounts in the period
following. This result holds true for both thin and thick portfolios, and also
extends to the weeks following the buy-trade.
Second, we use natural exogenous variation in the opportunity cost of time
spent paying attention to the brokerage account arising from weather shocks.
Matching data on local weather in the locality of the investor into the brokerage
dataset, we estimate the effects of local level weather on login activity. Our
econometric framework controls for region and day effects, holding constant
prices on the specific day and exploiting within-region variation in local weather,
which is arguably exogenous given that investors’ actions cannot influence local
weather conditions. Results show that investors are less likely to log in on
sunny days, with this effect driven by investors who pay most attention to their
accounts.
Taken together, our new results show that investor attention is sensitive to
both the hedonic utility value of information (in the gain / loss domain) and the
opportunity cost of alternative forms of utility, such as leisure. These results go
some way to showing that individual investors do not allocate attention purely
for the purpose of trading, but are susceptible to altering the level of attention
in light of the changing hedonic utility value of experiences derived from logging
in. These results contribute to the growing body of work in economics and




This thesis is a collection of three independent essays that investigate whether
behavioral models of individual decision making find support in field data.
Our approach has been to address questions about the psychology of decision
making and behaviour using large datasets and the techniques from economics.
Chapter 2 was devoted to the analysis of the effect of corrupting colleagues
in police misconduct. Chapter 3 documented plain evidence of violations of
fungibility in consumer credit card repayment choices. Chapter 4 revealed
systematic patterns of information avoidance among investors. Our main
findings can be briefly summarised as follows.
In Chapter 2, our main purpose was to investigate whether misconduct
spreads among police officers: whether a bad apple would spoil the whole
bunch. Our study builds on previous work that investigated peer influences
in a variety of domains via both lab and field studies, such as absenteeism
among school teachers, performance of batters and pitchers in baseball games,
knowledge sharing among weavers, and so on (for a review, see Herbst and Mas,
2015). However, despite the abundant literature on peer effects on workers
productivity, empirical studies of peer effects in police ethics and integrity have
been often rare and the small amount of evidence available presents problems
of inference that render their findings doubtful.
As we discussed in the first part of Chapter 2, quantifying peer effects
is empirically challenging because of the endogeneity introduced when peers
influence each other simultaneously and because there are common unobservable
factors that affect the members of the same peer group and, therefore, mask
genuine peer effects (Manski, 1993). To our knowledge, none of these challenges
have been addressed convincingly in the police deviance literature and, as
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such, any study claiming causal peer effects has been premature in doing so.
In Chapter 2, by using instrumental variable techniques, we overcame these
challenges and reported non-trivial evidence of peer effects: a 10% increase
in the fraction of peers with misconduct (e.g., when a complaint prone officer
is transferred to an existing group of 10 officers) increases the officers’ risk of
misconduct by 8 percentage points. Our results are grounded on the analysis
of large comprehensive datasets containing misconduct records for nearly fifty
thousand police officers serving the UK Metropolitan Police during the period
2010 to 2015. We investigated peer effects when officers were assigned to
different workgroups across these years; that is, our identification strategy
exploited the variation in peer quality that officers experienced after they
switched peer groups.
We should note that our results do not imply (or deny) the possibility that
these effects occurred because officers learned from each other which behaviour
is best to follow to satisfy their own interests or, instead perhaps, because
they were corrupted by the pure peer pressure of their colleagues. Nor is our
intention to engage in the discussion about which mechanisms have driven
these peer influences. Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to speculate that
a large portion of these effects reveal evidence of social conformity. Notice
that extensive qualitative research highlights that police culture is typically
imbedded in unwritten rules and protected by a code of silence and extreme
group loyalty (Loree, 2006). Moreover, its distinctive command-and-control
style of management is alleged to promote close mutually supportive and
inward-looking networks that preclude difference (Hough et al., 2018).
Having discussed peer influences, the second part of Chapter 2 is much more
technical and address the question of whether misconduct can be deterred by
sanctions. Evidence in the literature is inconclusive and, contrary to common
sense, posits that more severe sanctions encourage deviance behaviour (Harris
and Worden, 2014). We show, however, that this evidence is illusory and derives
from testing the deterrent effects of sanctions ignoring individual heterogeneity.
By studying a dynamic model that explicitly accounts for any individual
(time invariant) difference among officers, we show that formal disciplinary
actions do reduce future misconduct. Specifically, for officers with a history
of complaints, formal disciplinary actions in the previous quarter reduces the
chances of misconduct in the current quarter from 11.3% to 7.3%. Nonetheless,
other sanction threats, such as management actions, do not appear to deter
misconduct incidents.
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The new findings provided here expand our understanding of the triggers that
lead to police misconduct. Considering that integrity in policing is essential for
stablishing and maintaining legitimacy and that the police disciplinary systems
are grounded on the notion of deterrence, it is useful to have some quantitative
sense of the size of the deterrent effect of each specific sanction type, as it is
important too to have reliable measures of peer effects on deviant behaviour.
In addition to our main findings, there were a number of other findings that
do not directly relate to the central questions of Chapter 2 but are summarized
briefly next. Misconduct is most prominent among certain employee types,
like police sergeants and constables. Male police officers and officers with few
years of experience show a higher risk of misconduct. Although not statistically
significant, we observed that those officers who worked with line manager that
performed poorly (in their annual performance development reviews) evidenced
a higher risk of misconduct too.
Some important limitations of the misconduct analysis above deserve con-
sideration. Obviously, the major constraint of our two studies is the assumption
that complaints filed against officers are accurate proxies of misconduct events.
However, as we discussed in the final part of Chapter 2, these complaints could
either over or under represent real misconduct events. On one hand, fellow
officers, as opposed to citizens, might fail to report misconduct due to their
cultural rules of integrity (Klockars et al., 1997; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011). Yet,
it is also possible that those citizens who have low confidence in the complaint
process might fail to report misconduct incidents too (Lersch, 2002). On the
other hand, the frequency of complaints might mirror officers’ productivity
rather than actual deviant behaviour. In research of this nature, we are limited
to the analysis of reported cases of misconduct taking them as factual. We
note, however, that the study of allegations of misconduct is the usual approach
adopted by the related literature and so no study in this domain have been
immune to this constraint.
In Chapter 3, we move onto a different area and analyse how mental
accounting rules influence intertemporal choices of credit card repayment.
Specifically, we use a sample of 1.8 million credit card accounts to test a
particular prediction of a theory of mental accounting proposed by Prelec and
Loewenstein (1998): whether debt incurred on consumables is more likely to
be paid off more rapidly than debt incurred on durables. The descriptive
empirical results of Chapter 3 are strikingly clear. Repayment of debt incurred
for non-durable goods is an absolute 10% more likely than repayment of debt
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incurred for durable goods. These results are the first field evidence in support
for Prelec and Loewenstein’s prediction. They challenge the normative view
that people treat all money as fungible. If fungibility holds, what people pay
for should not affect how they pay for it. We show, however, that people prefer
to repay their different types of purchases in different ways, depending on the
hedonic effects of both their future episodes of consumption and their future
episodes of payments, as anticipated by Prelec and Loewenstein’s double mental
accounting model.
As we show in Appendix B, our results have passed a long list of robustness
checks, such as alternative divisions of spending categories in durables and
non-durables to the original one we tested and the inclusion of socioeconomic
controls as well as controls for balances due on other cards held by the consumer
at the same time. These additional checks show that repayment behaviour is
driven by inter-temporal mental accounting rules but, to our surprise, they also
show that repayment is driven by the application of intra-temporal heuristics.
Specifically, in our data consumers holding multiple cards were more likely
to pay down the card with the highest balance, instead of paying down the
highest interest rate debt first, in consistency with the ‘balance-matching’
repayment heuristic proposed by Gathergood et al. (2017), in which consumers
split the ratio of repayments across their cards in approximate proportion to
the ratio of revolving balances. Gathergood et al. (2017) proposed this heuristic
after analysing partial repayment of revolving debts, restricted to cases where
consumers face interest payments; in contrast, in our analysis we restricted
our data to observations where the consumers begin the month not revolving
any debt (so that spending can be linked to repayment). Hence, by adding
controls for the balances due on the other cards the consumers hold, we did not
expect a priori evidence for the use of this heuristic. It is important to mention
too that by the time our research went to peer-review, our main findings were
replicated by Montgomery et al. (2018) using credit card data from a large U.S.
bank which contains credit card transactions matched by household for more
than 10,000 household units.
Although we did find consistent support for Prelec and Loewenstein’s
prediction, we could not rule out potential confounds common to the study
of naturally occurring data. We were unable to account for selection into
credit card spending for durable and non-durable goods, which might occur
if some consumers were more likely to put onto their credit card spending
on non-durable goods they intended to repay straightaway than spending on
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durable goods they intended to repay straightaway. Due to data constraints,
we were also unable to account for other important determinants of repayment
behaviour in which mental accounting might be relevant, such as the sources
of income or the locations of funds cardholders use for repayment.
In our last chapter, we turn to discuss why and how traders pay selective
attention to their portfolios. The study of investors’ attention is economically
important because the frequency with which investors monitor their portfolio
limits the amount of information they could use for strategic decision making.
In Chapter 4, we assembled a rich panel dataset containing daily login
records to online portfolio accounts and daily trading activity for a total of
155,309 accounts for a four-year period, starting from 2012. In our analysis, we
extracted a representative random sample of 10% of accounts and reconstructed
detailed portfolios for this sample. As such, we were able to define accurate
measures of portfolio returns, contrary to earlier work on investors’ attention
that was limited to the analysis of correlations between login activity and some
proxies of the investor expectations about their portfolio returns, such as the
VIX index, the Dow index and the FTSE100 Index.
Our analysis of this data showed that investors log in to their accounts much
more often than they trade. Logins appears to have a hedonic component over
and above the purely functional procedure to make trades. This characteristic
pattern of login activity allowed us to study selective attention. On one hand,
we studied the demand side for attention and explored whether investors
deliberately reduce their attention to negative news in order to evade the
hedonic impact of those news in their utility function. On the other hand,
we also examined the supply side for attention and evaluated how changes in
the opportunity cost of attention affect investors’ login activity. To this end,
we exploited sub-regional variation within regions as the source of exogenous
weather shocks that impact on the opportunity cost of attention.
After exploring the days following the purchase of a stock, we found that
login activity is higher when the returns of that stock are higher and lower
when the returns of that stock are lower. When investors anticipate that their
portfolio has dropped in value, they appear to make attention decisions to
regulate the hedonic pain of negative news. This pattern of behaviour remains
stable even after controlling for several individual and portfolio characteristics.
We also found that when the opportunity cost of attention is high (as it is
in sunny days), investors tend to substitute viewing their portfolio for other
less costly leisure activities. Thus, our general results suggest that investors
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treat attention as a hedonic activity, contrary to the normative view that the
demand for attention (and so for information too) is only triggered by the
investors wish to enhance their decision making.
Overall, the studies reported in this thesis show that individuals do not
make decisions in isolation. Their choices reflect social and hedonic concerns.
Their choices are heavily context dependent as well. While evidence showing
how decision makers deviate from the normative rational ideal is prominent
in lab studies, in order to attain generalizability of particular pieces of this
evidence, we have opted to analyse naturally occurring observations and to
test whether the results discovered in the lab extend to the field. The work in
this PhD is part of a wider approach in the literature to address questions in
psychological and behavioural science by combining newly available big data
sets with the techniques from econometrics and, to the extent that we have
been successful, illustrates the promise of such an approach.
We envision that our research can foster future work on the analysis of indi-
vidual choice. There are some natural progressions for our studies. Regarding
our investigation of deviant behaviour, one set of issues concerns why other
disciplinary actions, rather than formal sanctions, have little to no deterrent
effect and how these other actions could be enhanced to be more effective.
The qualitative analysis of the mechanisms behind the peer effects are also of
substantial interest. Concerning our work on the mental accounting of card
repayment, future research could examine more closely how the double-entry
mental accounting predictions interact with other mental accounting dimensions
such as the location of funds or the sources of income. In addition, further
research should be undertaken to quantify the economic impacts of selective
attention on portfolio returns.
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Appendix A
Bad Cop, Bad Cops: Learning
and Peer Effects on Police
Misconduct
A.1 Fixed and Random Effects Estimates
A.1 Fixed and Random Effects Estimates 138
Table A.1.1 presents results from panel models including both fixed and
random effects that do not use instrumental variables. These panel models fit
Equation 2.1 using all quarters in the data, even those in which peers never
switch peer groups. While these panel models can be applied to the whole data
set, they do not correct for endogeneity.
We find that the panel models show significant but small effects of peer
misconduct. But our instrumental variable approach reveals that the panel
models greatly underestimate the causal effect of peer misconduct.
Model 1 of Table A.1.1 shows the random effects (RE) estimates of Equa-
tion 2.1. We observe positive and statistically significant peer effects. Model
2 displays fixed effects (FE) estimates that account for any unobserved time
invariant characteristic of the individuals. Although FE estimates are smaller
in magnitude, they still exhibit the expected positive sign. Models 3 and 4
employ similar estimators but are restricted to the sample of individuals who
had at least one incidence of misconduct in the period 2012 q1 to 2015 q1.
There is no apparent variation in the size of the peer effects in this subset of the
data. These preliminary results indicate that a 10-percentage point increase in
the proportion of peers with cases of misconduct in t − 1 would rise the rate
of misconduct in t by between 0.17 (Model 2) to 0.66 (Model 1) percentage
points. Although these results suggest that peer misconduct has some small
negative spillover effects, part of these effects are potentially spurious because
we have not yet accounted for endogeneity in the estimates.
Table 2.4 in the main text presents the estimates using our instrumental
variable approach, which is critical for identifying the causal effect of peer
misconduct. We observe that the estimated coefficients of peer effects in
Table 2.4 are much larger to those found in the preceding panel models from
Table A.1.1. A possible explanation for the large difference in the GMM
estimates from Table 2.4 and the RE and FE estimates from Table A.1.1 is
measurement errors in the endogenous variable Peer yi,t−1, which will lead to
attenuation bias in the RE and FE estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Note
that our endogenous variable represents the proportion of peers in t − 1 with
cases of misconduct and so measurement errors could arise if this proportion
does not always capture all peers in t − 1, probably because peers formally
registered under certain line manager are only a subset of the actual peer group.
Hence, RE and FE estimates are subject to two sources of bias operating
in opposite directions: the upward bias caused by endogeneity and correlated
effects and the downward bias caused by measurement errors. If the endogenous
A.1 Fixed and Random Effects Estimates 139
variable is measured with error, our instruments are also subject to measurement
error, as they represent the proportion of peers of peers with cases of misconduct.
However, to the extent that the measurement errors in our instruments are
uncorrelated with the measurement errors in the endogenous variable, our
GMM estimator should correct both the endogeneity bias and the attenuation
bias. Also, note that in contrast to the endogenous variable that measures the
proportion of peers with misconduct of a single individual, our instruments,
P̄1 and P̄2, constitute averages across many individuals and therefore should
be subject to smaller measurement errors.
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Table A.1.1 The Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer EffectsBAD COP, BAD COPS 2  
Table A-1. The Estimated Likelihood of Misconduct, Peer Effects 
 Whole sample   Individuals with incidence of Misconduct 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
VARIABLES RE FE   RE FE 
Prop. of peers in   − 1 with misconduct 0.066*** 0.017***   0.063*** 0.028*** 
 (0.005) (0.005)   (0.007) (0.008) 
Gender (reference: Females)       
 Male 0.015***    0.014***  
 (0.001)    (0.002)  
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)       
 Police Constable 0.032***    0.011***  
 (0.001)    (0.002)  
 Police Sergeant 0.033***    0.012***  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 Inspector 0.025***    0.001  
 (0.003)    (0.005)  
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
0.010***    -0.017*  
 (0.003)    (0.008)  
Business Group 
(reference: TP - Boroughs East) 
      
 TP - Boroughs North -0.000    -0.000  
 (0.003)    (0.003)  
 TP - Boroughs South 0.007**    0.008*  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 TP - Boroughs West 0.001    0.003  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 TP - Central -0.040***    -0.058*  
 (0.006)    (0.029)  
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.010***    -0.005  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 TP - Westminster -0.001    -0.003  
 (0.004)    (0.005)  
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.029***    -0.020***  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 Specialist Operations -0.045***    -0.032***  
 (0.002)    (0.003)  
 Other Business Group -0.036***    -0.026***  
 (0.002)    (0.005)  
Length of service       
 Length of service (10 years) -0.026*** -0.278***   -0.018*** -0.657*** 
 (0.002) (0.043)   (0.005) (0.101) 
 Length of service (10 years)2  0.004*** 0.009***   0.004** 0.027*** 
 (0.001) (0.003)   (0.001) (0.008) 
       
Employee Rating in   − 4  
(reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet 
Competent)  
      
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.035*** -0.010   -0.035*** -0.019 
 (0.005) (0.007)   (0.009) (0.013) 
  Competent (at required standard) -0.028*** -0.010   -0.030*** -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.007)   (0.009) (0.013) 
       
Constant 0.078*** 0.451***   0.119*** 0.944*** 
 (0.006) (0.066)   (0.010) (0.136) 
       
Observations 331,023 331,022   141,074 141,073 
Number of individuals 35,924 35,923   14,853 14,852 
R-squared  0.001    0.002 
ICC 0.0235    0  
   0.0329    0  
Quarter FEs YES YES   YES YES 
Year FEs YES YES   YES YES 
 2 Note. All models estimate the probability of at least one event of misconduct in quarter t conditional
on a set of covariates. The variable of interest is the proportion of peers in quarter t − 1 with re-
ported cases of misconduct. Columns 1 to 4 are linear probability panel data models that ignore the
endogeneity in the peer misconduct measure. RE estimators in Columns 1 and 3 incorporate ran-
dom individual intercepts that are assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. RE
estimators use information from both between individual variation and within individual variation
in the data. However, FE estimators in Columns 2 and 4 use only within individual variation in the
data. Thus, time-invariant characteristics in our data, like gender, employee type or business groups,
cannot be estimated by FE models. By using only within individual variation, FE estimators allow
for correlations between the individual intercepts and the explanatory variables. Alternative specifi-
cations applying instrumental variable techniques for the identification of peer effects are presented
in Table 2.4 in the main text. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, **
p<0.01, * p<0.05, p<0.10.
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A.2 Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Miscon-
duct - First Stage GMM
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Table A.2.1 Peer Effects on the Likelihood of Misconduct - First Stage GMM
 Individuals experiencing new peers  
 (1)  
VARIABLES GMM  
Instrument 1 0.048***  
 (0.004)  
Instrument 2 0.028***  
 (0.004)  
Gender (reference: Females) 0.003***  
 Male (0.001)  
   
Employee type (reference: Civil Staff)   
 Police Constable 0.022***  
 (0.001)  
 Police Sergeant 0.020***  
 (0.001)  
 Inspector 0.016***  
 (0.002)  
 Chief Inspector, Superintendent,  
 Chief Superintendent 
-0.001  
 (0.003)  
Business Group 
(reference: Territorial Police (TP) - Boroughs East) 
  
 TP - Boroughs North 0.000  
 (0.002)  
 TP - Boroughs South 0.002  
 (0.002)  
 TP - Boroughs West -0.002  
 (0.002)  
 TP - Central -0.018~  
 (0.011)  
 TP - Criminal Justice & Crime -0.013***  
 (0.002)  
 TP - Westminster 0.000  
 (0.003)  
 Specialist Crime and Operations -0.025***  
 (0.001)  
 Specialist Operations -0.039***  
 (0.002)  
 Other Business Group -0.039***  
 (0.002)  
Length of service   
 Length of service (10 years) -0.022***  
 (0.002)  
 Length of service (10 years)2  0.004***  
 (0.001)  
Employee Rating in   − 4  
 (reference: Competent but development required + Not Yet Competent)  
  
  Exceptional + Competent (above standard) -0.012*  
 (0.005)  
  Competent (at required standard) -0.005  
 (0.005)  
   
Constant 0.079***  
 (0.005)  
   
Observations 80,632  
Number of individuals 30,627  
LM test statistic for under identification (Kleibergen-Paap)  199.3  
P-value of under identification LM statistic P <0.001  
F statistic for weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 97.75  
Quarter FEs YES  
Year FEs YES  
 Note. The regression displays the first stage results of Model 1 in Table 2.4. The dependent variable
is the proportion of peers in quarter t − 1 with reported cases of misconduct. Two instruments are
used for identification: the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in
t − 2 and, likewise, the average proportion of peers of peers with incidence of misconduct in t − 3.
Standard errors clustered by individuals in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,
* p<0.05, p<0.10.
Appendix B
The Red, the Black, and the
Plastic: Paying Down Credit
Card Debt for Hotels not Sofas
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Table B.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Purchase Amounts for All Accounts –
Single-Purchase-Type Samples
 
 Frequency Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
       
   Non-durables       
  Airlines 3310 £687.28 £896.29 £171.26 £376.17 £843.81 
  Auto Rental 1699 £232.90 £653.84 £65.95 £125.00 £248.81 
   Hotel/Motel 6428 £352.50 £604.42 £84.00 £175.88 £385.51 
   Restaurants/Bars 4588 £158.61 £546.68 £30.00 £59.28 £116.47 
   Travel Agencies 7509 £1,057.38 £1,138.03 £257.10 £680.22 £1,449.66 
   Other Transportation 3980 £314.42 £756.31 £34.90 £82.12 £250.00 
   Drug Stores 905 £54.92 £117.79 £16.00 £32.95 £59.99 
   Gas Stations 7570 £73.01 £207.80 £32.72 £49.31 £68.96 
   Mail Orders 13682 £110.09 £227.94 £23.00 £49.99 £121.31 
   Food Stores 14920 £88.22 £206.36 £24.00 £49.50 £96.61 
   Other Retail 17528 £180.00 £568.35 £19.46 £43.95 £118.38 
   Recreation 5774 £255.34 £513.93 £50.75 £109.61 £246.00 
   Subtotal 87893 £260.65 £627.71 £30.30 £68.83 £199.00 
       
   Durables       
   Department Stores 3629 £239.77 £560.15 £39.99 £84.00 £228.95 
   Discount Stores 1704 £166.09 £218.47 £45.91 £101.41 £225.99 
   Clothing Stores 8939 £122.45 £217.56 £33.99 £61.19 £122.95 
   Hardware Stores 5022 £434.42 £1,048.35 £34.95 £89.99 £301.59 
   Vehicles 5894 £880.63 £1,569.33 £135.00 £285.00 £698.54 
   Interior Furnishing Stores 4493 £671.81 £998.71 £112.88 £330.00 £805.57 
   Electric Appliance Stores 6169 £384.74 £566.86 £59.99 £247.98 £460.76 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores 2886 £245.67 £797.44 £38.20 £79.99 £199.99 
   Health Care 3164 £441.70 £895.00 £66.88 £165.00 £347.10 
   Education 744 £715.45 £1,195.68 £61.28 £206.00 £866.00 
   Professional Services 12791 £311.76 £529.87 £68.88 £187.70 £346.47 
   Repair Shops 122 £314.43 £646.86 £34.67 £79.00 £299.00 
   Other Services 11474 £386.89 £972.88 £30.00 £89.84 £274.50 
   Subtotal 67031 £389.61 £871.30 £45.98 £132.00 £348.30 
       
   Single purchase total 154924 £316.45 £745.71 £36.00 £89.74 £265.75 
       
  Note. Single purchase total shows the monthly spending for the Single-Purchase-Type Sample of
monthly observations belonging to all credit card accounts. SD=standard deviation. p25=25th
percentile, p50=median, and p75=75th percentile.
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Table B.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Purchase Amounts for All Accounts –
Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample
 
 Frequency Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
       
   Non-durables       
  Airlines 9140 £913.88 £994.19 £277.80 £580.07 £1,198.82 
  Auto Rental 5275 £627.96 £859.00 £149.16 £348.09 £771.60 
  Hotel/Motel 23202 £658.96 £807.45 £180.30 £397.79 £818.73 
  Restaurants/Bars 34714 £591.75 £777.08 £136.69 £338.51 £749.61 
  Travel Agencies 16807 £1,091.29 £1,111.30 £329.68 £737.39 £1,470.14 
  Other Transportation 18705 £607.33 £835.77 £122.93 £325.31 £748.73 
  Drug Stores 11347 £611.50 £761.65 £129.84 £359.88 £802.15 
  Gas Stations 38893 £512.97 £721.04 £90.89 £264.15 £643.15 
  Mail Orders 29807 £314.29 £567.46 £41.70 £119.88 £335.86 
  Food Stores 65526 £451.56 £679.03 £81.04 £219.79 £540.19 
  Other Retail 66961 £468.18 £751.61 £67.31 £213.30 £552.47 
  Recreation 21587 £584.19 £769.27 £132.00 £322.13 £735.25 
  Subtotal 201729 £416.22 £717.53 £60.00 £169.10 £455.08 
       
   Durables       
   Department Stores 19045 £610.54 £823.67 £128.49 £329.46 £760.78 
   Discount Stores 9664 £586.99 £718.87 £144.99 £349.99 £749.97 
   Clothing Stores 43212 £495.36 £682.22 £98.37 £252.84 £609.98 
   Hardware Stores 21944 £699.69 £1,018.36 £118.86 £342.14 £848.62 
   Vehicles 16170 £895.12 £1,282.45 £206.01 £449.56 £1,000.00 
   Interior Furnishing Stores 16900 £859.11 £1,062.17 £210.54 £510.21 £1,089.32 
   Electric Appliance Stores 19460 £661.94 £876.12 £158.60 £388.00 £807.61 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores 14928 £600.04 £808.47 £127.46 £338.58 £760.22 
   Health Care 9508 £628.08 £907.03 £145.73 £318.37 £694.78 
   Education 2388 £781.05 £1,031.59 £152.49 £429.24 £1,019.88 
   Professional Services 28118 £559.69 £805.32 £131.45 £301.72 £648.93 
   Repair Shops 601 £733.74 £927.61 £140.65 £379.79 £965.40 
   Other Services 38198 £621.45 £956.66 £100.70 £294.24 £740.43 
   Subtotal 163269 £511.69 £845.92 £90.94 £241.08 £560.00 
       
   Multiple purchases total 282997 £418.52 £768.13 £58.17 £164.95 £437.83 
       
 
 
Note. Multiple purchase total shows the monthly spending for the Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample of
monthly observations belonging to all credit card accounts. Note that the Multiple-Purchase-Type
Sample includes the Single-Purchase-Type Sample described in Table B.1.1. As cardholders can
consume products in more than one category during the month, frequencies for each category do not
add to the month observations displayed in the multiple purchases total. SD=standard deviation.
p25=25th percentile, p50=median, and p75=75th percentile.
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B.2 Regressions with additional controls
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B.3 Reclassification of Consumption Categories
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B.4 Omitting travel related categories
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B.5 Estimating Marginal Effects for Individ-
ual Merchant Codes
B.5 Estimating Marginal Effects for Individual Merchant Codes 162
Table B.5.1 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance for Single-Purchase-Type




 First purchase of new accounts  All accounts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS 
OLS 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
 RE 
RE 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
FE 
Non-durable merchant codes       
   Airlines 0.0505*** 0.0477**  0.0328*** 0.0268*** 0.0252*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0213)  (0.00542) (0.00673) (0.00724) 
   Auto Rental 0.120*** 0.147***  0.00178 0.00208 -0.0265*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0302)  (0.00747) (0.00893) (0.00991) 
   Hotel/Motel 0.161*** 0.147***  0.0522*** 0.0544*** 0.0131*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0184)  (0.00379) (0.00466) (0.00468) 
   Restaurants/Bars 0.139*** 0.140***  0.0406*** 0.0408*** 0.0112* 
 (0.0168) (0.0193)  (0.00454) (0.00534) (0.00580) 
   Travel Agencies 0.0243** 0.0296**  0.00993*** 0.00121 0.0123** 
 (0.0106) (0.0133)  (0.00383) (0.00467) (0.00514) 
   Other Transportation 0.148*** 0.134***  0.0463*** 0.0429*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0202)  (0.00490) (0.00578) (0.00630) 
   Drug Stores 0.139*** 0.0949**  0.0349*** 0.0270** 0.0141 
 (0.0364) (0.0410)  (0.00968) (0.0115) (0.0121) 
   Gas Stations 0.195*** 0.184***  0.0554*** 0.0516*** 0.0107* 
 (0.0122) (0.0146)  (0.00398) (0.00483) (0.00565) 
   Mail Orders 0.0347* 0.0516**  -0.00259 -0.00292 -0.00444 
 (0.0192) (0.0237)  (0.00300) (0.00362) (0.00390) 
   Food Stores 0.146*** 0.122***  0.0375*** 0.0345*** 0.00659* 
 (0.00955) (0.0116)  (0.00287) (0.00356) (0.00388) 
   Other Retail 0.0537*** 0.0501***  0.0175*** 0.0182*** 0.00728** 
 (0.0102) (0.0123)  (0.00253) (0.00306) (0.00319) 
   Recreation 0.0451*** 0.0391**  0.00965** 0.00993** 0.00304 
 (0.0151) (0.0181)  (0.00402) (0.00484) (0.00507) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00628*** 0.00554***  0.0104*** 0.00884*** 0.00282*** 
 (0.000341) (0.000385)  (0.000153) (0.000187) (0.000372) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00262** 0.00170  -0.00274*** -0.00247*** 0.00638* 
 (0.00128) (0.00151)  (0.000379) (0.000443) (0.00357) 
Utilization (%) -0.00148*** -0.00188***  -0.00320*** -0.00332*** -0.000724*** 
 (0.000216) (0.000271)  (9.49x10-05) (0.000115) (0.000156) 
Account age (years) 0.136*** 0.124***  0.00495*** 0.00470*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0146)  (0.000138) (0.000155) (0.00171) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.856*** -0.865***  -0.208*** -0.203*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0263)  (0.00661) (0.00790) (0.00948) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.392*** 0.409***  0.0808*** 0.0776*** 0.0517*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0164)  (0.00384) (0.00454) (0.00559) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0710*** -0.0773***  -0.0122*** -0.0113*** -0.00836*** 
 (0.00277) (0.00399)  (0.000840) (0.000977) (0.00126) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00538*** 0.00616***  0.000772*** 0.000690*** 0.000537*** 
 (0.000252) (0.000383)  (7.00x10-05) (7.98x10-05) (0.000107) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000142*** -0.000172***  -1.71x10-05*** -1.47x10-05*** -1.17x10-05*** 
 (7.65x10-06) (1.22x10-05)  (1.90x10-06) (2.14x10-06) (2.99x10-06) 
Median house price (£)  3.27x10-08   -1.09x10-09  
  (5.44x10-08)   (2.05x10-08)  
Free school meals (proportion)  -0.254***   -0.190***  
  (0.0585)   (0.0240)  
Weekly Household Income (£)  -1.17x10-05   6.30x10-06  
  (4.14x10-05)   (1.58x10-05)  
       
Constant 0.658*** 0.744***  0.690*** 0.734***  
 (0.0160) (0.0340)  (0.00404) (0.0119)  
       
R-squared 0.351 0.341    0.017 
Observations 21,671 14,851  154,924 107,384 93,957 
Number of accounts 21,671 14,851  95,461 66,021 34,494                   
Month FEs YES YES  YES YES YES 
 
  
Note. Samples in all models include months in which expenses were related to only one merchant
code. Models 1 and 2 evaluate the probability of full repayment of the first purchase made by new
accounts. Models 3 to 5 include all accounts in the analysis. All models are linear probability models
in which the outcome takes the value of one when the repayment-purchase ratio is greater than .9 and
otherwise takes a value of zero. Reference category: durable goods. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.5.2 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance for
Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample, Proportion of the Total Month Spending on




 First purchase of new accounts  All accounts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
 RE RE 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
FE 
Non-durable merchant codes (proportion)       
   Airlines 0.0438*** 0.0424**  0.0321*** 0.0277*** 0.0233*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0167)  (0.00440) (0.00545) (0.00535) 
   Auto Rental 0.203*** 0.211***  0.0283*** 0.0271*** -0.00817 
 (0.0218) (0.0259)  (0.00641) (0.00759) (0.00757) 
   Hotel/Motel 0.257*** 0.260***  0.0672*** 0.0695*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0140)  (0.00309) (0.00376) (0.00354) 
   Restaurants/Bars 0.265*** 0.256***  0.0619*** 0.0579*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0141)  (0.00362) (0.00423) (0.00423) 
   Travel Agencies 0.00617 0.0145  0.0146*** 0.00943** 0.0141*** 
 (0.00861) (0.0109)  (0.00322) (0.00393) (0.00398) 
   Other Transportation 0.203*** 0.189***  0.0550*** 0.0524*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.0141) (0.0164)  (0.00417) (0.00490) (0.00492) 
   Drug Stores 0.143*** 0.120***  0.0295*** 0.0320*** 0.0140 
 (0.0284) (0.0326)  (0.00802) (0.00942) (0.00918) 
   Gas Stations 0.260*** 0.224***  0.0678*** 0.0568*** 0.0174*** 
 (0.00976) (0.0119)  (0.00341) (0.00412) (0.00434) 
   Mail Orders 0.0347** 0.0452**  0.00534* 0.00330 -0.00264 
 (0.0157) (0.0194)  (0.00275) (0.00330) (0.00328) 
   Food Stores 0.199*** 0.164***  0.0447*** 0.0384*** 0.0129*** 
 (0.00728) (0.00898)  (0.00245) (0.00302) (0.00305) 
   Other Retail 0.0985*** 0.104***  0.0246*** 0.0259*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00840) (0.0102)  (0.00222) (0.00266) (0.00257) 
   Recreation 0.109*** 0.112***  0.0234*** 0.0224*** 0.00797** 
 (0.0124) (0.0150)  (0.00346) (0.00416) (0.00402) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00723*** 0.00630***  0.0127*** 0.0112*** 0.00475*** 
 (0.000248) (0.000277)  (0.000113) (0.000137) (0.000235) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00713*** 0.00561***  -0.00218*** -0.00235*** 0.00958*** 
 (0.000908) (0.00109)  (0.000334) (0.000391) (0.00236) 
Utilization (%) -0.00188*** -0.00192***  -0.00320*** -0.00326*** -0.000855*** 
 (0.000139) (0.000174)  (6.68x10-05) (8.17x10-05) (0.000103) 
Account age (years) 0.160*** 0.157***  0.00672*** 0.00640*** -0.00741*** 
 (0.00972) (0.0115)  (0.000125) (0.000141) (0.00128) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.658*** -0.700***  -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0170)  (0.00468) (0.00561) (0.00623) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.316*** 0.343***  0.0717*** 0.0665*** 0.0571*** 
 (0.00838) (0.0113)  (0.00289) (0.00341) (0.00391) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0608*** -0.0681***  -0.0118*** -0.0105*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.00207) (0.00290)  (0.000672) (0.000775) (0.000937) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00486*** 0.00569***  0.000815*** 0.000692*** 0.000720*** 
 (0.000199) (0.000290)  (5.88x10-05) (6.65x10-05) (8.47x10-05) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000134*** -0.000164***  -1.93x10-05*** -1.58x10-05*** -1.72x10-05*** 
 (6.27x10-06) (9.59x10-06)  (1.66x10-06) (1.85x10-06) (2.48x10-06) 
Median house price (£)  1.07x10-07***   5.04x10-08***  
  (3.48x10-08)   (1.71x10-08)  
Free school meals (proportion)  -0.276***   -0.224***  
  (0.0389)   (0.0202)  
Weekly Household Income (£)  2.97x10-05   1.23x10-05  
  (2.67x10-05)   (1.32x10-05)  
       
Constant 0.541*** 0.580***  0.603*** 0.635***  
 (0.0107) (0.0225)  (0.00319) (0.00997)  
       
R-squared 0.257 0.259    0.022 
Observations 58,404 38,481  282,997 194,214 184,673 
Number of accounts 58,404 38,481  159,100 108,050 60,776                   
Month FEs YES YES  YES YES YES 
  Note. Table B.5.2 replicates Table B.5.1 specifications but months with multiple consumption cat-
egories or merchant codes are added to the sample. Models 1 and 2 evaluate the probability of
full repayment of the first purchase made by new accounts. Models 3 to 5 include all accounts in
the analysis. All models are linear probability models in which the outcome takes the value of one
when the repayment-purchase ratio is greater than .9 and otherwise takes a value of zero. Reference
category: Proportion of the total month spending on durable goods. Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.5.3 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance for




 First purchase of new accounts  All accounts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
 RE RE 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
FE 
Durable merchant codes       
   Department Stores -0.0436** -0.0316  -0.0229*** -0.0186*** -0.0145** 
 (0.0188) (0.0221)  (0.00478) (0.00569) (0.00578) 
   Discount Stores -0.162*** -0.161***  -0.0224*** -0.0205** -0.00168 
    (0.0239) (0.0283)  (0.00683) (0.00823) (0.00823) 
   Clothing Stores -0.0910*** -0.0884***  -0.0346*** -0.0345*** -0.0129*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0134)  (0.00326) (0.00396) (0.00412) 
   Hardware Stores -0.0876*** -0.0952***  -0.0114*** -0.0111** 0.00150 
 (0.0159) (0.0197)  (0.00415) (0.00496) (0.00510) 
   Vehicles -0.109*** -0.103***  -0.0397*** -0.0375*** -0.00700 
 (0.0129) (0.0160)  (0.00398) (0.00477) (0.00502) 
   Interior Furnishing Stores -0.0948*** -0.0900***  0.00391 0.00647 -0.00143 
 (0.0151) (0.0186)  (0.00441) (0.00532) (0.00545) 
   Electric Appliance Stores -0.124*** -0.108***  -0.0289*** -0.0289*** -0.00729 
 (0.0133) (0.0160)  (0.00379) (0.00452) (0.00468) 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores -0.134*** -0.126***  -0.0328*** -0.0285*** 0.00438 
 (0.0183) (0.0224)  (0.00554) (0.00672) (0.00710) 
   Health Care -0.111*** -0.104***  -0.0188*** -0.0155** -0.00355 
 (0.0203) (0.0251)  (0.00513) (0.00610) (0.00616) 
   Education -0.0382 -0.0353  -0.0355*** -0.0279** 0.00534 
 (0.0296) (0.0356)  (0.0111) (0.0131) (0.0149) 
   Professional Services -0.127*** -0.134***  -0.0309*** -0.0308*** -0.0116*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0148)  (0.00287) (0.00344) (0.00365) 
   Repair Shops -0.147 -0.177  -0.00291 0.000571 0.0258 
 (0.101) (0.122)  (0.0251) (0.0280) (0.0295) 
   Other Services -0.0473*** -0.0425***  -0.0187*** -0.0148*** -0.00678* 
 (0.0107) (0.0127)  (0.00296) (0.00353) (0.00381) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00620*** 0.00553***  0.0103*** 0.00875*** 0.00280*** 
 (0.000343) (0.000386)  (0.000153) (0.000187) (0.000372) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00235* 0.00149  -0.00284*** -0.00254*** 0.00640* 
 (0.00129) (0.00151)  (0.000379) (0.000444) (0.00357) 
Utilization (%) -0.00151*** -0.00190***  -0.00322*** -0.00333*** -0.000731*** 
 (0.000217) (0.000272)  (9.50x10-05) (0.000115) (0.000156) 
Account age (years) 0.126*** 0.115***  0.00483*** 0.00460*** -0.0112*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0146)  (0.000138) (0.000155) (0.00171) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.911*** -0.907***  -0.213*** -0.209*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0256)  (0.00645) (0.00773) (0.00934) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.414*** 0.426***  0.0821*** 0.0793*** 0.0502*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0162)  (0.00380) (0.00450) (0.00556) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0746*** -0.0800***  -0.0123*** -0.0114*** -0.00813*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00398)  (0.000837) (0.000974) (0.00126) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00563*** 0.00635***  0.000771*** 0.000689*** 0.000523*** 
 (0.000252) (0.000382)  (6.99x10-05) (7.97x10-05) (0.000107) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000148*** -0.000176***  -1.69x10-05*** -1.45x10-05*** -1.14x10-05*** 
 (7.66x10-06) (1.22x10-05)  (1.90x10-06) (2.14x10-06) (2.99x10-06) 
Median house price (£)  2.08x10-08   -1.39x10-09  
  (5.45x10-08)   (2.05x10-08)  
Free school meals (proportion)  -0.279***   -0.193***  
  (0.0587)   (0.0240)  
Weekly Household Income (£)  -1.44x10-05   5.88x10-06  
  (4.15 x10-05)   (1.58 x10-05)  
       
Constant 0.776*** 0.857***  0.719*** 0.761***  
 (0.0157) (0.0340)  (0.00395) (0.0119)  
       
R-squared 0.346 0.337    0.016 
Observations 21,671 14,851  154,924 107,384 93,957 
Number of accounts 21,671 14,851  95,461 66,021 34,494                   
Month FEs YES YES  YES YES YES 
 
  
Note. Samples in all models include months in which expenses were related to only
one merchant code. Models 1 and 2 evaluate the probability of full repayment of
the first purchase made by new accounts. Models 3 to 5 include all accounts in the
analysis. All models are linear probability models in which the outcome takes the
value of one when the repayment-purchase ratio is greater than .9 and otherwise
takes a value of zero. Reference category: non-durable goods. Standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.5.4 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance for
Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample, Proportion of the Total Month Spending




 First purchase of new accounts  All accounts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
 RE RE 
(+ socioeconomic controls) 
FE 
Durable merchant codes (proportion)       
   Department Stores -0.103*** -0.0950***  -0.0330*** -0.0288*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0176)  (0.00401) (0.00479) (0.00458) 
   Discount Stores -0.246*** -0.218***  -0.0492*** -0.0440*** -0.00676 
    (0.0190) (0.0227)  (0.00588) (0.00704) (0.00676) 
   Clothing Stores -0.146*** -0.137***  -0.0523*** -0.0487*** -0.0212*** 
 (0.00889) (0.0107)  (0.00275) (0.00331) (0.00323) 
   Hardware Stores -0.136*** -0.146***  -0.0280*** -0.0272*** -0.00754* 
 (0.0124) (0.0154)  (0.00356) (0.00425) (0.00412) 
   Vehicles -0.163*** -0.163***  -0.0447*** -0.0440*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0129)  (0.00336) (0.00404) (0.00400) 
   Interior Furnishing Stores -0.170*** -0.171***  -0.0214*** -0.0172*** -0.00627 
 (0.0114) (0.0143)  (0.00365) (0.00441) (0.00427) 
   Electric Appliance Stores -0.169*** -0.148***  -0.0363*** -0.0344*** -0.0117*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0130)  (0.00325) (0.00389) (0.00379) 
   Sporting Goods/Toy Stores -0.206*** -0.194***  -0.0480*** -0.0450*** -0.000204 
 (0.0147) (0.0180)  (0.00471) (0.00567) (0.00557) 
   Health Care -0.149*** -0.138***  -0.0227*** -0.0198*** -0.00709 
 (0.0169) (0.0209)  (0.00442) (0.00523) (0.00503) 
   Education -0.104*** -0.119***  -0.0456*** -0.0417*** -0.0184 
 (0.0253) (0.0305)  (0.00949) (0.0112) (0.0116) 
   Professional Services -0.166*** -0.169***  -0.0312*** -0.0288*** -0.0112*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0124)  (0.00256) (0.00306) (0.00303) 
   Repair Shops -0.131* -0.195**  -0.0181 -0.0150 0.00719 
 (0.0766) (0.0945)  (0.0216) (0.0243) (0.0245) 
   Other Services -0.0926*** -0.0828***  -0.0293*** -0.0267*** -0.0106*** 
 (0.00880) (0.0105)  (0.00258) (0.00306) (0.00305) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00702*** 0.00618***  0.0125*** 0.0111*** 0.00474*** 
 (0.000249) (0.000278)  (0.000113) (0.000137) (0.000235) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00729*** 0.00575***  -0.00225*** -0.00240*** 0.00956*** 
 (0.000915) (0.00109)  (0.000335) (0.000392) (0.00236) 
Utilization (%) -0.00200*** -0.00202***  -0.00323*** -0.00328*** -0.000863*** 
 (0.000140) (0.000175)  (6.69x10-05) (8.18x10-05) (0.000104) 
Account age (years) 0.142*** 0.145***  0.00655*** 0.00624*** -0.00747*** 
 (0.00976) (0.0115)  (0.000125) (0.000141) (0.00128) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.692*** -0.720***  -0.168*** -0.162*** -0.123*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0170)  (0.00461) (0.00553) (0.00617) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.322*** 0.344***  0.0708*** 0.0654*** 0.0565*** 
 (0.00842) (0.0113)  (0.00288) (0.00339) (0.00389) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0607*** -0.0674***  -0.0115*** -0.0101*** -0.0101*** 
 (0.00208) (0.00291)  (0.000671) (0.000774) (0.000936) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00481*** 0.00559***  0.000786*** 0.000662*** 0.000715*** 
 (0.000200) (0.000291)  (5.87x10-05) (6.64x10-05) (8.46x10-05) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000132*** -0.000161***  -1.85x10-05*** -1.50x10-05*** -1.71x10-05*** 
 (6.31x10-06) (9.63x10-06)  (1.66x10-06) (1.85x10-06) (2.48x10-06) 
Median house price (£)  9.94x10-08***   5.05x10-08***  
  (3.49x10-08)   (1.71x10-08)  
Free school meals (proportion)  -0.301***   -0.227***  
  (0.0391)   (0.0202)  
Weekly Household Income (£)  3.59x10-05   1.34x10-05  
  (2.68x10-05)   (1.33x10-05)  
       
Constant 0.716*** 0.737***  0.643*** 0.671***  
 (0.0105) (0.0225)  (0.00309) (0.00995)  
       
R-squared 0.247 0.252    0.021 
Observations 58,404 38,481  282,997 194,214 184,673 
Number of accounts 58,404 38,481  159,100 108,050 60,776                   
Month FEs YES YES  YES YES YES 
  Note. Table B.5.4 replicates Table B.5.3 specifications but months with multiple
consumption categories or merchant codes are added to the sample. Models 1 and 2
evaluate the probability of full repayment of the first purchase made by new accounts.
Models 3 to 5 include all accounts in the analysis. All models are linear probability
models in which the outcome takes the value of one when the repayment-purchase
ratio is greater than .9 and otherwise takes a value of zero. Reference category:
Proportion of the total month spending on non-durable goods. Standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6.1 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance, Cardholders Holding Multiple




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES New Accounts - SP New Accounts - MP All Accounts - SP All Accounts - MP 
     
Non-durable (proportion)  0.149***  0.0448*** 
  (0.0124)  (0.00390) 
Non-durable = 1 0.0836***  0.0293***  
 (0.0163)  (0.00465)  
Merchant APR (%) 0.00589*** 0.00799*** 0.00940*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.00117) (0.000830) (0.000446) (0.000318) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00318 0.00780*** -0.00140 -0.000173 
 (0.00333) (0.00229) (0.000961) (0.000841) 
Utilization (%) -0.000947 -0.00143*** -0.00437*** -0.00373*** 
 (0.000627) (0.000400) (0.000280) (0.000194) 
Account age (years) 0.0354 0.0644** 0.00467*** 0.00620*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0288) (0.000390) (0.000345) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.962*** -0.667*** -0.263*** -0.179*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0352) (0.0171) (0.0118) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.442*** 0.304*** 0.104*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0230) (0.00890) (0.00658) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0820*** -0.0578*** -0.0145*** -0.00957*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00583) (0.00174) (0.00138) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00648*** 0.00469*** 0.000824*** 0.000551*** 
 (0.000805) (0.000577) (0.000131) (0.000110) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000181*** -0.000134*** -1.64x10-05*** -1.10x10-05*** 
 (2.57x10-05) (1.90x10-05) (3.31x10-06) (2.87x10-06) 
Median house price (£) -7.29x10-08 3.16x10-08 1.18x10-07*** 8.44x10-08** 
 (1.28x10-07) (8.33x10-08) (4.51x10-08) (3.70x10-08) 
Free school meals (proportion) -0.0798 -0.373*** -0.101* -0.246*** 
 (0.143) (0.0909) (0.0555) (0.0456) 
Weekly Household Income (£) 9.47x10-05 7.36x10-05 -4.94x10-06 1.30x10-05 
 (9.75x10-05) (6.16x10-05) (3.50x10-05) (2.89x10-05) 
Constant 0.671*** 0.524*** 0.689*** 0.598*** 
 (0.0829) (0.0517) (0.0271) (0.0221) 
     
Observations 2,613 7,644 20,255 38,390 
R-squared 0.358 0.235   
Month FEs YES YES YES YES 
Number of accounts   13,941 23,851 
  Note. The samples used on each column are subsets of each of the main samples used in Tables 3.4,
3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, Column 3. These subsets correspond to the account x months in which a cardholder
hold multiple cards with positive balance and has postcode socioeconomic data. SP: Single Purchase
Months; MP: Multiple Purchase Months. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6.2 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance, Single-Purchase-Type Sample for




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
        
Non-durable = 1 0.0834*** 0.0837*** 0.0842*** 0.0831*** 0.0830*** 0.0833*** 0.0835*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00583*** 0.00586*** 0.00596*** 0.00583*** 0.00583*** 0.00587*** 0.00585*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00326 0.00322 0.00348 0.00411 0.00427 0.00335 0.00329 
 (0.00333) (0.00333) (0.00332) (0.00334) (0.00334) (0.00333) (0.00333) 
Utilization (%) -0.000949 -0.000917 -0.000855 -0.00106* -0.00101 -0.000917 -0.000924 
 (0.000627) (0.000627) (0.000626) (0.000628) (0.000627) (0.000627) (0.000627) 
Account age (years) 0.0359 0.0387 0.0375 0.0381 0.0390 0.0375 0.0383 
 (0.0384) (0.0385) (0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.962*** -0.961*** -1.043*** -0.998*** -1.005*** -0.988*** -0.991*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0595) (0.0570) (0.0574) (0.0577) (0.0579) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.476*** 0.457*** 0.460*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0360) (0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0355) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0820*** -0.0819*** -0.0882*** -0.0848*** -0.0854*** -0.0839*** -0.0841*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00843) (0.00858) (0.00849) (0.00850) (0.00851) (0.00851) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00648*** 0.00647*** 0.00697*** 0.00671*** 0.00675*** 0.00663*** 0.00664*** 
 (0.000805) (0.000805) (0.000814) (0.000808) (0.000809) (0.000810) (0.000810) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000181*** -0.000181*** -0.000195*** -0.000187*** -0.000189*** -0.000185*** -0.000185*** 
 (2.57x10-05) (2.57x10-05) (2.59x10-05) (2.58x10-05) (2.58x10-05) (2.58x10-05) (2.58x10-05) 
Median house price (£) -7.20x10-08 -7.22x10-08 -7.01x10-08 -6.39x10-08 -6.63x10-08 -6.72x10-08 -6.91x10-08 
 (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) (1.28x10-07) 
Free school meals (proportion) -0.0761 -0.0773 -0.0675 -0.0629 -0.0655 -0.0747 -0.0752 
 (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Weekly Household Income (£) 9.54x10-05 9.79x10-05 0.000106 9.76x10-05 9.76x10-05 9.63x10-05 9.73x10-05 
 (9.75x10-05) (9.75x10-05) (9.74x10-05) (9.74x10-05) (9.74x10-05) (9.75x10-05) (9.75x10-05) 
Number of Cards w/ Positive Balance 0.000302 0.00207* 0.000397 0.000358 0.000172 0.000323 0.000225 
 (0.000494) (0.00120) (0.000494) (0.000494) (0.000495) (0.000494) (0.000496) 
Balance in other cards (£1000)  -0.00265      
  (0.00163)      
Ratio balance of card to total balance on all 
cards 
  0.121***     
   (0.0326)     
Card has the highest utilization = 1    0.0548***    
    (0.0200)    
Card has the lowest utilization = 1     -0.0567***   
     (0.0196)   
Card has the highest balance = 1      0.0331*  
      (0.0201)  
Card has the lowest balance =1       -0.0350* 
       (0.0197) 
Constant 0.669*** 0.667*** 0.633*** 0.651*** 0.708*** 0.661*** 0.696*** 
 (0.0829) (0.0829) (0.0833) (0.0831) (0.0839) (0.0830) (0.0843) 
        
Observations 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 2,613 
R-squared 0.358 0.359 0.361 0.360 0.360 0.359 0.359 
Month FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
Note. The sample is based on the sample used in Table B.6.1, Column 1. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6.3 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance, Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
        
Non-durable (proportion) 0.149*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00786*** 0.00791*** 0.00836*** 0.00793*** 0.00794*** 0.00818*** 0.00816*** 
 (0.000832) (0.000830) (0.000826) (0.000825) (0.000826) (0.000829) (0.000830) 
Credit limit (£1000) 0.00789*** 0.00773*** 0.00836*** 0.00972*** 0.00978*** 0.00830*** 0.00824*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00228) (0.00228) (0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00229) 
Utilization (%) -0.00145*** -0.00142*** -0.00119*** -0.00155*** -0.00145*** -0.00129*** -0.00129*** 
 (0.000400) (0.000399) (0.000398) (0.000397) (0.000398) (0.000399) (0.000399) 
Account age (years) 0.0654** 0.0722** 0.0667** 0.0664** 0.0658** 0.0672** 0.0668** 
 (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0287) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.665*** -0.662*** -0.792*** -0.743*** -0.743*** -0.732*** -0.734*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0367) (0.0356) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0362) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.304*** 0.303*** 0.356*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 0.329*** 0.331*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0232) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0577*** -0.0576*** -0.0676*** -0.0640*** -0.0640*** -0.0622*** -0.0628*** 
 (0.00582) (0.00581) (0.00584) (0.00580) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00584) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.00469*** 0.00468*** 0.00549*** 0.00521*** 0.00521*** 0.00503*** 0.00509*** 
 (0.000577) (0.000576) (0.000577) (0.000574) (0.000575) (0.000576) (0.000577) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -0.000134*** -0.000134*** -0.000157*** -0.000149*** -0.000149*** -0.000144*** -0.000145*** 
 (1.90x10-05) (1.90x10-05) (1.90x10-05) (1.89x10-05) (1.90x10-05) (1.90x10-05) (1.90x10-05) 
Median house price (£) 3.36x10-08 2.93x10-08 2.41x10-08 2.67x10-08 2.14x10-08 2.66x10-08 2.63x10-08 
 (8.33x10-08) (8.31x10-08) (8.26x10-08) (8.26x10-08) (8.27x10-08) (8.29x10-08) (8.30x10-08) 
Free school meals (proportion) -0.365*** -0.369*** -0.365*** -0.348*** -0.350*** -0.359*** -0.358*** 
 (0.0909) (0.0908) (0.0902) (0.0902) (0.0904) (0.0906) (0.0906) 
Weekly Household Income (£) 7.50x10-05 8.11x10-05 9.43x10-05 8.64x10-05 8.96x10-05 8.97x10-05 8.85x10-05 
 (6.16x10-05) (6.15x10-05) (6.11x10-05) (6.11x10-05) (6.12x10-05) (6.13x10-05) (6.14x10-05) 
Number of Cards w/ Positive Balance 0.000758** 0.00466*** 0.000978*** 0.000914*** 0.000534 0.000836** 0.000569* 
 (0.000344) (0.000801) (0.000342) (0.000342) (0.000343) (0.000343) (0.000344) 
Balance in other cards (£1000)  -0.00638***      
  (0.00118)      
Ratio balance of card to total balance on all 
cards 
  0.209***     
   (0.0187)     
Card has the highest utilization = 1    0.124***    
    (0.0111)    
Card has the lowest utilization = 1     -0.110***   
     (0.0110)   
Card has the highest balance = 1      0.0915***  
      (0.0113)  
Card has the lowest balance =1       -0.0855*** 
       (0.0112) 
Constant 0.519*** 0.515*** 0.456*** 0.480*** 0.589*** 0.490*** 0.577*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0515) (0.0519) (0.0517) (0.0521) 
        
Observations 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 7,644 
R-squared 0.235 0.238 0.247 0.248 0.245 0.242 0.241 
Month FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
Note. The sample is based on the sample used in Table B.6.1, Column 2. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6.4 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance, Single-Purchase-Type Sample for




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
        
Non-durable = 1 0.0293*** 0.0286*** 0.0307*** 0.0299*** 0.0298*** 0.0302*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00464) (0.00465) (0.00465) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.00940*** 0.00971*** 0.00964*** 0.00949*** 0.00943*** 0.00951*** 0.00945*** 
 (0.000446) (0.000446) (0.000445) (0.000444) (0.000445) (0.000445) (0.000445) 
Credit limit (£1000) -0.00140 -0.000743 -0.000545 -0.000131 -0.000346 -0.00105 -0.00115 
 (0.000961) (0.000961) (0.000961) (0.000966) (0.000969) (0.000961) (0.000962) 
Utilization (%) -0.00437*** -0.00423*** -0.00426*** -0.00460*** -0.00448*** -0.00432*** -0.00433*** 
 (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000280) (0.000280) 
Account age (years) 0.00467*** 0.00443*** 0.00433*** 0.00445*** 0.00451*** 0.00454*** 0.00458*** 
 (0.000390) (0.000389) (0.000389) (0.000389) (0.000389) (0.000389) (0.000390) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.263*** -0.264*** -0.339*** -0.302*** -0.295*** -0.296*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0178) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.132*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 
 (0.00891) (0.00889) (0.00930) (0.00902) (0.00904) (0.00907) (0.00908) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.0145*** -0.0146*** -0.0186*** -0.0169*** -0.0162*** -0.0161*** -0.0157*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00173) (0.00178) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00175) (0.00176) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.000824*** 0.000832*** 0.00108*** 0.000976*** 0.000933*** 0.000925*** 0.000902*** 
 (0.000131) (0.000131) (0.000133) (0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000132) (0.000132) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -1.64x10-05*** -1.66x10-05*** -2.19x10-05*** -1.97x10-05*** -1.87x10-05*** -1.85x10-05*** -1.80x10-05*** 
 (3.31x10-06) (3.30x10-06) (3.34x10-06) (3.32x10-06) (3.32x10-06) (3.32x10-06) (3.32x10-06) 
Median house price (£) 1.18x10-07*** 1.16x10-07*** 1.13x10-07** 1.16x10-07*** 1.16x10-07*** 1.15x10-07** 1.16x10-07*** 
 (4.51x10-08) (4.50x10-08) (4.49x10-08) (4.50x10-08) (4.50x10-08) (4.51x10-08) (4.51x10-08) 
Free school meals (proportion) -0.101* -0.100* -0.0965* -0.0941* -0.0966* -0.100* -0.101* 
 (0.0555) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0554) (0.0554) 
Weekly Household Income (£) -4.90x10-06 2.20x10-06 2.66x10-06 -1.70x10-06 -2.88x10-06 -1.62x10-06 -3.13x10-06 
 (3.50x10-05) (3.49x10-05) (3.49x10-05) (3.49x10-05) (3.49x10-05) (3.50x10-05) (3.50x10-05) 
Number of Cards w/ Positive Balance 8.71x10-05 0.00511*** 0.000256 0.000191 -5.14x10-05 0.000140 -7.30x10-06 
 (0.000434) (0.000700) (0.000432) (0.000433) (0.000433) (0.000433) (0.000434) 
Balance in other cards (£1000)  -0.00733***      
  (0.000803)      
Ratio balance of card to total balance on all cards   0.106***     
   (0.0104)     
Card has the highest utilization = 1    0.0589***    
    (0.00595)    
Card has the lowest utilization = 1     -0.0416***   
     (0.00556)   
Card has the highest balance = 1      0.0409***  
      (0.00613)  
Card has the lowest balance =1       -0.0276*** 
       (0.00565) 
Constant 0.689*** 0.678*** 0.662*** 0.674*** 0.719*** 0.681*** 0.712*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0271) (0.0274) (0.0272) (0.0275) 
        
Observations 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255 20,255 
Number of accounts 13,941 13,941 13,941 13,941 13,941 13,941 13,941 
Month FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
  
Note. The sample is based on the sample used in Table B.6.1, Column 3. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table B.6.5 Estimated Likelihood of Repaying Full Balance, Multiple-Purchase-Type Sample




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES RE RE RE RE RE RE RE 
        
Non-durable (proportion) 0.0448*** 0.0444*** 0.0464*** 0.0456*** 0.0453*** 0.0459*** 0.0455*** 
 (0.00390) (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00389) (0.00389) 
Merchant APR (%) 0.0119*** 0.0122*** 0.0123*** 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 0.0121*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.000319) (0.000318) (0.000317) (0.000317) (0.000317) (0.000318) (0.000318) 
Credit limit (£1000) -0.000160 0.000636 0.000995 0.00160* 0.00139* 0.000391 0.000269 
 (0.000841) (0.000839) (0.000836) (0.000840) (0.000843) (0.000838) (0.000839) 
Utilization (%) -0.00374*** -0.00360*** -0.00358*** -0.00394*** -0.00383*** -0.00366*** -0.00367*** 
 (0.000194) (0.000194) (0.000193) (0.000194) (0.000194) (0.000194) (0.000194) 
Account age (years) 0.00621*** 0.00591*** 0.00568*** 0.00585*** 0.00594*** 0.00596*** 0.00603*** 
 (0.000345) (0.000344) (0.000343) (0.000343) (0.000344) (0.000344) (0.000344) 
Amount purchase (£1000) -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.280*** -0.236*** -0.228*** -0.229*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0123) 
Amount purchase (£1000)2 0.0683*** 0.0683*** 0.107*** 0.0909*** 0.0876*** 0.0862*** 0.0836*** 
 (0.00658) (0.00656) (0.00683) (0.00666) (0.00668) (0.00668) (0.00671) 
Amount purchase (£1000)3 -0.00957*** -0.00957*** -0.0156*** -0.0132*** -0.0126*** -0.0123*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00140) (0.00138) (0.00139) (0.00138) (0.00139) 
Amount purchase (£1000)4  0.000551*** 0.000556*** 0.000937*** 0.000790*** 0.000747*** 0.000721*** 0.000704*** 
 (0.000110) (0.000109) (0.000111) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) (0.000110) 
Amount purchase (£1000)5 -1.10x10-05*** -1.12x10-05*** -1.96x10-05*** -1.65x10-05*** -1.54x10-05*** -1.48x10-05*** -1.45x10-05*** 
 (2.87x10-06) (2.86x10-06) (2.89x10-06) (2.87x10-06) (2.87x10-06) (2.87x10-06) (2.88x10-06) 
Median house price (£) 8.47x10-08** 8.34x10-08** 7.59x10-08** 7.91x10-08** 7.80x10-08** 7.87x10-08** 8.06x10-08** 
 (3.70x10-08) (3.68x10-08) (3.66x10-08) (3.66x10-08) (3.67x10-08) (3.68x10-08) (3.68x10-08) 
Free school meals (proportion) -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.242*** -0.235*** -0.238*** -0.243*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0454) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0454) (0.0454) (0.0455) 
Weekly Household Income (£) 1.34x10-05 2.05x10-05 2.49x10-05 1.88x10-05 1.83x10-05 2.04x10-05 1.77x10-05 
 (2.89x10-05) (2.87x10-05) (2.86x10-05) (2.86x10-05) (2.87x10-05) (2.87x10-05) (2.88x10-05) 
Number of Cards w/ Positive Balance 0.000510* 0.00651*** 0.000760** 0.000668** 0.000347 0.000603** 0.000375 
 (0.000300) (0.000501) (0.000298) (0.000298) (0.000299) (0.000299) (0.000300) 
Balance in other cards (£1000)  -0.00934***      
  (0.000626)      
Ratio balance of card to total balance on all 
cards 
  0.147***     
   (0.00746)     
Card has the highest utilization = 1    0.0795***    
    (0.00417)    
Card has the lowest utilization = 1     -0.0600***   
     (0.00398)   
Card has the highest balance = 1      0.0617***  
      (0.00425)  
Card has the lowest balance =1       -0.0450*** 
       (0.00401) 
Constant 0.596*** 0.586*** 0.558*** 0.577*** 0.639*** 0.583*** 0.632*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0223) 
        
Observations 38,390 38,390 38,390 38,390 38,390 38,390 38,390 
Number of accounts 23,851 23,851 23,851 23,851 23,851 23,851 23,851 
Month FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  Note. The sample is based on the sample used in Table B.6.1, Column 4. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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The classification of categories of expenditure as durable and non-durable
in our main analysis follows the classification used in Kuchler (2013). One
referee asked us to conduct a survey of consumers to generate an independent
classification of expenditure types. We conducted a preregistered survey to
estimate the durability of items from each merchant category, see https://
aspredicted.org/f9iu4.pdf. The Argus data contains 27 main categories in
total. We exclude 2 from our main analysis: cash and utilities. Many of the
remaining 25 categories are very broad and might contain both durable and
non-durable goods. Therefore, we obtained the next-level-down disaggregation
of individual items and designed the survey based on these. Respondents were
asked to rate the durability of each among 152 individual items on a 1-7 scale.
We excluded from the survey items whose consumption is rare (with a weight
of less than 1 in 1,000 in the 2014 UK Consumer Price Inflation indices (CPI)).
The exact wording of the questions was as follows:
The survey sample was drawn from Prolific Academic, and restricted to UK
Nationals living in the UK. The survey, which was conducted online, can be
viewed here: http://www.stewart.warwick.ac.uk/expt/durability_1/ We collected
responses from 501 participants. The survey received ethical approval from
the University of Warwick Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics
Committee, approval number 102/17-18. For each item, we constructed the
mean durability score over participants. We then took the weighted average
of durability scores within each category (using CPI weights). CPI weights
reflect the levels of spending on different goods and services in the UK National
Accounts and are used for the calculation of inflation statistics. Based on this
approach we obtained a weighted mean durability score for each of the 25
spending categories. We have median split the 25 categories into low and high
durability and repeat our main analysis using 25 reclassified categories. We
have also use category non-durability scores (normalized between 0 and 1) in
place of the 0/1 dummy for low/high non-durability and repeat the analysis
(See Tables B.7.7 and B.7.8).
The detailed procedure to construct average weighted scores is defined as
follows:
1. Data cleaning. As recorded in advance in our preregistration, we flagged:
(1) participants who rate an airline ticket as more durable than a car,
(2) the 5% fastest and 5% slowest participants, (3) participants with
duplicated IP, (4) participants whose autocorrelation over successive
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responses are in the top 2.5% of bottom 2.5% of the distribution, (5)
participants whose responses scale entropy is in the lowest 5%, and
(6) the 5% of participants with the lowest correlation between their
ratings and the average of everyone else’s ratings. Participants identified
through this (non-sequential) procedure were dropped from the sample
(112 participants from the 501 sample).
2. For each item, we computed the item mean score over participants.
3. We computed the relative weights for item within each merchant code.
We have weights for each CPI subcategory, however, a subcategory
can be matched to many items, e.g., the items ‘An Item of Men’s or
Boy’s Clothing’, ‘An Item of Women’s Clothing’, ‘An Item of Children’s
Clothing’, are related to the CPI subcategory ‘03.1 Clothing’. Or the
items ‘A Visit to the Osteopath’, ‘A Visit to the Chiropractor’, ‘A Visit
to the Opticians’, are related to the CPI subcategory ‘06.2.1/3 Medical
services and paramedical services’. So, to prevent double counting or
multiple counting weights, for each merchant code, we adjusted the item’s
weight to account for the number of items within CPI subcategories.
4. Then, for each merchant code, we computed a merchant code average
durability, weighting the items durability (from step 2) with the relative
weights (from step 3) and adding these weighted scores to get the merchant
code score. The results from this procedure are displayed in Figure B.7.2A.
The figure also shows merchant code scores that are just average of items
scores (from step 2) and do not use any weight.
Tables B.7.1–B.7.6 use the durability classification of the merchant codes
after median split the merchant codes from Figure B.7.2A into low and high
durability. Tables B.7.7 and B.7.8 use the category non-durability scores
(normalized between 0 and 1) in place of the 0/1 dummy for low/high non-
durability and repeat the analysis. These scores are displayed in Figure B.7.2C).
While our data analysis procedure described is consistent with the preregis-
tration of the study, to have an estimate of the uncertainty in the average scores
obtained above, we also repeated the analysis but this time calculating scores
within subjects. Thus, we omitted step 2 because each participant provided
only one score for each item and we repeated steps 2 to 4 within participant.
Figure B.7.2B shows the average merchant code scores along with 95% CI.
The general average scores are close to the scores obtained in panel A with
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very small differences, differing only because some participant did not provide
scores to some items. In all cases, our consumers’ judgments of the durability
of each category are very close to the Kuchler (2013) classification we used in
our original analysis. This means that our estimates of the coefficient for the
non-durability dummy / proportion are very close to those presented for the
original Kuchler classification in the main text (in the main text, our results
showed a coefficient for the non-durable dummy of 0.095 (Table 3.4, Column 3);
while the results after the reclassification of merchant codes show a coefficient
of 0.075 (Table B.7.1, Column 3))  
 
 
  Fig. B.7.1 Question format used in the consumer survey for the classification of items in
durables and non-durables.
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Fig. B.7.2 Durability scores for each merchant code. The red line highlights the median
score. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































You Only Watch When You’re
Winning: Selective Attention
Among Individual Investors
C.1 Selective Attention I: Stock Prices and Lo-
gin Behaviour
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1 2 3 4 5 
Days following the purchase of an stock
Price in t increased Price in t unchanged Price in t decreased
Fig. C.1.1 Probability of logging in by price change of most recent purchased stock, daily
price changes.The panels shows the raw likelihood of logging in during the 5 business days
following the purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays, according to changes in the
daily return of that stock. The probability is displayed for the cases in which the trader (A)
has only one stock in his portfolio and increases his position in that stock (2,119 weeks from
1,023 accounts), (B) has a portfolio of stocks and buys a new stock (12,566 weeks from 5,313
accounts), and (C) has one or more stocks in his portfolio and increases his position in one
of these stocks (13,600 weeks from 4,339 accounts). The latter case of accounts x weeks (C)
includes the first group of accounts x weeks (A). In all weeks, no other transaction has taken
place. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
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Days following the purchase of an stock
Price in t increased Price in t unchanged Price in t decreased
Fig. C.1.2 Probability of logging in by price change of most recent purchased stock, price
changes since purchase. The panels shows the raw likelihood of logging in during the 5
business days following the purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays, according to
changes in the return of the stock since the purchase day. The probability is displayed for
the cases in which the trader (A) has only one stock in his portfolio and increases his
position in that stock (2,119 weeks from 1,023 accounts), (B) has a portfolio of stocks and
buys a new stock (12,566 weeks from 5,313 accounts), and (C) has one or more stocks in his
portfolio and increases his position in one of these stocks (13,600 weeks from 4,339 accounts).
The latter case of accounts x weeks (C) includes the first group of accounts x weeks (A). In
all weeks, no other transaction has taken place. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
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Fig. C.1.3 Probability of logging in by price changes of most recent purchased stock, price
changes since purchase, one month window. The panels shows the raw likelihood of logging
in during the 20 business days following the purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays,
according to changes in the daily return of that stock. The probability is displayed for the
cases in which the trader (A) has only one stock in his portfolio and increases his position in
that stock (1,407 months from 828 accounts), (B) has a portfolio of stocks and buys a new
stock (7,300 months from 4,200 accounts), and (C) has one or more stocks in his portfolio
and increases his position in one of these stocks (7,668 months from 3,570 accounts). The
latter case of accounts x months (C) includes the first group of accounts x months (A). In all
months, no other transaction has taken place. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
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Days following the purchase of an stock
Price in t increased Price in t unchanged Price in t decreased
Fig. C.1.4 Probability of logging in by return of most recent purchased stock, return day t
vs. day 0, across one month. The panels shows the raw likelihood of logging in during the 20
business days following the purchase of an stock, excluding bank holidays, according to
changes in the return of the stock since the purchase day. The probability is displayed for
the cases in which the trader (A) has only one stock in his portfolio and increases his
position in that stock (1,407 months from 828 accounts), (B) has a portfolio of stocks and
buys a new stock (7,300 months from 4,200 accounts), and (C) has one or more stocks in his
portfolio and increases his position in one of these stocks (7,668 months from 3,570 accounts).
The latter case of accounts x months (C) includes the first group of accounts x months (A).
In all months, no other transaction has taken place. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.
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Table C.1.1 Logins and Daily Returns, by Stock Seniority, OLS Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock + (Daily) 0.008*** 0.002 0.005* 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Purchased Stock - (Daily) 0.002 0.008*** 0.003 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Second Stock + (Daily) 0.004 0.006** 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Second Stock - (Daily) 0.002 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
% Change, Remaining Stocks + (Daily) 0.007* 0.005 0.003 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
% Change, Remaining Stocks - (Daily) 0.014*** 0.008* 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female=1 -0.010 -0.018 -0.001 -0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.048 -0.051 -0.069 -0.087**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
38 - 47 years old 0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.008
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
48 - 57 years old -0.006 -0.012 -0.018 -0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
58 - 67 years old 0.025 0.021 0.013 0.009
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
68 or more years old 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.108*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 0.198*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.198***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Quartile 4 0.341*** 0.347*** 0.340*** 0.336***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.007 0.009 0.007 0.011
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Quartile 3 0.014 0.024 0.027 0.028
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Quartile 4 0.017 0.038 0.034 0.032
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.151*** -0.162*** -0.146*** -0.126**
(0.049) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052)
Quartile 3 -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.117* -0.086
(0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.051)
Quartile 4 -0.155*** -0.150*** -0.137** -0.103*
(0.049) (0.048) (0.055) (0.052)
Constant 0.437*** 0.418*** 0.400*** 0.371***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.097) (0.094)
Observations 44090 44090 44090 44085
Number of Accounts 3648 3648 3648 3648
Adjusted R-squared 0.0599 0.0669 0.0643 0.0687
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. The table replicates Table 4.8 but distinguishing the effect of changes
in prices of the most recent stock and the second recent stock. The data is
therefore restricted to months in which the cardholders has a portfolio of at
least three stocks after the purchase day. Change in value of the purchased
stock is computed daily with respect of the value in the preceding business day.
Change in value followed by a positive sign records the changes from 0; while
change in value followed by a negative sign, up to 0 (excluding 0). The other
regressors, monthly frequency of trades, portfolio value and number of stocks,
reflect account average measures. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: Significance levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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Table C.1.2 Logins and Returns Since Purchase, by Stock Seniority, OLS Model
Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Change, Purchased Stock + (Since Purchase) 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Purchased Stock - (Since Purchase) 0.004* 0.003* 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Second Stock + (Since Purchase) -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Second Stock - (Since Purchase) 0.003 0.002 0.002* 0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Change, Remaining Stocks + (Since Purchase) 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
% Change, Remaining Stocks - (Since Purchase) 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female=1 -0.011 -0.017 -0.001 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Investor Age
28 - 37 years old -0.047 -0.052 -0.069 -0.089**
(0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
38 - 47 years old 0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.009
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
48 - 57 years old -0.005 -0.012 -0.017 -0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
58 - 67 years old 0.026 0.021 0.015 0.009
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
68 or more years old 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.059
(0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038)
Number of Trade Days per Month
Quartile 2 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.091***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Quartile 3 0.200*** 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.199***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Quartile 4 0.344*** 0.348*** 0.343*** 0.338***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Portfolio Value
Quartile 2 -0.008 0.008 0.004 0.008
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Quartile 3 0.011 0.023 0.024 0.024
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Quartile 4 0.012 0.033 0.027 0.025
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Number of Stocks
Quartile 2 -0.155*** -0.170*** -0.155*** -0.135***
(0.049) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052)
Quartile 3 -0.135*** -0.142*** -0.127** -0.095
(0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.051)
Quartile 4 -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.147*** -0.112*
(0.049) (0.047) (0.054) (0.052)
Constant 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.426*** 0.391***
(0.106) (0.111) (0.099) (0.096)
Observations 44090 44090 44090 44085
Number of Accounts 3648 3648 3648 3648
Adjusted R-squared 0.0605 0.0675 0.0662 0.0714
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note. The table replicates Table 4.9 but distinguishing the effect of changes in prices
of the most recent stock and the second recent stock. The data is therefore restricted
to months in which the cardholders has a portfolio of at least three stocks after the
purchase day. Change in value of the purchased stock is computed daily with respect of
the value at the end of the purchase day. Change in value of the rest of the portfolio are
measured with respect of the value during that day too. Change in value followed by a
positive sign records the changes from 0; while change in value followed by a negative
sign, up to 0 (excluding 0). The other regressors, monthly frequency of trades, portfo-
lio value and number of stocks, reflect account average measures. Standard errors in
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,** p<0.02, * p<0.05.
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C.2 Selective Attention II: Evidence from Weather
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Fig. C.2.1 Probability of logging in by gender and daytime visibility. lines span 95%
confidence intervals.
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Fig. C.2.2 Probability of logging in by investor age and daytime visibility. lines span 95%
confidence intervals.
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Fig. C.2.3 Probability of logging in by investor experience and daytime visibility. Lines span
95% confidence intervals.
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Fig. C.2.4 Probability of logging in by investor portfolio value and daytime visibility. The
plot shows the variation in login rates conditional on the portfolio value at the beginning of
the month. Lines span 95% confidence intervals.












































































































Fig. C.2.5 Probability of logging in by season and daytime visibility. Lines span 95%
confidence intervals.
